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On 29 October 2015, the European Union (EU) and New Zealand announced their intention to 
commence the process for negotiations to achieve a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 
Closer trade relations would undoubtedly provide immense economic benefits to New Zealand. 
It would, however, come at a cost in certain areas. One area where concerns have been raised 
relates to intellectual property (IP) and the increasing trend of including higher levels or 
‘TRIPS-plus’ protections in FTAs. This is particularly so in relation to pharmaceuticals and 
geographical indications, as stronger IP protection in those areas would come at a significant 
cost to New Zealand. Given the confidential nature of trade negotiations, the extent to which 
TRIPS-plus protections may be included within an EU-NZ FTA and the implications for New 
Zealand law remain unknown. This thesis seeks to address this issue. 
First, a comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections relating to 
pharmaceuticals and geographical indications within recent FTAs concluded by each Party 
shall be conducted to identify those protections which may be included within an EU-NZ FTA. 
A further analysis shall be conducted to determine the domestic positions of the EU and New 
Zealand in order to shed light on the context of those FTAs and to identify any common 
interests or positions regarding IP protection. By succinctly identifying those TRIPS-plus 
protections which could be included within an EU-NZ FTA, a further discussion on the 
implications for New Zealand will then ensue. This discussion will seek to address such issues 
as whether New Zealand should implement TRIPS-plus protections and, if so, to what extent.
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A General Background 
On 29 October 2015, the European Union (EU) and New Zealand announced their intention to 
commence the process for negotiations to achieve a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA).1 
Recognising the EU as New Zealand’s third-largest trading partner,2 closer trade relations 
would open opportunities to enhance economic growth and investment while strengthening the 
longstanding relationship between the two parties. While an FTA would undoubtedly provide 
immense economic benefits to New Zealand, it would, however, come at a cost in certain areas. 
One area where concerns have been raised relates to intellectual property rights (IPRs). New 
Zealand provides the minimum intellectual property (IP) standards, consistent with its 
international obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).3 The EU, however, is a proponent of enhanced IP or so-
called ‘TRIPS-plus’ protection, imposing stronger protection within both its domestic laws and 
its trade agreements with third parties. In order to gain concessions in sensitive areas such as 
agriculture, New Zealand will likely be required to implement some form of TRIPS-plus 
protection.  
Of particular interest to this research paper are TRIPS-plus protections relating to 
pharmaceuticals and geographical indications (GIs). As a country heavily reliant on imported 
and subsidised pharmaceutical products, the implementation of stronger IP protection may 
have the effect of increasing legal barriers to a consumers’ ability to access affordable 
medicines, thereby benefiting pharmaceutical companies at the expense of the New Zealand 
citizen. Whereas the registration of terms under a geographical indication (GI) may prevent a 
New Zealand producer from using that term in the labelling and marketing of their product, 
resulting in the forced adaptation of well-established business practices which have been 
                                                 
1 European Commission “Statement of the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission 
and the New Zealand Prime Minister” (press release, 29 October 2015). 
2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Key facts on EU-NZ Trade” <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-
trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/eu-fta/key-facts-on-nz-eu-trade/>. 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994), 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999), 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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permissible for many years. This may similarly increase legal barriers to a consumers' ability 
to access similar products as it reduces competition for a product labelled under what may have 
been a well-known term. 
Presently, it remains uncertain what level and scope of protection for pharmaceuticals and GIs 
may be included within an EU-NZ FTA. Given the position of the EU, it may be inferred that 
the inclusion of TRIPS-plus protections will be resolutely proposed and advocated for. 
However, the inclusion of those protections and the extent to which they may be included will 
be an issue for New Zealand to determine, depending upon the level of market access granted 
by the EU in areas pertinent to New Zealand’s interests. As such, the implications resulting 
from any implementation of stronger protection also remain unknown.  
B Purpose of Research and Methodology 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify those TRIPS-plus protections relating to 
pharmaceuticals and GIs that may be included within an EU-NZ FTA and the implications 
arising from any implementation of those protections in New Zealand domestic law.  
In order to achieve that purpose, this thesis shall conduct a qualitative analysis, combining 
doctrinal legal analysis and archival research. The researcher proposes that a comparative 
interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections in recent FTAs negotiated by both parties 
would identify those protections deemed as acceptable to the parties to be included within an 
FTA. To this end, the researcher shall conduct a legal comparison between the recently 
negotiated Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP),4 to which New Zealand is a party, and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA),5 to which the EU is a party. This analysis shall be conducted in accordance 
with art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).6 It is also proposed that 
an analysis of the parties’ domestic IP laws and negotiating documents in concluding those 
agreements will shed light on the context of those FTAs, thereby identifying any common 
interests or positions regarding IP protection.  
                                                 
4 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Australia-Brunei Darussalam-
Canada-Chile-Japan-Malaysia-Mexico-New Zealand-Peru-Singapore-Viet Nam (signed 08 March 2018, entered 
into force 30 December 2018) [hereinafter CPTPP]. 
5 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, European Union-Canada (opened for signature 26 September 
2014, provisionally entered into force 21 September 2017) [hereinafter CETA]. 
6 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (signed 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
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It is further proposed that by succinctly identifying those TRIPS-plus protections which could 
be included within an EU-NZ FTA, a further discussion on the implications for New Zealand 
will then ensue. This discussion will seek to address such issues as whether New Zealand 
should implement TRIPS-plus protections and, if so, to what extent. 
It is important to note that the CPTPP was preceded by the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP Agreement),7 which has not entered into force. Except where otherwise 
provided, that agreement has been incorporated in full within the CPTPP.8 Of significance to 
this thesis is that specific TRIPS-plus protections were included within that agreement but have 
subsequently been suspended under art 2 of the CPTPP. While those provisions are not legally 
enforceable in New Zealand, they serve as indications of TRIPS-plus protections that New 
Zealand may consider implementing in an FTA and shall therefore be included within this 
thesis. Any reference to the TPP Agreement without simultaneous reference to the CPTPP 
should be interpreted as referring to the unenforceable agreement and should be considered 
non-binding on the parties. 
C Structure of the Thesis 
This research paper comprises six chapters. 
The second chapter considers the evolution and protection of IPRs in the international sphere, 
with particular reference to pharmaceuticals and GIs. Chapters three and four conduct a 
comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections relating to pharmaceuticals 
(chapter three) and GIs (chapter four) within CETA and the CPTPP and within the domestic 
laws of the parties, identifying those protections which would likely be included within an EU-
NZ FTA. Chapter five discusses the implications arising from the implementation of those 
protections within an EU-NZ FTA, addressing the issues whether New Zealand should 
implement TRIPS-plus protections and, if so, to what extent. The final chapter concludes the 
thesis and reflects upon its limitations, as well as providing suggestions for future research.
                                                 
7 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Australia-Brunei Darussalam-Canada-Chile-Japan-Malaysia-Mexico-
New Zealand-Peru-Singapore-United States-Viet Nam (signed 04 February 2016, not in force) [hereinafter TPP 
Agreement]. 
8 CPTPP, above n 4, art 1.1. 
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II Global Regulation of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
A The Evolution of Intellectual Property Rights in the International Sphere 
The protection of IPRs is by no means a modern concept. Exclusive control over the ‘fruits of 
ones labour’ can be traced in theoretical origin to the works of 17th century philosopher John 
Locke, who contended that a property right is a natural right.9 According to Locke, the exertion 
of labour to existing resources adds value to that resource, bringing it within the realm of 
property, the reward for which is ownership.10 Although conceptualised in the context of 
physical property, Locke’s theory has been applied to IP as “[i]ntellectual property is no less 
the fruit of one’s labor than is physical property.”11 While heavily criticised for failing to 
provide an adequate account of property rights,12 Locke’s basic notion of ownership and 
control over one’s work continues to hold fast in the global IP system. 
Historically, legal recognition of IPRs granted a period of exclusive rights only to national right 
holders. However, the subsequent recognition that IPRs should be protected across national 
borders led to the conclusion of numerous international agreements throughout the 19th and 
20th centuries.13 Introducing the concept of national treatment, where a country’s domestic IP 
laws are applied to both national and foreign right holders without discrimination, these 
agreements sought to impose minimum standards and harmonise protection across signatory 
states.14 Despite some success, the later of these international agreements proved relatively 
ineffective in standardising and harmonising IP law, leading some states to strengthen the 
                                                 
9 John Locke Two Treatises on Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988 [1690]) in 
Christopher May The Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The new enclosures (2nd ed, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2010) at 27. 
10 At 27. 
11 Frank H Easterbrook “Intellectual Property is still Property” (1990) 13 Harv JL & Pub Pol'y 108 at 113. 
12 See, for example, Richard A Spinello and Herman T Tavani (eds) Intellectual Property Rights in a Networked 
World: Theory and Practice (Hershey PA, Information Science Publishing, 2005) at 188-190. 
13 See, for example, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (adopted 20 March 1883, as 
last revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967) 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305, the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (adopted 9 September 1886, as revised at Paris on 24 July 1971 and 
amended in 1979) S Treaty Doc No 99-27 (1986), the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks (1891) 23 UST 1353, 828 UNTS 389, the Rome Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (signed 26 October 1961, entered into 
force 18 May 1964) 496 UNTS 43  and the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (signed 2 December 1961, as revised at Geneva on 19 March 1991) S Treaty Doc No 104-17. 
14 Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Arwel Davies World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (2nd ed, 
Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) at 740. 
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relationship between IPRs and trade.15 The result of their efforts was a binding international 
agreement which imposed substantive rights and obligations on signatories, coupled with an 
enforceable dispute resolution mechanism. Accordingly, the acceptance and consolidation of 
IPRs as rights to be solemnly protected at the international level can be accredited to the TRIPS 
Agreement, which forms an integral part of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO).16 
1 Multilateral inclusion: the TRIPS Agreement 
The premise of the TRIPS Agreement is that insufficient protection of IP will lead to trade 
distortions caused by piracy and counterfeiting.17 In order for legitimate trade to develop, 
owners of IP need adequate protection at the international level. However, the TRIPS 
Agreement also recognises that excessive IP protection may itself become a barrier to 
legitimate trade.18 As such, the TRIPS Agreement seeks to provide a balance by setting down 
enforceable minimum standards of IP protection that all WTO Members must adhere to, thus 
setting the floor but not the ceiling.  
The TRIPS Agreement builds upon the existing international framework for IP protection by 
incorporating aspects and principles of previous agreements. This includes the principle of 
national treatment, which is encapsulated within art 3.1. It also includes the most-favoured 
nation (MFN) principle; a fundamental principle underpinning the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),19 the purpose of which is to ensure uniformity by requiring that any 
privilege or advantage granted to nationals of one WTO Member be accorded to nationals of 
all WTO Members.20 The most significant impact of this principle has been in the context of 
FTAs as, unlike the GATT, the TRIPS Agreement does not contain any specific exception to 
MFN treatment in that context.21 This means that the adoption of any additional or stronger IP 
                                                 
15At 740. 
16 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (15 April 1994) 1867 U.N.T.S 154 
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], art II:2.  
17 Daniel Gervais The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2008) at 155. 
18 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, preamble. 
19 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S 190, 33 
I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter, GATT). 
20 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 4.4. 
21 See GATT, above n 19, art XXIV. Note that the TRIPS Agreement does not contain a similar provision. 
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protections under an FTA is not only applicable between the parties to that agreement, but must 
be granted to all WTO Members alike. 
Despite its significant achievement as the first effectively enforceable international IP 
agreement, the TRIPS Agreement represents a compromise between IP producing (typically 
developed) and IP consuming (typically developing) countries, therefore many of its general 
provisions are drafted in a manner designed to balance competing interests. Article 6 affirms 
the right of each WTO Member to determine for itself the issue of exhaustion of IPRs, which 
has implications for the parallel importation of IP protected products. In addition, arts 7 and 8 
set out the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement, which enable Members to take 
advantage of flexibilities built into that agreement. This permits Members to act in a manner 
conducive to their own socioeconomic needs, whilst ensuring a balance between the greater 
public good and the rights of IP owners.  
Of significance to this thesis is that art 1.1 leaves it to individual Members to enact more 
extensive protection at their own discretion, provided that such protection does not contravene 
the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. This is in recognition of the diverse levels of IP 
protection between individual Members, some of which already imposed higher levels of 
protection than that negotiated under the TRIPS Agreement. It has been said that this provision 
indirectly emphasises that the TRIPS Agreement did not achieve the level of protection that 
some Members desired,22 but rather the highest level of protection that could be negotiated at 
the time.23 For this reason, the provision leaves open the possibility for more extensive 
protection in subsequent trade agreements. 
2 Extending intellectual property rights: TRIPS-plus protections  
Further trade liberalisation at the multilateral level has largely stalled since the failed Doha 
round of negotiations which commenced in 2001. Since then, the international community has 
seen a proliferation of FTAs which seek to liberalise trade on a bilateral, plurilateral or regional 
level. Crucially, more extensive protection of IPRs have been deemed a necessity by highly 
innovative IP producing states, such as the EU and the United States of America (US), in 
granting trade concessions within FTAs. Known as ‘TRIPS-plus’ protection, such protection 
goes beyond the minimum standards set out in the TRIPS Agreement by for example 
                                                 
22 Gervais, above n 17, at 164. 
23 Susy Frankel “The Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs” (2001) 1(1) VUWLRP 
1 at 6. 
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establishing greater subject matter coverage and longer duration of rights, by eliminating or 
limiting flexibilities established within the TRIPS Agreement, or by requiring protection of 
forms of IPRs which were not included within the ambit of the TRIPS Agreement.24 While 
many of these protections are a reflection of the status quo within IP producing states,25 this is 
often not the case for the negotiating partner who is forced to accept higher levels of IPRs that 
may not correspond to their socioeconomic needs in order to gain access to larger and more 
affluent markets.26 Such asymmetrical power relations have led to considerable discussion on 
whether or not TRIPS-plus protections constitute barriers to trade, as what may be beneficial 
for trade for one state is not necessarily beneficial for another. 
Of pertinence to this research paper are TRIPS-plus protections relating to pharmaceuticals, 
both patent-related and regulatory, and GIs. Each shall be examined in turn. 
(a) Pharmaceuticals: patent protection 
Traditionally, pharmaceutical products have been protected by way of a patent, which provides 
the innovator or right holder with a period of exclusivity in which they alone may produce the 
product and reap its financial benefits. Patents allow the innovator to recoup the costs 
associated with researching and developing the product, thereby providing an incentive for 
innovators to invest in developing pharmaceutical products.27 The opposing perspective is that, 
by granting an exclusive right over the product, the innovator holds a monopoly over the price 
and quantity of the product, thereby reducing public access.28 An ‘optimum’ patent term of 20 
years has been established under the TRIPS Agreement as an international standard to balance 
competing interests.29 
Over the past few decades, the cost and time of researching, developing and marketing a 
pharmaceutical product has increased exponentially. Recent data published by the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America estimates that it costs on average USD 
$2.6 billion to develop and market one product – up from USD$179 million in the 1970’s.30 
                                                 
24 At 7-8 and 12. 
25 At 6. 
26 Susan K Sell “TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicines” (2007) 28(1) Liverpool L Rev 
41 at 59. 
27 Meir P Pugatch “The International Regulation of IPRs in a TRIPS and TRIPS-plus World” (2005) 6(3) JWIT 
431 at 433. 
28 At 433. 
29 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 33. 
30 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 2015 biopharmaceutical research industry profile 
(Washington, DC, April 2015) at 35. 
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This is compounded by an increase in the length of time taken to develop the product and to 
obtain authorisation by the marketing authority, due to stronger regulations surrounding safety 
and efficacy in clinical testing. It has been estimated that even in New Zealand the length of 
time – from patent filing to marketing authorisation – had increased to over ten years in the 
1990’s from three – four years during the 1960s.31 Research on the pharmaceutical 
development process in the US and 15 EU countries estimates this figure to have increased on 
average to 13.9 years, for products introduced onto the market from the year 2000 onwards.32 
As a result, the global pharmaceutical industry has successfully lobbied for the enactment of 
extensive IP protection in the domestic laws of IP producing states. Consequently, such 
protections have been reflected within those state’s trade policy, leading to the imposition of 
TRIPS-plus protections within FTAs. 
(i) Patent term: extension/restoration 
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement establishes a minimum patent term of 20 years – a term 
which begins on the date the patent application was filed.33 Due to the time it takes to conduct 
clinical trials on new products and the competitive nature of the pharmaceutical industry, 
companies wishing to apply for patent protection for a potential product must do so at the 
earliest possible time, which is often many years before they can file for marketing 
authorisation.34 By the time the pharmaceutical product is introduced onto the market, it has a 
significantly reduced effective patent life. This means that a pharmaceutical company which 
obtained a patent for its product has a significantly shorter monopoly period in which to recoup 
their expenditure.35 One implication of this is the stifling of innovation, due to reduced 
expected returns. 
Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement requires Members to compensate pharmaceutical companies 
for delays in approving a patent or in authorising a pharmaceutical product. In order to 
rebalance the effects resulting from an increased time delay, IP producing states have enacted 
legal provisions which compensate patent holders for delays caused by the patent office in 
                                                 
31 John Parker “Pharmaceutical Patent Term Restoration in New Zealand” (2000) 18(3) Prometheus 319 at 322. 
Note that a pharmaceutical product subject to a 16 year patent during the 1960’s had an effective patent life of 
12.45 years, while a pharmaceutical product subject to a 20 year patent during the 1990’s has an effective patent 
life of 8.15 years. 
32 Fabio Pammolli, Laura Magazzini and Massimo Riccaboni “The productivity crisis in pharmaceutical R&D” 
(2011) 10(6) Nat Rev Drug Discov 428 at 429. 
33 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 33. 
34 Bryan Mercurio “TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends” in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino 
(eds) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) at 229. 
35 At 229. 
9 
 
assessing the patent application or by the marketing authority in examining an application for 
registration.36 Known as patent term extension or restoration, or sui generis protection, these 
provisions ‘extend’ the patent term once the basic patent has expired, thereby prolonging the 
patent holders’ monopoly. While the extension of a patent term may not have serious 
implications for IP producing states, there is genuine concern for the public health effects in IP 
consuming states, as those states largely rely on generic products in order to maintain 
affordable medicine pricing. 
(ii) Compulsory licencing 
Although patents confer exclusive rights, the TRIPS Agreement not only permits limited 
exceptions to those rights but also permits ‘other use’ without authorisation of the right holder, 
subject to several conditions. Known as compulsory licencing, art 31 permits a licence 
applicant to produce and use the subject matter of a patent predominantly for domestic 
purposes37 where they have unsuccessfully sought to obtain authorisation from the right holder 
on reasonable commercial terms.38 The requirement to obtain authorisation is waived in the 
case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in the case of public 
non-commercial use.39 Where a compulsory licence is granted, the right holder must be paid 
adequate remuneration for the unauthorised use of its IP.40 Article 31 has not been without 
controversy or concern, in particular relating to what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency and the ability of a Member to supply its own domestic 
market. In response to concerns, WTO Members adopted the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health41 to clarify and reaffirm the rights of Members to use the flexibilities of art 31 in 
taking measures to protect public health. Of significance, the Doha Declaration affirmed the 
right of each Member to determine for itself what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.42 In addition, the Doha Declaration recognised the 
                                                 
36 See, for example, Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act 35 USC §156 [hereinafter, Hatch-
Waxman Act] for patent term restoration in the United States of America, and Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1768/92 of 18 June 1992 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal 
products (1992) OJ L182/1 for sui generis protection for pharmaceuticals in the European Union. 
37 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 31(f). See World Trade Organization “Implementation of paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health” WT/L/540 and Corr.1, 01 September 2003 
(Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003), on the solution for WTO Members with insufficient or no 
domestic manufacturing capabilities to make effective use of compulsory licencing. 
38 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 31(b) and (f). 
39 Art 31(b). 
40 Art 31(h). 
41 World Trade Organization “Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” WTO Doc. WT/ MIN 
(01)/DEC/2 (20 November 2001) (Adopted 14 November 2001) [hereinafter “Doha Declaration”]. 
42 Para 5. 
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difficulties faced by Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector and called for a solution to this problem to be found.43 The solution was 
to waive the obligations under art 31 to the extent necessary in order for Members to produce 
and export pharmaceutical products to an eligible importing Member, primarily least-
developed countries.44 This solution came into force as art 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement in 
2017. 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement does not oblige Members to issue compulsory licences but 
rather leaves it for each Member to determine for themselves.45 Notwithstanding the above and 
further conditions stipulated in art 31, nor does it limit the circumstances under which a 
compulsory licence may be issued. Despite this, some IP producing states have sought to 
directly limit the ability to use compulsory licencing by restricting the grounds on which one 
may be issued.46 This has negative implications when such restrictions are included within 
trade agreements with less innovative or IP consuming states, as it hinders their ability to 
provide their citizens with access to affordable medicine. 
A preliminary examination of both EU and New Zealand domestic law, and provisions relating 
to compulsory licencing within CETA and the TPP Agreement, indicates that there is no issue 
of TRIPS-plus protection relating to compulsory licencing between the parties. In fact, both 
parties support and commit to the post-TRIPS health initiatives domestically and endorse these 
initiatives within their respective FTAs. As there is no issue here with respect to compulsory 
licensing, it shall not be specifically examined as part of this thesis. 
(iii) Patent linkage 
When applying for marketing authorisation of a new product, a pharmaceutical company may 
be required to submit their clinical test data in support of their application. While that data must 
be protected against unfair commercial use and disclosure,47 many countries allow for the use 
of that data in support of an application for marketing authorisation of a generic pharmaceutical 
                                                 
43 Para 6. 
44 World Trade Organization “Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and public health”, above n 37, para 2. 
45 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 31. Note that art 31 commences “Where the law of a Member allows for other 
use…”. 
46 See, for example, Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement [2005] ATS 1 (signed 18 May 2004, entered 
into force 01 January 2005), art 17.9.7 [hereinafter, AUSFTA]. Note that a compulsory licence may only be 
issued to remedy anti-competitive practices and in the cases of public non-commercial use, national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
47 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 39.3. 
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product, even where the original product is still under patent. In addition, nothing in the TRIPS 
Agreement specifically addresses the use of a patented product by a generic manufacturer in 
order to obtain marketing authorisation prior to the expiration of that patent. However, art 30 
does authorise limited exceptions to the exclusive rights of the patent holder. This has been 
interpreted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in Canada – Pharmaceutical Products to 
include the use of a patented product by a generic manufacturer when applying for marketing 
authorisation.48 This interpretation is consistent with state practice prior to the entry into force 
of the TRIPS Agreement and is known as the regulatory review exception or ‘Bolar 
exemption’.49  
Irrespectively, there has recently been a push towards introducing within FTAs TRIPS-plus 
protections known as patent linkage. In its limited form, this requires the implementation of a 
notification system whereby a patent holder is informed of an application by a generic 
manufacturer for marketing authorisation prior to authorisation being granted.50 In its extreme 
form, on the other hand, marketing authorities are outright prevented from approving a generic 
version of the patented product without the consent of the patent holder until the expiration of 
the patent term.51 The result is the elimination of a legitimate exception to exclusive rights 
under the TRIPS Agreement. 
Introduction of such provisions represents a significant shift in the traditional position as it 
removes the responsibility of ‘enforcer’ from the patent holder and delegates that role to 
marketing authorities instead, ignoring the fact that patents are private rights.52 This provides 
a significant benefit to the patent holder as generics are prevented entirely from entering the 
market, rather than entering at the risk of infringement proceedings. In addition, patent linkage 
impairs the ability of compulsory licence holders to make use of their licence as products 
produced under a licence still need to obtain marketing authorisation.53 Patent linkage 
provisions, therefore, effectively render a compulsory licence redundant. 
                                                 
48 Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000 (Report of the Panel), 
at 7.84. Note that this exception does not permit the manufacture and stockpiling of drugs prior to the expiration 
of the patent, at 7.38. 
49 See, for example, Hatch-Waxman Act, above n 36, §271(e)(1) and Patent Act RSC 1985 c P-4, s 55.2(1). 
50 See for example TPP Agreement, above n 7, art 18.53.1(a). 
51 Mercurio, above n 34, at 224. 
52 At 225. See also Carlos María Correa “Implications of bilateral free trade agreements on access to medicines” 
(2006) 84(5) Bull World Health Organ 399 at 402. 
53 Beatrice Lindstrom “Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property Provisions in Trade 
Agreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific” (2010) 42(3) NYU J Int’l L & Pol 917 at 950. 
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(iv) Patentable subject matter: second use patents 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that a patent may be granted to any invention 
provided it is new, involves an inventive step and is capable of industrial application. The 
TRIPS Agreement does not define these concepts, leaving it to individual Members to provide 
a reasonable interpretation instead. Recently, pharmaceutical companies have utilised this 
flexibility to seek second use patents for new uses of known therapeutic products. For example, 
pharmaceutical company Merck & Co Inc successfully claimed patentability of a second 
medical use in the United Kingdom (UK) in Actavis v Merck.54 Second use patents have since 
been expressly endorsed by the European Patent Office (EPO).55 
The argument against second use patents is that it allows pharmaceutical companies to prolong 
their monopoly by claiming a second use to an existing product, such as a new dosage form or 
method of use.56 However, it is arguable that the effect of this is relatively limited as the original 
patent will still expire and generics may thereafter enter the market, albeit without reference to 
the new use or dosage form. Nevertheless, some US FTAs require the protection of second use 
patents.57 This has the effect of carving out a TRIPS Agreement flexibility by dictating how a 
Member must interpret provisions within the TRIPS Agreement. 
(v) Exhaustion and parallel importation 
Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement affirms the right of each WTO Member to determine for 
itself the issue of exhaustion of IPRs. This refers to the mode by which the exclusive rights of 
a patent holder are extinguished through the sale of the patented product. Many countries 
recognise an international exhaustion regime, where the rights of the patent holder are 
extinguished upon first placing the product on the market in any country.58 Unless otherwise 
prohibited, this has the effect of permitting the practice of parallel importation, where the 
product is then imported (or reimported) elsewhere without the permission of the patent 
holder.59 As patent holders may choose to engage in price discrimination when offering their 
                                                 
54 Actavis UK Ltd v Merck & Co Inc [2008] EWCA Civ 444. 
55 See G 0002/08 (Dosage regime/ ABBOTT RESPIRATORY) of 19 February 2010, 
ECLI:EP:BA:2010:G000208.. 
56 Lindstrom, above n 53, at 953. 
57 See, for example, AUSFTA, above n 46, art 17.9.1 
58 Lindstrom, above n 53, at 951. 
59 At 951. 
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product for sale, parallel importation may permit a country to purchase the pharmaceutical 
product elsewhere at a lower price. 
Some IP producing states argue in favour of banning parallel importation and seek to restrict 
its practice within FTAs. This is evidenced in the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement, which prohibits importation of a patented product without the patent holders 
consent where the patent holder has placed restrictions on importation by contract or by other 
means.60 Such provisions grant extensive power to the patent holder to contractually restrict a 
country from acting in the best interests of the general public. 
A preliminary examination of both EU and New Zealand domestic law, and provisions relating 
to exhaustion within CETA and the TPP Agreement, indicates that there is no issue of TRIPS-
plus protection relating to exhaustion between the parties. While the EU prohibits parallel 
importation, New Zealand regulatory law renders it impossible other than by the Crown.61 Even 
then, the ability of the Crown to parallel import is restricted by legislative provisions and 
international pressure.62 As there is little issue here with respect to exhaustion and consequently 
parallel importation, it shall not be specifically examined as part of this thesis. 
(b) Pharmaceuticals: regulatory protection 
In the ordinary course of business, information is developed which the business owner has an 
interest in keeping confidential in order to benefit from the commercial value in keeping it 
secret.63 Commonly known as undisclosed information or ‘trade secrets’, such information 
broadly encompasses technical information, confidential business information and know-how, 
including industrial processes and formulae, business plans and information as concerns 
methods.64 Such information is protected against misappropriation, either by competitors or by 
those within the business who have been given that information in confidence.65 
The protection of undisclosed information is encapsulated within art 39 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which obligates Members to ensure effective protection of such information 
                                                 
60 AUSFTA, above n 46, art 17.9.4. 
61 See Medicines Act 1981, s 32A and Ministry of Health Regulatory Impact Assessment: Therapeutic Products 
Regulation - Replacement of Medicines Act 1981 and Medicines Regulation 1984 with a new legislative scheme 
for therapeutic products – Analysis of specific issues and options (24 March 2016) at 140-141. 
62 Hansard (5 December 1989) 503 NZPD 14360. 
63 Anna Kingsbury ‘The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the Protection of Commercial Confidential 
Information and Trade Secrets in New Zealand Law” (2016) 38(4) EIPR 237 at 238. 
64 Douglas C Lippoldt and Mark F Schultz Trade Secrets, Innovation and the WTO (International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development, E15Initiative Think Piece, August 2014) at 1. 
65 Kingsbury, above n 63, at 238. 
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against unfair competition.66 Article 39.2 requires the protection of undisclosed information 
against unauthorised disclosure or misappropriation where that information is secret, has 
commercial value by way of its secrecy and reasonable steps have been taken to ensure its 
secrecy. In addition, art 39.3 requires the protection of undisclosed pharmaceutical and 
agricultural chemical test data where such data has been submitted to a governmental agency 
as a condition for obtaining marketing authorisation. Test data under art 39.3 must be protected 
not only against unfair commercial use but also “against disclosure, except where necessary to 
protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair 
commercial use.” 
 Article 39.3 requires Members to take positive action in order to protect clinical test data 
against unfair commercial use and disclosure. There is, however, no obligation to provide 
exclusive rights in that data. Nevertheless, innovative IP producing states have implemented 
data exclusivity provisions for a definitive period, during which time a generic manufacturer 
cannot rely on the originator’s test data in support of their application for marketing 
authorisation of their generic product.67 This does not prevent the generic manufacturer from 
conducting their own clinical trials in order to replicate the originator’s pharmaceutical product, 
however, the resources and expenditure required to do so makes this option infeasible in 
practice.68 As a generic manufacturer must rely on the originator’s clinical test data in order to 
show bioequivalence with an approved product, data exclusivity has the effect of precluding 
the entry of a generic product onto the market.69 It is important to note that data exclusivity 
operates irrespective of the status of a right holders’ patent. Data exclusivity regimes, therefore, 
add an additional layer of IP protection by acting as a de facto patent where a patent may not 
otherwise exist.70 
In addition to data exclusivity, some countries may provide a period of market exclusivity: a 
period where a generic manufacturer cannot market their product, even after the use of 
undisclosed clinical test data in support of their application for marketing authorisation has 
                                                 
66 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 39.1. 
67 Jerome H Reichman “Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: 
The Case for a Public Goods Approach” (2009) 13(1) Marq Intell Propr L Rev 1 at 4. 
68 At 5. 
69 At 5. 
70 At 5. 
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been permitted.71 This similarly has the effect of extending the monopoly of the right holder 
and may lead to an informal or de facto patent extension. 
(c) Geographical indications 
GIs are distinctive signs that identify a given product as originating from a particular 
geographical location. They can be distinguished from a trade mark on the basis of geography, 
which permits a GI to confer on all producers of that product in that particular region the 
exclusive right to use that distinctive sign in order to identify their product.72 The place of 
origin is recognised as essential to the product itself, rendering a unique value to the product 
by yielding certain qualities or attributes that cannot be obtained or replicated elsewhere.73 
Geographical location thus goes beyond providing a mere reference to place of origin, 
embodying attributes of quality that are used to increase the economic value of the product 
through its reputation.74 It is this notion of terroir, the essential link between place of origin 
and product quality, which provides the underlying basis for granting an IPR in a name. 
Unlike other forms of IPRs which are designed to reward innovation and creation, GIs are 
designed to protect a products’ reputation and prevent the dilution of its economic value.75 GIs 
reward producers in a given geographical region who follow particular production practices, 
by offering adequate protection against misappropriation or false representation of that 
geographical region, both of which are detrimental to the products’ reputation and the 
producer’s business. At the same time, a GI denotes the origin and therefore quality of a product 
to consumers, the false use of which deceives a consumer into purchasing an inferior product.76 
Protection is therefore granted on the basis of two interrelated legal principles: protection 
against misleading use (consumer welfare) and protection against unfair competition 
(preserving reputation).77 
                                                 
71 See, for example, Directive 2004/27 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (2004) 
OJ L136/34, art 10. 
72 José Manuel Cortés Martín “TRIPS Agreement: Towards A Better Protection for Geographical Indications?” 
(2004) 30(1) Brook J Int’l L 117 at 117. 
73 Kal Raustiala and Stephen R. Munzer “The Global Struggle over Geographic Indications” (2007) 18(2) EJIL 
337 at 338. 
74 C Bramley and JF Kirsten “Exploring the Economic Rationale for Protecting Geographical Indicators in 
Agriculture” (2007) 46(1) Agrekon 69 at 77. 
75 Martín, above n 72, at 118. 
76 Dwijen Rangnekar The Socio-Economics of Geographical Indications: A Review of Empirical Evidence from 
Europe (UNCTAD-ICTSD, Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 8, May 2004) at 14. 
77 At 14. 
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International protection of GIs was relatively limited prior to their inclusion within the TRIPS 
Agreement. The TRIPS Agreement represented a fundamental step forward by obligating 
Members to substantively protect GIs through the enforcement of minimum standards. Article 
22.2 obliges Members to provide legal means for interested parties to prevent any use of an 
indication that misleads the public as to the true geographical origin of the product or any use 
which constitutes an act of unfair competition, thus incorporating the central legal principles 
identified above. While art 22 sets out the general provisions for the protection of GIs, art 23 
affords additional protection for wines and spirits. Crucially, art 23.1 prohibits the use of 
expressions including ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘style’ and ‘imitation’ in relation to a GI when 
differentiating a similar product from the GI protected product. Members are also required to 
enter into negotiations concerning the establishment of a notification and registration system 
in order to facilitate the protection of GIs,78 and are called upon to negotiate for increased 
protection of wines and spirits.79 
The inclusion of GIs within the TRIPS Agreement represented a significant achievement for 
‘Old World’ countries, who sought to protect their traditionally established and world-
renowned wine and spirit products against place name misappropriation from ‘New World’ 
countries.80 Nevertheless, the ideological divide between Old and New World countries has 
persisted and has prevented both the creation of a notification and registration system and the 
multilateral entry into negotiations aimed at increasing protection under art 23.81 This has 
prompted the inclusion of provisions protecting GIs within FTAs and other trade agreements 
which seek to secure protection for specific products.82 In this respect, Old World countries are 
arguably utilising bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements to establish the registration system 
mandated under the TRIPS Agreement. 
In addition, increased global trade and reduced agricultural subsidies have prompted some Old 
World countries to advocate for expanded product protection, in particular GI protection for 
agricultural food products.83 This approach has been criticised by many New World countries 
as an attempt to claw back generic terms or invalidate terms that are protected under trade mark 
                                                 
78 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 23.4. 
79 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 24.1. 
80 Raustiala and Munzer, above n 73, at 350. 
81 Irene Calboli “Expanding the Protection of Geographical Indications of Origin under TRIPS: Old Debate or 
New Opportunity? (2006) 10 Marq Intell Prop L 181 at 194. 
82 See, for example, Agreement between the European Community and Canada on trade in wines and spirit 
drinks [2004] OJ L35/3 (signed 16 September 2003, entered into force 01 June 2004) [hereinafter 2003 Wines 
and Spirit Drinks Agreement]. 
83 Raustiala and Munzer, above n 73, at 350. 
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law in other countries.84 On the other hand, proponents of this approach emphasise the dilution 
of their reputation through the ‘genericisation’ of their place name.85 As the TRIPS Agreement 
protects the use of a GI where it is used in good faith and its continued use precedes the signing 
of that agreement,86 such an approach has been criticised as violating the TRIPS Agreement.87 
Nevertheless, the protection of specific foodstuffs and agricultural products has similarly been 
included within recent FTAs concluded by certain old world countries, in particular the EU.88 
B Towards an EU-NZ FTA 
As mentioned above, the extent to which TRIPS-plus protection is afforded remains a matter 
for each individual country to determine, having regard to their individual domestic 
socioeconomic circumstances. For, according to Gervais, “each country is different and 
therefore should tailor its IP policy to its own need”.89 Of particular significance for each 
individual country to determine is the degree to which the rights of producers of IP and the 
rights of consumers are best balanced, taking into account the wider public good. In this respect, 
it could be expected that an appropriate balance in an IP consuming state would place greater 
emphasis on the rights of consumers, as the wider public good would prescribe access to 
innovative creations. Whereas in an IP producing state, it could be expected that an appropriate 
balance would place greater emphasis on the rights of producers instead, as the wider public 
good would promote the creation of innovation. On this basis and given the respective positions 
of the EU and New Zealand, it could be expected that the positions of the parties in relation to 
IP protection would be reasonably disparate. 
With that being said, New Zealand is a small market economy and shares features with both 
developed and developing countries.90 With respect to IP, this means that it is in the unique 
position that it uses more IP than it produces, yet has the ability to create innovation and has 
the resources to access IP at higher prices.91 This allows New Zealand to calibrate laws to 
                                                 
84 Calboli, above n 81, at 196. 
85 Irene Calboli and Daniel Gervais The Socio-Economic Aspects of Geographical Indications of Origins (paper 
prepared for the Worldwide Symposium on Geographical Indications, World Intellectual Property Organisation, 
Budapest, October 20-22, 2015). 
86 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 23.4 – 6. 
87 Calboli, above n 81, at 197. 
88 See, for example, CETA, above n 5. 
89 Daniel J Gervais ‘IP Calibration’ in Daniel J Gervais (ed) Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: 
Strategies to optimize economic development in a TRIPS-plus era (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2014) at 87. 
90 Susy Frankel Test Tubes for Global Intellectual Property Issues: Small Market Economies (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2015) at 13-14. 
91 At 3. 
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specific needs by enhancing innovation in certain areas whilst ensuring consumers retain 
reasonable access in others.92 It further allows New Zealand to customise trade agreements in 
order to ensure that IP protection reflects the appropriate level of development in both trading 
partners by adopting a mixture of minimum standards and innovation-tailored provisions.93 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the level of domestic IP protection between the EU and New 
Zealand will inevitably be so disparate that they are diametrically opposed. 
Frankel contends that when entering into trade agreements with larger developed economies, 
small market economies may agree to adopt higher IP protections than what their domestic 
socioeconomic situation would suggest appropriate in order to gain trade concessions.94 In this 
respect, IP may be used as a trade-off where benefits may be gained in other areas pertinent to 
the specific interests of the small market economy. It is possible that New Zealand may be 
prepared to implement stronger IP protection in relation to pharmaceuticals and GIs in order to 
gain concessions in areas such as agriculture. With this being said, Frankel also contends that 
domestic IP regimes “only work to support innovation and creativity if they are appropriately 
framed and calibrated to correlate with development levels and innovation opportunities”.95 
Any consideration of adopting higher IP protection in an EU-NZ FTA must take into account 
the wider implications that may arise and ensure that adoption would not stifle opportunities to 
offset costs in key areas or unduly hinder socioeconomic development. 
 
                                                 
92 Gervais, above n 89, at 88. 
93 At 87. 
94 Frankel, above n 90, at 23. 
95 At 210. 
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III Protection for Pharmaceuticals 
 
A General Introduction 
The following chapter on the protection of pharmaceuticals shall be broken into three sections. 
The first section shall provide a comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections 
within CETA, the TPP Agreement and the CPTPP, with the TRIPS Agreement providing a 
baseline for comparison. This analysis shall be conducted in accordance with arts 31 and 32 of 
the VCLT. The second section shall provide a comparative interpretative analysis of EU and 
New Zealand domestic law in order to ascertain the position of the Parties. Recourse will be 
had to archival materials, including government documents and position papers, in conducting 
this analysis. The third section shall pull together the main findings of this chapter to identify 
any challenges or difficulties which may arise and therefore need to be overcome during the 
course of negotiations.  
Any interpretative analysis of an international treaty must be conducted in accordance with the 
customary rules of interpretation of international law. Codified within the VCLT, art 31.1 sets 
forth the fundamental interpretative rule, which provides as follows: “A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Article 31 continues by 
setting out those elements which comprise the context, such as another agreement or document 
made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and other matters which are to be taken 
into account together with the context.96 These include any subsequent agreement or practice 
regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty, and any relevant and applicable rules 
of international law.97 Recourse may also be had to supplementary means of interpretation, 
including preparatory work, in order to confirm the meaning or to ascertain the meaning where 
it is left ambiguous or leads to an interpretation which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.98 
Frankel contends that treaty interpretation is a ‘logical progression’ that must be conducted 
holistically.99 This means that the full effect of all the elements within art 31 must be taken into 
                                                 
96 VCLT, above n 6, art 31(2) and (3). 
97 Art 31(3). 
98 Art 32. 
99 Frankel, above n 90, at 56. 
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account, without privileging one over another.100 Such an approach is prescribed within the 
fundamental interpretative rule stated above as context, object and purpose will often 
intermingle and therefore be considered concurrently, while the ordinary meaning will be 
dependent on the context. Treaty interpretation does not, however, permit the interpreter to 
read in rights and obligations where the treaty is silent on the matter.101 In addition, recourse 
to supplementary material, such as preparatory work or drafting history, must only be done 
within the strict confines of art 32. This is because the treaty provisions represent the intentions 
of the parties as negotiated whilst supplementary material will go toward the parties’ initial 
positions. 
While drafting history is not a primary consideration within the interpretative process, the 
positions of the parties are by no means to be dismissed. Treaty provisions reflect competing 
interests and effective interpretation ought to reconcile those interests to give effect to the 
parties’ intentions.102 Such intentions are often based on national policy, which in turn 
influence the international norms. In this respect, the object and purpose of national policy may 
be relevant to treaty interpretation, though they are not decisive;103 they are simply one element 
to be considered within the interpretative process. 
B Interpretation and Comparative Analysis of TRIPS-plus Protections: CETA, 
 TPP Agreement and CPTPP 
TRIPS-plus protections relating to pharmaceuticals can broadly be divided into two categories: 
patent protection and regulatory protection. 
1 Patent protection 
(a) Patent term: extension/restoration 
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that “[t]he term of protection available shall not 
end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”104 It is 
widely accepted that the TRIPS Agreement represents the floor but not the ceiling.105 Provided 
                                                 
100 At 45. 
101 At 54. 
102 At 44. 
103 At 65. 
104 Footnote omitted. 
105 Note that the TRIPS Chairman’s Report of 23 July 1990 contained a clause which would encourage states to 
extend the term of protection in appropriate cases to compensate for delays caused by the regulatory approval 
process. This clause was not included in any subsequent drafting materials. World Trade Organization 
Chairman’s Report to the GNG: Status of work in the negotiating group, Negotiating Group on Trade-Related 
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that the minimum patent term of 20 years is complied with, individual states are free to impose 
longer terms of protection within their domestic law and similarly include such protections 
within their trade agreements with third parties. Nevertheless, longer terms of protection are 
considered TRIPS-plus as they mandate a stronger level of protection than the minimum 
prescribed by the TRIPS Agreement. 
CETA makes no reference to a minimum term of protection. Rather, art 20.2 states that the 
provisions of CETA “complement the rights and obligations between the Parties under the 
TRIPS Agreement”. This means that it contributes extra elements or is in addition to those 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. As CETA does not alter the minimum term of protection, 
that stipulated in the TRIPS Agreement prevails. 
Article 20.27 of CETA goes beyond that provided in the TRIPS Agreement by prescribing a 
system of patent term restoration that the parties to CETA are bound to abide by. Known as sui 
generis protection, the parties are required to grant a period of protection in respect of a 
pharmaceutical product protected by a basic patent in force at the request of the patent holder.106 
This is provided that marketing authorisation has been granted for that product, that product 
has not previously been the subject of a period of sui generis protection, and the marketing 
authorisation is the first authorisation to place that product on the market of that party.107 Article 
20.27.1 defines ‘basic patent’ as a patent which protects a product as such and which has been 
designated by the patent holder as the basic patent for the purpose of granting sui generis 
protection. Provided that the three specified conditions are met, art 20.27.2 states that the 
parties “shall provide a period of sui generis protection … at the request of the holder”. In one 
respect, this could be interpreted to mean that sui generis protection must be granted upon 
every request made by a patent holder without any other conditions imposed. However, this 
would be inconsistent with art 20.2.2 of CETA which provides that each party “shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within its 
own legal system and practice”. Thus, art 20.27.2 may be seen to provide an inherent flexibility 
for each Party to determine the conditions to which a request for sui generis protection may be 
subject, provided the system is in place for a request to be made. 
                                                 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76, 23 July 
1990) at 19. 
106 CETA, above n 5, art 20.27.2. 
107 Art 20.27.2. 
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In addition to the conditions specified in art 20.27.2, art 20.27.3 permits a party to prescribe 
restrictions to the granting of sui generis protection based upon matters of temporality. First, a 
party may require an application for marketing authorisation to be submitted within a 
reasonable time in order for sui generis protection to be granted. The issue of what is 
‘reasonable’ is for each party to determine.  Second, a party may stipulate a period of time in 
which the request for sui generis protection must be made, provided it is no less than 60 days 
from the date on which marketing authorisation was granted.  The issue of temporality 
continues to art 20.27.4 which provides that the period of sui generis protection shall take effect 
at the end of the lawful term of the basic patent. Where there is more than one patent protecting 
the product, the patent holders must select by agreement which is to operate as the basic patent 
as there may only be one single period of sui generis protection for any given product.108 
Of most significance to this section is the term of sui generis protection, which is set down in 
arts 20.27.5 and 20.27.6, providing the following: 
5. Each Party shall provide that the period of sui generis protection be for a period 
 equal to the period which elapsed between the date on which the application for the 
 basic patent was filed and the date of the first marketing authorisation, reduced by a 
 period of five years. 
6. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 and without prejudice to a possible extension of the 
 period of sui generis protection by a Party as an incentive or a reward for research in 
 certain target populations, such as children, the duration of the sui generis protection 
 may not exceed a period of two to five years, to be established by each Party. 
To summarise the above, the period of sui generis protection prescribed by CETA is the length 
of time between the filing of the patent and the granting of marketing authorisation, minus five 
years. This period may not exceed a period of two to five years, to be determined by each party, 
unless an extension is granted for research in certain target populations such as children. To 
illustrate, a ten-year period between the filing of a patent for a non-paediatric pharmaceutical 
product and the granting of marketing authorisation would result in a maximum period of sui 
generis protection of five years or a minimum of two, depending on the party. The result would 
be the same for a 12-year period between the filing of the patent and the granting of marketing 
authorisation, as the maximum period cannot exceed five years. However, a ten-year period 
between the filing of a patent for a pharmaceutical product created within a paediatric 
                                                 
108 Art 20.27.4. 
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investigation and the granting of marketing authorisation would result in a maximum period of 
five years sui generis protection, plus an extension if permitted by the relevant party. It is 
important to note that while CETA prescribes the process for determining the period of sui 
generis protection, it remains within the purview of each party to determine, firstly, whether 
an extension may or may not be possible, and secondly, within the parameters of art 20.27.6, 
the maximum period of the sui generis protection. 
Article 20.27.8 sets down the subject matter that is covered by the sui generis protection, being 
the pharmaceutical product covered by the marketing authorisation and any use of that product 
that has been authorised prior to expiration of the sui generis protection. Any modifications to 
the pharmaceutical product which would alter the active ingredients would not be covered by 
the sui generis protection.109 This would not, however, prevent a manufacturer from applying 
for a separate patent based upon the modified active ingredients and thereafter claiming a 
period of sui generis protection for the ‘new’ pharmaceutical product. The sui generis 
protection would, however, extend to a new use of a known pharmaceutical product, provided 
that use has been authorised by the relevant authorities before the expiry of the period of sui 
generis protection.  
Akin to CETA, the TPP Agreement makes no reference to the minimum term of patent 
protection. In accordance with art 1.2.1(a) of that Agreement, the minimum patent term as 
stipulated in art 33 of the TRIPS Agreement prevails. The TPP Agreement also provides a 
system of patent term restoration, referred to therein as patent term adjustment. This system 
has since been suspended by art 2 of the CPTPP and is therefore not enforceable law.110 
Nevertheless, the provisions of the TPP Agreement relating to patent term adjustment remain 
relevant as an indicator of the provisions New Zealand may consider acceptable within an FTA 
and shall therefore be examined. 
The TPP Agreement provides for two systems of patent term adjustment by distinguishing 
between the granting of a patent and the granting of marketing authorisation. Article 18.46 
covers the former while art 18.48 covers the latter. 
Article 18.46 begins by directing each party to “make best efforts to process patent applications 
in an efficient and timely manner, with a view to avoiding unreasonable or unnecessary 
                                                 
109 See art 20.27.1 for the definition of ‘product’. 
110 CPTPP, above n 4, art 2. See the Annex for a list of the provisions suspended. 
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delays”.111 In aid of this, art 18.46.2 permits the parties to provide procedures for the expedition 
of the examination of a patent application at the request of the applicant. Provided the 
application is processed in an efficient and timely manner in accordance with art 18.46.1, there 
should, however, be no need to request an expedition of examination. From the ordinary 
meaning of the language used, it can be seen that the parties intend for patent applications to 
be processed in a well-organised and favourable period of time, the purpose being to limit any 
delays that are outside what would be considered a normal timeframe.  
Articles 18.46.3 and 18.46.4 set out the operative elements for patent term adjustment in 
relation to the granting of a patent, providing the following: 
3. If there are unreasonable delays in a Party’s issuance of patents, that Party shall provide 
the means to, and at the request of the patent owner shall, adjust the term of the patent to 
compensate for such delays.112 
4. For the purposes of this Article, an unreasonable delay at least shall include a delay in 
the issuance of a patent of more than five years from the date of filing of the application in the 
territory of the Party, or three years after a request for examination of the application has been 
made, whichever is later … 
Article 18.46.3 poses a couple of questions in relation to the meaning of the terms used and 
their effect. The first being the meaning of ‘unreasonable’ delay, for which a definition for the 
purposes of this provision is provided in art 18.46.4. The inclusion of the phrase “at least shall 
include” indicates that the definition provided is considered the minimum standard to be 
applied by the parties, without setting a maximum. This interpretation is consistent with art 
18.5 of the TPP Agreement which states that a party “may, but shall not be obliged to, provide 
more extensive protection for, or enforcement of, intellectual property rights under its law”. 
Even so, a minimum of five years must pass before a delay is considered unreasonable. Article 
18.46.4 goes on to list matters which the parties may exclude from the determination of such 
delays, including delays out of the control of or not directly attributable to the marketing 
authority and delays attributable to the applicant. It is for each party to determine whether or 
not to exclude these periods of time from the determination of ‘unreasonable’ delays. 
A second issue relates to the meaning of the term ‘adjust’ in relation to the term of the patent. 
In its ordinary usage, ‘adjust’ means to alter or to move something in order to achieve the 
                                                 
111 TPP Agreement, above n 7, art 18.46.1. 
112 Footnote omitted. 
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desired result.113 Article 18.46, however, provides no guidance on how the parties are to adjust 
the term of the patent. One possible interpretation is for an extension to the patent term itself. 
Another interpretation could be for the parties to provide a separate and distinct period of sui 
generis protection which would apply at the end of the patent term, similar to that prescribed 
by CETA. A further interpretation could see the patent term commencing at the time the patent 
application is approved, rather than at the time the patent application is filed. In addition, art 
18.46 does not prescribe the length of time the patent term is to be adjusted by. The result is a 
provision which provides a substantial degree of flexibility to the parties to determine what is 
appropriate for their individual circumstances when ‘adjusting’ the patent term. 
Article 18.48 begins in the same manner as art 18.46 by directing each party to make “best 
efforts to process applications for marketing approval of pharmaceutical products in an 
efficient and timely manner, with a view to avoiding unreasonable or unnecessary delays”.114 
The wording used is identical to art 18.46.1, but for its application to marketing authorisation 
rather than the processing of patent applications. Similar to art 18.46.2, art 18.48.4 permits the 
parties to adopt or maintain procedures that expedite the processing of marketing authorisation 
applications. The intention of the parties can therefore be said to be the same. 
Articles 18.48.2 and 18.48.3 set out the operative elements for patent term adjustment in 
relation to the granting of marketing authorisation, providing the following: 
2. With respect to a pharmaceutical product that is subject to a patent, each Party shall 
make available an adjustment of the patent term to compensate the patent owner for 
unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of the marketing approval 
process.115 
3. For greater certainty, in implementing the obligations of this Article, each Party may 
provide for conditions and limitations provided that the Party continues to give effect to this 
Article. 
Similar to art 18.46.3, art 18.48.2 poses a couple of questions in relation to the meaning of the 
terms used and their effect. One issue relates to the meaning of the term ‘adjust’ in relation to 
the term of the patent. As the aim of this provision is analogous to that of art 18.46.3, being the 
adjustment of the patent term as compensation, the same interpretation for that provision could 
be applied here. However, footnote 46 (Chapter 18) of the TPP Agreement makes clear that “a 
                                                 
113 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, ‘adjust’, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/>. 
114 TPP Agreement, above n 7, art 18.48.1. 
115 Other footnotes omitted. 
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Party may alternatively make available a period of additional sui generis protection … [which] 
shall confer the rights conferred by the patent”.116 This means that the parties consider patent 
term adjustment and sui generis protection as two distinct forms of patent term restoration. It 
can be inferred that the intention of the parties in relation to the meaning of ‘adjust’ is for the 
patent term itself to be altered. It is important to note that sui generis protection as an alternative 
is only intended in relation to art 18.48.2; it is not intended in relation to art 18.46.3 as that 
provision does not provide a similar alternative to patent term adjustment for unreasonable 
delays in the issuance of a patent. 
A second issue relates to the meaning of ‘unreasonable curtailment’, for which no interpretation 
has been provided by the Parties. This is in direct contrast to art 18.46.4, which provides a 
minimum definition for unreasonable delay. On this basis, it can be inferred that it is for each 
Party to determine what is an unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term. In its 
ordinary usage, ‘unreasonable curtailment’ means the act of reducing or restricting something 
beyond what is acceptable or fair.117 In the context of this provision, curtailment goes towards 
the temporal effect on the effective patent term, as any delay in the granting of marketing 
authorisation would result in a restriction or reduction of the effective patent term. The result 
is a shorter duration of market exclusivity of the pharmaceutical product before the patent 
expires. However, it is a matter of national interpretation how long a delay may be before it is 
considered unacceptable or unfair. 
Finally, an issue may be raised in relation to responsibility for the unreasonable curtailment of 
the effective patent term. Article 18.48.2 refers to delays due to the marketing authorisation 
process rather than the broader process undertaken in order to bring a product to the market. 
Taking a narrow perspective, this means that only delays attributable to the marketing authority 
while examining the application for marketing authorisation will be taken into account. An 
argument could be made that delays brought about through clinical trials or reliance upon third-
party marketing authorisation information should be included within an examination of 
whether there has been unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term.118 To accept this 
argument would, however, result in the examination of elements not specifically required by 
the TPP Agreement. Moreover, art 18.48.3 permits each Party to provide for conditions or 
                                                 
116 Emphasis added. 
117 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, above n 113, ‘unreasonable’ and ‘curtailment’. 
118 See Dr Graeme Jarvis, “Submission on consultation document: Implementation of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Intellectual Property Chapter” (Medicines New Zealand, March 2016) at [11]. 
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limitations in implementing the obligations under art 18.48,119 which would extend to 
responsibility for unreasonable curtailment. In any event, this would also be a matter for 
national interpretation. 
A comparative interpretative analysis of the patent term restoration provisions in CETA and 
those in the TPP Agreement reveals numerous differences between the two agreements. This 
is not only in relation to detailed sub-clauses and the specific language used, but also 
differences within the broader structure of the schemes and their application. Despite these 
disparities, the overall legal effect of both schemes renders them neither irreconcilable nor 
mutually exclusive. 
The scope of the sui generis scheme in CETA is broad with no mention as to the extent of 
coverage, while the patent term adjustment scheme in the TPP Agreement clearly sets the scope 
of the scheme as being unjustified delays in patent issuance and unreasonable curtailment to 
the effective patent term by virtue of the marketing authorisation process. The broad scope of 
CETA does not, however, mean that sui generis protection must be afforded to every 
application that satisfies the basic conditions set out in art 20.27 of that Agreement. To argue 
otherwise would have the absurd consequence of automatic and unconditional patent term 
restoration upon request, and therefore there is no justification or need for a set minimum patent 
term. Article 20.2.2 of CETA provides that it is for each Party to determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of that Agreement within its own legal system. This 
accords each Party the flexibility to determine the scope of sui generis protection within its 
own legal system, provided that it gives effect to its obligations within CETA; being the 
establishment of a system which enables the granting of a period of sui generis protection at 
the request of a patent holder. In this respect, each Party may choose to limit the scope or 
maintain a broad scope of application whilst maintaining compliance with CETA. 
The periods of time to be considered when examining or calculating a request for patent term 
restoration also differ between the two agreements. Both CETA and the TPP Agreement take 
the same start and end point, the former being the patent filing date and the latter the date upon 
which marketing authorisation is granted. However, while CETA examines the period between 
those dates as one distinct period of time, the TPP Agreement divides the same period into two 
distinct periods of time to be examined separately, distinguishing the patent approval process 
                                                 
119 For example, time limits for applying for an extension, number of extensions granted, length of the extension 
and subject matter of the extension. 
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from the marketing authorisation process. The reason for this distinction could be in 
recognition that the two processes are separate from each other and that a delay in one process 
does not necessarily mean that there is a corresponding delay in the other process. In this 
respect, an applicant for patent term restoration may only claim for the loss they have actually 
suffered. 
Both CETA and the TPP Agreement acknowledge that a period of time will inevitably elapse 
in the natural course of the combined patent and marketing authorisation processes. CETA 
therefore subtracts a period of five years from its calculation, being a reasonable amount of 
time in which to process both the patent and marketing authorisation applications. Similarly, 
the TPP Agreement disregards a period of five years, only after which it considers the delay in 
patent issuance to be unreasonable. However, this period of five years only applies with respect 
to the issuance of the patent; it does not include any delays in the marketing authorisation 
process which result in unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term. The TPP 
Agreement can therefore be seen to recognise that a period of more than five years may pass 
within the natural course of the combined patent and marketing authorisation processes. The 
implication of this interpretation is that an applicant for patent term restoration may be more 
likely to succeed under the sui generis scheme in CETA than under the patent term adjustment 
scheme in the TPP Agreement. 
With that being said, CETA imposes a maximum period of sui generis protection, being two–
five years to be determined by each Party, whereas the TPP Agreement does not specify any 
maximum period. This means, for example, that an applicant whose patent issuance was 
delayed for 12 years could only receive a maximum period of sui generis protection of five 
years under CETA, or a maximum of two; while under the TPP Agreement they could receive 
a maximum of seven years patent term adjustment. Any limitation on the period of patent term 
adjustment claimable is for each Party to the TPP Agreement to determine for themselves, 
rather than it being imposed. 
While the two schemes take different approaches in relation to the period of patent term 
restoration and the periods of time examined, it does not necessarily mean that the end results 
must be significantly different. The failure to specify a maximum period of patent term 
adjustment in the TPP Agreement does not mean that the parties to that Agreement may not 
impose limitations in their own legal systems. It merely means that the parties are free to 
determine any limitations themselves. Similarly, the wide breadth of scope afforded under 
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CETA does not necessarily mean that the parties to that Agreement have no ability to limit the 
scope. It merely means that the parties are not limited to a narrower scope should they wish to 
extend it. In this context, either Party under CETA may choose to limit the scope to 
unreasonable delays in patent issuance or unreasonable curtailments to the effective patent 
term, similar to the TPP Agreement. The key consideration is that they have the flexibility to 
do this should they choose to. 
Finally, the form and temporal occurrence of the patent term restoration schemes differ 
between the two agreements. CETA provides for a sui generis scheme of patent term 
restoration which does not operate as part of the patent term but rather operates separately and 
of its own right. This period of protection applies at the end of the lawful patent term, upon its 
expiration. In comparison, the TPP Agreement provides for a patent term adjustment scheme 
which, as interpreted above, operates to adjust the patent term itself. It also permits a sui generis 
scheme of patent term restoration as an alternative to patent term adjustment where there has 
been unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term. This alternative could apply at the 
end of the lawful patent term, similar to the sui generis scheme under CETA, as nothing in the 
TPP Agreement indicates when this alternative sui generis protection would apply. 
On the face of it, it makes no significant difference whether the period of patent term restoration 
applies at the end of the lawful patent term or operates to extend the lawful patent term. 
However, art 20.27.10 of CETA permits each Party to revoke the sui generis protection on 
specified grounds, including on grounds relating to the withdrawal of marketing authorisation. 
The implication of this is that were marketing authorisation to be withdrawn, the sui generis 
protection may be revoked even though the basic patent still retains legal effect.120 The patent 
itself is not affected as the sui generis scheme exists of its own right. Whereas under the patent 
term adjustment scheme of the TPP Agreement, the patent term itself has been adjusted so any 
revocation of patent term restoration would require the extrication of the adjusted term from 
the basic patent.121 With that being said, the subject matter of the basic patent and that of the 
patent as adjusted under the TPP Agreement are the same. The only difference is the length of 
the patent term. In addition, this would only affect any adjustment granted in relation to 
unreasonable curtailment, as the issue is the revocation of marketing authorisation which does 
not affect the basic patent. On this basis, extrication would be reasonably straight-forward. 
                                                 
120 Note that this scenario would only apply where the lawful term of the basic patent has not yet expired, as the 
period of sui generis protection applies after the expiration of the lawful term of the basic patent. 
121 Note that art 18 of the TPP Agreement makes no reference to revocation and is therefore silent on this issue. 
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Based upon the above analysis, it is apparent that, while there are differences between the 
patent term restoration schemes in both agreements, there could be little significant difference 
in the overall legal effect or application of the schemes. The inherent flexibilities of both 
agreements means that the two patent term restoration schemes are neither mutually exclusive 
nor irreconcilable.  
(b) Patent linkage 
As a measure primarily employed to enhance patent monopoly, patent linkage is not included 
within the TRIPS Agreement. However, it is increasingly employed within bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements, including both CETA and the CPTPP, albeit to differing standards. It 
is important to note that the provisions on patent linkage within the TPP Agreement were not 
suspended by the CPTPP and therefore remain good law.122 
Patent linkage is addressed in art 20.28 of CETA, which provides: 
If a Party relies on “patent linkage” mechanisms whereby the granting of marketing 
authorisations (or notices of compliance or similar concepts) for generic pharmaceutical 
products is linked to the existence of patent protection, it shall ensure that all litigants are 
afforded equivalent and effective rights of appeal. 
CETA does not require the Parties to implement a system of patent linkage. Rather, it sets 
obligations to ensure equal treatment of litigants where a system of patent linkage does exist. 
The purpose of this provision is to ensure that both generic and originator manufacturers have 
equal and effective rights of appeal, so that both manufacturers may challenge a finding by the 
relevant authority relating to the status of the originator’s patent. In some jurisdictions, 
including Canada, only the generic manufacturer may appeal an unfavourable decision.123 The 
originator manufacturer cannot appeal but may instead initiate patent infringement proceedings 
once the generic product has entered the market. The aim of this provision is therefore to ensure 
that all Parties are equal before the law, irrespective of any unintended effect this may have on 
the entry of generic products onto the market. 
                                                 
122 See CPTPP, above n 4, annex, for a list of the suspended provisions. Note that art 18.53 is not included in that 
list. 
123 See Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133, regs 6-7. Note that while the PM 
(NOC) Regulations do not expressly prohibit an originator manufacturer from appealing an unfavourable decision, 
the practice is for a Notice of Compliance to be issued immediately after the decision which renders an appeal 
moot. See Kristina Lybecker Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: How 
Canada Measures Up (Fraser Institute, January 2017) at 13. 
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In contrast, the CPTPP prescribes a patent linkage system which must be adhered to where a 
Party permits the reliance upon prior marketing authorisation in obtaining marketing 
authorisation for a generic pharmaceutical product. Article 18.53 of the TPP Agreement sets 
forth this system, which requires the Parties to adopt or maintain one of two prescribed patent 
linkage systems. The first may be described as a notification system. Article 18.53.1(a) imposes 
an obligation on the marketing authority to enable notification to a patent holder of an 
application for marketing authorisation of a generic pharmaceutical product which is made in 
reliance on the originator products’ data. While the marketing authority is under no obligation 
to provide notice to the patent holder, the system must allow for the patent holder to be notified 
prior to the granting of marketing authorisation. Notification is only to be enabled where 
marketing would occur during the term of the patent. In determining whether notification is to 
be enabled, knowledge of any applicable patents is presumably required. The system must also 
ensure that the patent holder has adequate time and opportunity to seek remedies prior to the 
granting of marketing authorisation, and that there are procedures and remedies available for 
the resolution of disputes.124  
Unlike CETA, the CPTPP does not impose obligations ensuring equal treatment of litigants in 
respect of rights of appeal. Rather, the CPTPP mandates the provision of procedures and 
remedies for the resolution of disputes concerning the validity or infringement of a patent. 
Reference to both validity and infringement indicates that procedures and remedies shall be 
available to both Parties, however, what those procedures and remedies entail remains for each 
Party to determine for themselves. 
The second and more restrictive system may be described as a prevention system, as art 18.53.2 
operates to prevent or preclude the granting of marketing authorisation for a generic 
pharmaceutical product where there is an applicable and valid patent. It is important to note 
that art 18.53.2 makes clear that this system is an alternative to the first, thereby making 
notification the preferred system. Again, knowledge of any applicable patents is presumably 
required. Article 18.53.2 also makes clear that preclusion is based upon patent information 
previously submitted to the marketing authority or direct coordination between the marketing 
authority and the patent office. While patent information may have initially been submitted to 
the marketing authority when obtaining prior authorisation, coordination may be necessary to 
determine whether a pharmaceutical product previously marketed remains under patent.  
                                                 
124 TPP Agreement, above n 7, art 18.53.1(b) and (c). 
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Article 18.53.2 does, however, contain a proviso to the effect that the granting of marketing 
authorisation shall be precluded “unless by consent or acquiescence of the patent holder.” 
While consent requires express permission, acquiescence requires acceptance without 
protest.125 This means that, provided there is no objection, the marketing authority may still 
grant marketing authorisation to a generic pharmaceutical product. In practice, this proviso 
may likely be irrelevant as only in rare cases will a patent holder consent or acquiesce to the 
granting of marketing authorisation for a product marketed in violation of its patent. However, 
the implication of the proviso is that a patent holder must object in order for the granting of 
marketing authorisation to be precluded. This interpretation would suggest that a patent holder 
must be notified of a pending marketing authorisation application in order to object. The 
difference between the two systems may therefore be seen as the end result: whether the 
granting of marketing authorisation is automatically precluded upon objection by the patent 
holder, or whether the patent holder must seek legal remedies to ensure marketing authorisation 
is not granted despite their objection. 
The most significant difference between the patent linkage provisions in CETA and those in 
the CPTPP is that the CPTPP obliges Parties to adopt a patent linkage system while CETA 
does not. Rather, CETA recognises that some Parties may permit such a system without 
obliging other Parties to adopt one. However, the preferred patent linkage system in the TPP 
Agreement would see the formation of a notification system which would allow patent holders 
to seek remedies prior to the granting of marketing authorisation, rather than a system which 
would preclude the granting of marketing authorisation where there is an applicable patent. Of 
the two systems, the notification system carries the least impact and, for many Parties, may be 
implemented with little amendment to domestic laws. In this respect, it could be argued that 
there is very little practical difference between a provision that recognises a Party’s patent 
linkage system and a provision that requires very little amendment to a Party’s domestic law 
in order to be compliant.  
(c) Patentable subject matter: second use patents 
Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that a patent may be granted to any invention 
provided it is new, involves an inventive step and is capable of industrial application. The 
TRIPS Agreement does not define these concepts, leaving it to individual Members to provide 
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a reasonable interpretation instead.126 Recent developments relating to pharmaceuticals have 
seen the broadening of the interpretation of ‘new’ to include new uses of known therapeutic 
products, protected as second use patents. While the TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit a 
Member from adopting a broader interpretation and consequently second use patents, any trade 
agreement that requires the adoption of such an interpretation is above the requirements of the 
TRIPS Agreement and may therefore be deemed TRIPS-plus.  
Similarly, CETA makes no provision for second use patents. In fact, CETA makes no reference 
to patentable subject matter at all. The failure to include a provision on patentable subject 
matter must be interpreted in conjunction with art 20.2.1 of CETA, which provides that the 
provisions of CETA “complement the rights and obligations between the Parties under the 
TRIPS Agreement.” This means that in the absence of specific provision, the Parties intended 
for the rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement to prevail with respect to patentable 
subject matter. 
In comparison to CETA, the TPP Agreement does contain a provision on patentable subject 
matter, found in art 18.37. Overall, the wording used in art 18.37 is very similar to that in art 
27 of the TRIPS Agreement. Article 18.37.1 sets forth the same definition of patentable subject 
matter, which includes the three key elements: new, involves an inventive step and is capable 
of industrial application. The TPP Agreement similarly contains little assistance on the 
interpretation of those elements,127 leaving it largely to each Party to determine for themselves. 
Given the high degree of similarity between the TPP Agreement and the TRIPS Agreement 
with respect to patentable subject matter, and the intention of the parties to CETA for the rights 
and obligations of the TRIPS Agreement to prevail, there is no effective difference between 
CETA and the TPP Agreement in this respect. 
The most significant difference between CETA and the TPP Agreement is the inclusion of a 
clause relating to second use patents. This is contained in art 18.37.2 of the TPP Agreement, 
which provides: 
                                                 
126 Note that footnote 5 of the TRIPS Agreement provides alternative terms for ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of 
industrial application’, being ‘non-obvious’ and ‘useful’, respectively. 
127 Note that footnote 30 (Chapter 18) of the TPP Agreement similarly provides alternative definitions for 
‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’, which are to be synonymous with the terms ‘non-
obvious’ and ‘useful’ respectively. Note also that footnote 30 directs each Party to consider whether the claimed 
invention would have been obvious to a person skilled or having ordinary skill in the art, having regard to the 
prior art, when determining inventive step. 
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Subject to paragraphs 3 and 4 and consistent with paragraph 1, each Party confirms that patents 
are available for inventions claimed as at least one of the following: new uses of a known 
product, new methods of using a known product, or new processes of using a known product. 
A Party may limit those new processes to those that do not claim the use of the product as such. 
As evident from the above provision, the Parties to the TPP Agreement confirm that patents 
are available for three kinds of second uses. A Party must ensure that at least one of those 
second uses is claimable within its domestic law, although all three qualify for patentability. 
The first, new use of a known product, can be understood as the “substance x for use in the 
treatment of disease y”.128 There is no change to the product itself, but a change to the disease 
that it is now used to treat. The second, new method of using a known product, can be 
understood as no change to the chemical composition of the product but a change in the method 
of administration in its treatment of a disease, for example, from oral administration to 
intravenous injection. The third, new processes of using a known product, can be understood 
as “the use of product x for the manufacture of a medicament for the treatment of disease y”.129 
Here, the chemical composition of the product has been changed as it has been used to 
manufacture a new pharmaceutical product. This third type, known as a ‘Swiss-type claim’, 
would likely have the most success in satisfying the three elements of patentability as the first 
two would have difficulty establishing novelty. In both these cases, the new use or new method 
may be described as ‘suitable for’ the treatment of a disease, but nothing of significance has 
changed to the product itself for that use or method to be considered ‘new’. However, this 
would depend on each Party’s interpretation of the three key elements of patentability and their 
domestic law.  
The use of the words “each Party confirms” implies that each Party to the TPP Agreement 
already permits at least one of the second uses listed in art 18.37.2. The purpose of art 18.37.2 
can be seen as the locking-in of existing policies relating to second use patents so that they may 
not be reversed or amended in a way to limit their endorsement. Article 18.37.2 does not require 
the Parties to implement anything additional to what is already provided for in their domestic 
law. The effective difference between the TPP Agreement and CETA therefore lies in the 
flexibility of the Parties to determine future domestic policies relating to second use patents. 
                                                 
128 European Patent Office “Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office” (November 2018), Part G 
– Patentability, Chapter VI – Novelty at 7.1. 
129 At 7.1. 
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It is important to note that art 18.37.2 has been suspended by the CPTPP and does not apply. 
The effect of this suspension is that each Party retains the flexibility to determine the issue of 
second use patents by not locking-in existing policies, but nor does it prohibit their use.  
2 Regulatory protection: data and market exclusivity 
While data and market exclusivity are to be treated as their own separate forms of regulatory 
protection, they often go hand in hand or may be viewed as two sides of the same coin. For this 
reason, they shall be considered concurrently here. 
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement sets forth the international standard for the protection of 
undisclosed data or confidential information (trade secrets), including the protection of 
pharmaceutical clinical or test data submitted for marketing authorisation. It does not, however, 
make any reference to market exclusivity. The purpose of art 39 is to protect undisclosed 
information against unfair competition, described in art 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention as 
“[a]ny act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters”. 
Acts which may constitute unfair competition include acts designed to create confusion as to 
the goods or activities of a competitor, false allegations designed to discredit a competitor and 
allegations designed to mislead the public in any way about a competitors’ goods.130  
Protection for undisclosed clinical or test data is afforded in art 39.3, which requires Members 
to protect such data against unfair commercial use and disclosure where that data is submitted 
in order to obtain marketing authorisation for a new pharmaceutical product.131 Unfair 
commercial use includes the use of that data by a generic manufacturer when obtaining 
marketing authorisation for their product, as such use confers on them a significant advantage 
to the detriment of the originator manufacturer. Article 39.3 makes it clear that protection must 
be afforded where submission of undisclosed data is a condition for obtaining marketing 
authorisation. Disclosure may, however, be permitted where it is necessary to protect the public 
or where steps have been taken to ensure protection against unfair commercial use. 
One issue left unresolved by the TRIPS Agreement is how that undisclosed data should be 
‘protected’. A helpful interpretation is provided in art 39.2 which states, in relation to the more 
general undisclosed information, that “natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of 
                                                 
130 Paris Convention, above n 13, art 10bis(3). 




preventing information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or 
used by others without their consent”. Even so, this statement relates more to the result or aim 
of the protection, being the prevention of disclosure, rather than any requirement as to how 
protection is to be achieved. In addition, art 39.3 does not refer to any appropriate length of 
time which the data ought to be protected for. This is despite earlier drafts of the TRIPS 
Agreement including provisions which, if adopted, would have imposed a minimum duration 
of protection.132 
Both data and market exclusivity have become common features within plurilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements, of which CETA and the TPP Agreement are no exception. It is 
important to note that data and market exclusivity provisions within the TPP Agreement have 
been suspended by art 2 of the CPTPP. Nevertheless, those provisions remain relevant as an 
indicator of the provisions New Zealand may consider acceptable within an FTA and shall 
therefore be examined. 
Article 20.29 of CETA sets out the protection of undisclosed data related to pharmaceutical 
products, providing the following: 
1. If a Party requires, as a condition for authorising the marketing of pharmaceutical 
products that utilise new chemical entities … the submission of undisclosed test or other data 
necessary to determine whether the use of those products is safe and effective, the Party shall 
protect such data against disclosure, if the origination of such data involves considerable effort, 
except where the disclosure is necessary to protect the public or unless steps are taken to ensure 
that the data are protected against unfair commercial use. 
2. Each Party shall provide that for data subject to paragraph 1 that are submitted to the 
Party after the date of entry into force of this Agreement: 
(a) no person other than the person who submitted them may, without the latter’s 
permission, rely on such data in support of an application for an authorisation 
during a period of not less than six years from the date on which the Party 
granted authorisation to the person that produced the data for authorisation … 
Article 20.29.1 utilises very similar language to art 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, with the 
most significant difference being the removal of protection against unfair commercial use from 
the provision, focusing on protection against disclosure instead. This provides a stricter 
                                                 
132 See World Trade Organization Chairman’s Report to the GNG, above n 105, Part III, Section 7 at 1A.3 and 
World Trade Organization “Draft Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Trade Negotiations Committee” (MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev. 1, 3-7 December 1990), art 42(4A). 
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standard than art 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, as for there to be unfair commercial use a 
disclosure must have been made. Article 20.29 does, however, like art 39.3 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, envisage that disclosure may be permitted where steps have been taken to ensure 
the data is protected against unfair commercial use. While this would not likely provide any 
assistance to a generic manufacturer who produces products for commercial sale, it may aid 
manufacturers who produce generic pharmaceutical products under compulsory licences either 
for the domestic market or for export. Irrespective of the intention behind the manufacture of 
a generic pharmaceutical product, the product nevertheless needs to be proven safe and 
effective in order for it be marketed. As both Parties to CETA permit the granting of 
compulsory licences in their domestic legislation, this exception to the protection against 
disclosure may be crucial in the event of a national health emergency, either domestically or 
internationally. The relationship between data exclusivity provisions and compulsory licencing 
is outside the scope of this thesis; however, it provides the basis for future research. 
Article 20.29.2(a) goes beyond the TRIPS Agreement by specifying a period of time for which 
the undisclosed test data referred to in art 20.29.1 must be protected for; being no less than six 
years from the date of marketing authorisation. This imposes a minimum period of protection 
in which the test data may not be utilised by a generic manufacturer in support of their 
application for marketing authorisation. The resulting period of data exclusivity safeguards the 
originator manufacturer’s product from competition, ensuring the manufacturer alone may reap 
the benefits during this period. The rationale behind the adoption of a period of six years data 
exclusivity may be seen as a means to lock-in existing domestic law,133 so that either Party may 
impose a longer exclusivity period but may not decrease it below six years.  
In addition to specifying a minimum period of data exclusivity, art 20.29.2(a) arguably sets a 
higher standard of protection by ensuring the protection of undisclosed data against reliance 
rather than unfair commercial use. Unless the marketing authority actually uses the originator 
manufacturer’s data, it is arguable that mere reliance is not use. To contextualise, a generic 
manufacturer need only prove that their product is bioequivalent to the originator’s product. 
Provided that bioequivalence is proven, the marketing authority may accept the application, 
thereby relying on the originator’s data only to the extent of ensuring that the two products are 
                                                 
133 Note that Canada imposes a minimum period of six years data exclusivity while the EU imposes a minimum 
period of eight years. See Food and Drug Regulations, s C.08.004.1(3) and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency [2004] OJ L136/1, art 14.11. 
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indeed the same. According to Correa, to argue that mere reliance is in fact use would introduce 
an interpretation that was not mandated by the TRIPS Agreement and that would create undue 
barriers to accessing medicines.134 For the above reason, protection against reliance arguably 
affords more protection than protection against unfair commercial use. On the other hand, the 
practical effect of reliance on that data is to grant a commercial benefit by allowing the 
competitor to make a profit, therefore reliance arguably ought to nevertheless be considered as 
unfair commercial use.135 
The adoption of ‘reliance’ within CETA clarifies the position of the Parties towards the 
protection of undisclosed data in light of art 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement. The aim of the 
provision may therefore be understood as preventing the utilisation of undisclosed data by a 
generic manufacturer in order to derive a commercial benefit, whether or not the data is actually 
used or merely relied upon. The exception to this prevention is where express permission to 
rely on the data has been granted by the owner of the data. As this would lead to increased 
competition and lost profits to the originator manufacturer, it may be assumed that express 
permission may often be withheld. 
In addition to a six-year period of data exclusivity, CETA provides for a period of market 
exclusivity. Article 20.29(b) provides the following: 
A Party shall not grant an authorisation to any person who relies on such data during a period 
of not less than eight years from the date on which the Party granted the authorisation to the 
person that produced the data for the authorisation, unless the person that produced these data 
provides permission. 
While art 20.29(a) pertains to the reliance on undisclosed data in support of an application for 
marketing authorisation, art 20.29(b) pertains to the granting of that marketing authorisation. 
In the former, a generic manufacturer may not rely on that data for a period of six years from 
the date on which marketing authorisation was granted to the data owner. After the six years 
have passed, the generic manufacturer may rely on that data in support of their application to 
have their own product marketed. However, art 20.29(b) operates to prevent the granting of 
marketing authorisation until a period of eight years has passed from the date on which 
marketing authorisation was granted to the data owner. The result is a six-year period of data 
                                                 
134 Carlos Maria Correa Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals: Implementing 
the Standards of the TRIPS Agreement (Switzerland, South Centre, 2002) at 32. 
135 G Lee Skillington and Eric M Solovy “The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by Article 39.3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement” (2003) 24(1) Nw J Int’l L & Bus 1 at 29-30. 
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exclusivity, and a further two-year period of market exclusivity, where the data may be relied 
upon, but the marketing authorisation may not be granted until the full eight years has passed. 
The practical effect is that the originator manufacturer has an eight-year monopoly on their 
pharmaceutical product that is protected through CETA’s regulatory regime, in addition to or 
irrespective of the existence of a patent. 
Similar to art 20.29(a), the period of market exclusivity may be waived with the express 
permission of the data owner. Again, the increased competition and loss of profits would render 
any waiver unlikely. The exception may be in order for the originator manufacturer to market 
its own generic version of the original product; however, with lack of competition, the purpose 
would be to obtain authorisation in order to release that product as soon as the period of market 
exclusivity has ceased and the market is flooded with other generic versions. 
Article 18.50.1(a) of the TPP Agreement concerns the protection of undisclosed test or other 
data relating to new pharmaceutical products, providing the following: 
If a Party requires, as a condition for granting marketing approval for a new pharmaceutical 
product, the submission of undisclosed test or other data concerning the safety and efficacy of 
the product, that Party shall not permit third persons, without the consent of the person that 
previously submitted such information, to market the same or a similar product on the basis of: 
 (i) that information; or 
 (ii) the marketing approval granted to the person that submitted such  
  information, 
for at least five years from the date of marketing approval of the new pharmaceutical product in 
the territory of the Party. 
Unlike both the TRIPS Agreement and CETA, art 18.50.1(a) makes no reference to unfair 
competition or the protection of undisclosed data against disclosure. Instead, the purpose is to 
prevent the marketing of a generic product where the application is based on information or 
data previously submitted or the prior marketing authorisation of a pharmaceutical product. 
The emphasis therefore lies in ensuring that products which do rely on undisclosed data are not 
marketed based on that data, rather than precluding reliance on that data in support of an 
application for market authorisation. In this respect, the provision has the primary aim of 
ensuring market exclusivity rather than data exclusivity. This market exclusivity applies for a 
period of at least five years from the date of marketing authorisation. 
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The lack of protection against disclosure does not necessarily mean that the Parties to the TPP 
Agreement are under no obligation to protect undisclosed test or other data submitted in support 
of an application for marketing authorisation. All Parties to the TPP Agreement are also WTO 
Members, therefore they remain bound to comply with art 39 of the TRIPS Agreement. It may 
therefore be speculated that, as the TRIPS Agreement provides general protection for 
undisclosed data against disclosure, the Parties deemed it unnecessary to reiterate this in the 
TPP Agreement. 
Article 18.50.1(a) does not expressly distinguish between or refer to either ‘use’ or ‘rely’. 
Rather it uses the phrase ‘on the basis of’. In its ordinary usage ‘basis’ means the underlying 
support or foundation for something, such as a process.136 In any given context, this could 
include either ‘use’ or ‘rely’ or both, as is the case here. Article 18.50.1(a) provides that a 
generic product may not be marketed on the basis of undisclosed test or other data previously 
submitted or prior marketing approval of a pharmaceutical product. In the former, it is the use 
of the undisclosed data that provides the underlying support for the generic products’ 
application for marketing authorisation, while in the latter it is reliance on prior marketing 
authorisation. Similar to CETA, the aim is to prevent the utilisation of undisclosed data, 
whether that data is actually used or indirectly used by way of reliance on prior marketing 
authorisation. 
Article 18.50 continues by addressing specific concerns relating to the granting of marketing 
authorisation where there is reliance on undisclosed data or other information. Article 
18.50.1(b) precludes the granting of marketing authorisation for a generic product which relies 
upon prior marketing authorisation that was obtained based upon evidence of prior marketing 
authorisation of the same product in another territory. In other words, even where the originator 
manufacturer relies upon prior marketing authorisation of its own product in another territory, 
a generic manufacturer may still not rely on that marketing authorisation in support of its own 
application. It may be inferred that this is due to the fact that the undisclosed test or other data 
has nevertheless been submitted by the originator manufacturer, irrespective of which territory 
that data was submitted in. Reliance on prior marketing approval in another territory is still 
reliance on the undisclosed test or other data.  
Article 18.50.2 goes on to apply art 18.50.1, with the necessary changes, for a period of at least 
three years to new clinical information submitted in relation to a new second use of a previously 
                                                 
136 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, above n 113, ‘basis’. 
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approved pharmaceutical product, or for a period of at least five years for a new pharmaceutical 
product that contains a chemical entity not previously approved in that Party. Finally, art 
18.50.3 provides an exception to art 18.50 by permitting a Party to take measures to protect 
public health in accordance with the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and any waiver 
or amendment to the TRIPS Agreement done in relation to that Declaration. This may include 
the granting of marketing authorisation to a generic pharmaceutical product manufactured 
under art 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement, even where the application was based upon 
undisclosed test or other data or prior marketing authorisation. 
The TPP Agreement also affords specific protection to new biologics, separate from the general 
protection for new pharmaceutical products. Article 18.51.1 provides the following: 
With regard to protecting new biologics, a Party shall either: 
(a) with respect to the first marketing approval in a Party of a new pharmaceutical 
product that is or contains a biologic, provide effective market protection 
through the implementation of Article 18.50.1 (Protection of Undisclosed Test 
or Other Data) and Article 18.50.3, mutatis mutandis,  for a period of at least 
eight years from the date of first marketing approval of that product in that 
Party; or, alternatively, 
(b) with respect to the first marketing approval in a Party of a new pharmaceutical 
product that is or contains a biologic, provide effective market protection: 
  (i) through the implementation of Article 18.50.1 (Protection of  
   Undisclosed Test or Other Data) and Article 18.50.3, mutatis  
   mutandis, for a period of at least five years from the date of first 
   marketing approval of that product in that Party, 
  (ii) through other measures, and 
  (iii) recognising that market circumstances also contribute to effective 
   market protection 
  to deliver a comparable outcome in the market.137 
A biologic is a drug created from a living organism, which often consists of large and complex 
molecules. This is opposed to traditional small molecule pharmaceutical products which are 
                                                 
137 TPP Agreement, above n 7, footnote 59: Nothing requires a Party to extend the protection of this paragraph to: 
(a) any second or subsequent marketing approval of such a pharmaceutical product; or 
(b) a pharmaceutical product that is or contains a previously approved biologic. 
Footnote 60 omitted. 
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chemically synthesised. Biologics require a complex and costly development process, hence 
the separate and longer period of protection afforded in art 18.51.1(a). 
Article 18.51 mandates the effective market protection of biologics with respect to the first 
marketing authorisation in a Party. It is important to note that art 18.51 only applies to the first 
marketing authorisation. Footnote 59 (Chapter 18) makes it clear that it does not apply to any 
second or subsequent marketing authorisation or to a product that contains a previously 
approved biologic. As to the aim of the provision, while no definition is provided for effective 
market protection, art 18.51.1 provides two options for how this is to be achieved. The first is 
through the implementation of art 18.50.1, in compliance with the exception for public health 
set forth in art 18.50.3.138 This is to be implemented for a period of eight years instead of the 
five years set down in art 18.50.1.139 Alternatively, the Parties may choose to adopt a three-
tiered protection scheme, which offers the Parties a level of independent choice in how 
protection is to be implemented.140 
The first tier requires the direct implementation of art 18.50.1, in compliance with the exception 
for public health set forth in art 18.50.3.141 In addition, protection is to be implemented through 
other measures and general market circumstances to deliver a comparable market outcome.142 
Article 18.51(b) provides no guidance for the interpretation of ‘other measures’, leaving the 
provision ambiguous and therefore subject to independent interpretation. As the aim of art 
18.50.1 is to prevent the marketing of a generic product which relies on test or other data 
submitted in support of a previous marketing authorisation, it could be inferred that ‘other 
measures’ may include any measure which would obtain a similar result. This may include 
measures that the Parties are already obliged to implement, such as those relating to patent term 
and patent linkage. It could also include specific measures which would permit marketing 
authorisation after the initial five-year period in order to manufacture the generic product for 
the purpose of stockpiling, while preventing the sale of that product for a further specified 
period of time. The crucial issue for each Party to determine for themselves would be whether 
those measures provide an outcome ‘comparable’ to an eight-year period of effective market 
protection. Finally, the third tier recognises the contribution of market circumstances to 
effective market protection. The development of biosimilars is much costlier than it is for small 
                                                 
138 Art 18.51(a). 
139 Art 18.51(a). 
140 Art 18.51(b). 
141 Art 18.51(b)(i). 
142 Art 18.51(b)(ii) and (iii). 
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molecule generic products, which means that the marketed price of a biosimilar may not be 
drastically cheaper than for a biologic. This puts pressure on the biosimilar manufacturer who 
may be less inclined to develop such products, resulting in a lack of competition on the market 
to the benefit of the biologic manufacturer. 
A comparative analysis between the data and market exclusivity provisions of CETA and those 
of the TPP Agreement highlight numerous differences between the agreements. However, 
similar to the provisions relating to patent term restoration, those differences do not render the 
two agreements irreconcilable or mutually exclusive. 
The protection of undisclosed data within CETA takes the form of both data and market 
exclusivity schemes, whilst in the TPP Agreement it only takes the form of the latter. The 
failure of the TPP Agreement to include a provision relating to data exclusivity does not 
necessarily mean that the Parties are under no obligation to protect undisclosed test or other 
data, as they are bound to comply with art 39 of the TRIPS Agreement. In this respect, they are 
bound to protect such data against disclosure and from unfair commercial use. CETA, on the 
other hand, provides for a period of data exclusivity, where the Parties to that Agreement may 
not permit a generic manufacturer to rely on undisclosed data submitted by an originator 
manufacturer in support of their own application for marketing authorisation. This is beyond 
the protection offered by art 39 of TRIPS as it prevents mere reliance on the data, without the 
actual use or disclosure of it. 
Despite the omission of a data exclusivity scheme in the TPP Agreement, the practical effect 
resulting from the schemes of both agreements is identical if the overall intention of the Parties 
is to prevent the access onto the market of a generic product for a specified period of time, 
thereby providing a monopoly to the originator manufacturer. Precluding the reliance on data 
previously submitted by an originator manufacturer prevents the generic manufacturer from 
applying for marketing authorisation without conducting their own clinical trials. Even after 
reliance is permitted, marketing authorisation may not be granted for a further specified time 
under CETA. The effect is that, unless the generic manufacturer conducts their own trials, the 
generic product is precluded from entering the market until the period of market exclusivity 
expires. The same result is achieved under the TPP Agreement, which prohibits the granting 
of marketing authorisation where the application relies on data previously submitted for a 
specified period of time. Even if the intention of the Parties to CETA is to prevent reliance on 
the data, the practical effect remains substantially the same; for once a generic manufacturer’s 
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application has been processed in compliance with the TPP Agreement, they still may not 
market their product until the specified period has expired. 
The significant difference between data exclusivity and market exclusivity is therefore not the 
practical effect, as both provide a monopoly to the originator manufacturer until the period of 
exclusivity expires. Rather, it relates to timing. Only upon the expiry of the period of data 
exclusivity can a generic manufacturer submit its application for marketing authorisation. It 
then has to further wait for this application to be processed and approved before it may market 
its product. By contrast, under a market exclusivity scheme, a generic manufacturer may submit 
its application, and have it processed and approved, so that upon the expiry of the period of 
market exclusivity it may market its product immediately. As both agreements contain periods 
of market exclusivity, the practical difference between them is not so much the omission of a 
data exclusivity scheme from the TPP Agreement but the overall period of exclusivity granted 
under each Agreement and the resulting period of monopoly afforded to the originator product. 
The overall length of exclusivity provided under CETA is eight years, with six years data 
exclusivity and a further two years market exclusivity. In comparison, the TPP Agreement 
provides a minimum period of five years market exclusivity. Naturally, the practical effect of 
these periods of exclusivity is that, under the TPP Agreement, a generic product must only wait 
five years until it may be marketed, whereas a product marketed in a territory which is party to 
CETA must wait eight years. As previously mentioned, the rationale behind the periods of 
exclusivity within CETA may be seen as a means to lock-in existing domestic law. The same 
could similarly be said of the period of exclusivity within the TPP Agreement or may instead 
be seen as a compromise between parties with diverse laws on this matter.143 The periods of 
time specified within each agreement may therefore be seen as the result of negotiation rather 
than a reflection of each Party’s initial objective or intention. In this respect, they are arbitrary 
periods of time which may be subject to change in future agreements depending on the parties 
involved. 
Finally, there are differences between the agreements relating to the scope of the exclusivity 
schemes. These differences have principally been addressed above. For example, the aim of 
                                                 
143 For example, New Zealand provides a period of 5 years data exclusivity under s23B of the Medicines Act 
1981, the United States provides a period of 5 years exclusivity for a new chemical entity and 7 years exclusivity 
for an orphan drug under s314.108 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and Japan informally provides a period of 
8 years data exclusivity for new drugs under art 14-4 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 1960. See also TPP 
Agreement, above n 7, art 18.83 for the transition periods required by Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru 
and Vietnam in order to implement art 18.50 or art 18.51, or both. 
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the exclusivity scheme under CETA is to preclude the reliance on previously submitted data 
used to support an application for marketing authorisation, as the focus is on data exclusivity. 
Whereas the aim under the TPP Agreement is to prohibit the marketing of a generic product 
where its application is based on previously submitted data or prior marketing authorisation, 
as the focus is on market exclusivity. However, the practical effect of each scheme is the same. 
Similarly, the language used when referring to the ‘use’ of the data in support of an application 
for marketing authorisation differs between the agreements. While CETA places emphasis on 
the ‘reliance’ on previously submitted data, the TPP Agreement places emphasis on 
applications made ‘on the basis of’ previously submitted data or prior marketing authorisation. 
As discussed above, the latter phrase incorporates the term ‘rely’ as part of its ordinary meaning 
and any application made on the basis of prior marketing authorisation is made on reliance 
rather than actual use. While the terms differ, the effect is the same.  
The TPP Agreement, however, contains a separate provision which concerns the protection of 
undisclosed test or other data relating to biologics, whereas CETA does not include a similar 
provision. Rather, biologics are incorporated within the data and exclusivity schemes of CETA 
alongside small molecule drugs. This means that biologics in CETA are protected for a period 
of eight years, which is comparable to the first and stronger form of protection mandated under 
the TPP Agreement. Other than providing recognition for the particular situation of biologics, 
the protection afforded to biologics under the TPP Agreement does not add anything 
significantly different to the protection afforded to biologics under CETA. 
Based on the above analysis, it is apparent that, while there are differences between the data 
and market exclusivity schemes in the two agreements, there is little significant difference in 
the overall practical effect of the schemes. The omission of data exclusivity from the TPP 
Agreement does not render the two exclusivity schemes either irreconcilable or mutually 
exclusive. 
C Interpretation and Comparative Analysis of Domestic Law: European Union and New 
 Zealand 
The above section analysed and compared TRIPS-plus protections relating to pharmaceuticals 
within CETA, the TPP Agreement and the CPTPP, with the TRIPS Agreement providing a 
baseline for comparison. The purpose of that section was to identify those protections which 
may be included within an EU-NZ FTA and the existence of any significant differences 
between the protections which may need to be considered by the Parties during the course of 
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negotiations. It is recognised by the researcher that international trade agreements are the result 
of negotiation and as such may be seen as culminations of multiple interests across multiple 
parties. As interests are often diverse between negotiating parties, international trade 
agreements may not accurately reflect the domestic position of any given party. The aim of this 
section is therefore to provide a comparative interpretative analysis of EU and New Zealand 
domestic law relating to the protection of pharmaceuticals in order to ascertain the respective 
positions of the parties and to determine any challenges or differences between their respective 
laws.  
First, the protection of IPRs within the EU must be discussed. The EU has the exclusive 
competence to legislate in areas listed in art 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).144 One of these areas is the common commercial policy, which includes “the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property”.145 The Court of Justice of the European Union 
has interpreted this to include, in its entirety, the TRIPS Agreement.146 As a result, all external 
matters relating to IPRs fall within the exclusive competence of the EU. Internal matters, 
however, are shared between the EU and the Member States.147 In the present context, the role 
of the EU is the establishment of the “competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market”.148 While “rules on intellectual property are essential in order to maintain 
competition undistorted on the internal market”, they do not necessarily constitute competition 
rules.149 Unless otherwise expressly stated therein, exclusive EU competence in the internal 
market may only be exercised within the ambit of the provisions of the TFEU which relate to 
competition.150 Within the context of the shared competence, however, the EU may also 
“establish measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform 
protection of intellectual property rights throughout the Union”, which includes the 
establishment of a centralised Union-wide authorisation body.151 The aim of that provision is 
                                                 
144 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 202 (07 June 2016) 
[hereinafter, TFEU]. 
145 Art 207.1. 
146 Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd and Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH v DEMO Anonimos 
Viomikhaniki kai Emporiki Etairia Farmakon [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:520 at 52-59. 
147 TFEU, above n 144, art 4.2(a). 
148 Art 3.1. 
149 Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v Council of the European Union 
[2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:240 at 22. 
150 At 23. 
151 TFEU, above n 144, art 118. 
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to provide an EU-wide IP regime, thereby removing barriers relating to national rules and 
regulations, which co-exists alongside national IP regimes. 
IP protections relating to pharmaceuticals have not managed to avoid the complex 
arrangements highlighted above. This is particularly so in relation to patent protection, which 
shall be discussed below. As the purpose of this thesis is to identify those protections which 
may be included within an EU-NZ FTA, the scope of this section shall be limited to legal 
protection at the EU- or interstate-level. Any reference to national laws will be done for the 
purpose of interpretation or example only. 
Domestic legal protection of pharmaceuticals can also be broadly divided into two categories: 
patent protection and regulatory protection. 
1 Patent protection 
Patent law may be considered one of the least harmonised areas of IP law within the EU. That 
said, attempts to create an EU unitary patent system have achieved a high level of success in 
recent years, with the entry into force of the EU regulations on the creation of a unitary patent 
system152 and the signing of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement).153 
Commencement of this system has, however, been stalled due to outstanding ratifications of 
the UPC Agreement.154 For the meantime, patent protection is granted either by way of a 
national patent or a European patent, the latter being granted centrally under the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) by the European Patent Office (EPO).155 The result is a dual-system 
approach: an inventor may choose to apply for a patent in each Member State they want their 
invention to be protected in, or they may choose to apply for one single European patent to be 
applicable in any specified Member State. While the granting of the patent may take place at 
                                                 
152 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection [2012] OJ L 361/1 and 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements [2012] OJ L 361/89. 
153 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court OJ C 175/1 (signed 20 July 2013, not yet in force). 
154 See art 89 for entry into force. Note that ratification is required by Germany in order for the Agreement to enter 
into force. European Patent Office “When will the Unitary Patent system start?” <www.epo.org/law-
practice/unitary/unitary-patent/start.html>. 
155 Convention on the Grant of European Patents 1065 UNTS 199 (signed 05 October 1973, entered into force 07 
October 1977, as revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC 
of 29 November 2000) [hereinafter EPC]. 
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either level, a European patent is to “have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions 
as a national patent”.156 
It is important to note that, while signatories of the EPC include all current Member States of 
the EU, the EPO is an intergovernmental organisation and is not an institution of the EU. 
However, the creation of an EU unitary patent has expressly occurred under the auspices of a 
‘special agreement’ in accordance with the provisions of the EPC,157 and shall take effect as a 
European patent which benefits from unitary effect.158 In addition, the EPC establishes a system 
of law, common to those party to the Convention, for the granting of patents.159 This includes 
subject matters relating to the granting of patents which are in compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement and which fall in their entirety within the exclusive competence of the EU. For 
these reasons, the EPC shall be considered in this section as EU domestic law, in so far as it is 
applicable in this context. 
(a) Patent term: extension/restoration 
Article 63(1) of the EPC provides that “the term of the European patent shall be 20 years from 
the date of filing of the application”. This is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Article 
63(2) goes on to provide that nothing in art 63(1) limits the “right of a Contracting State to 
extend the term of a European patent, or to grant corresponding protection which follows 
immediately on expiry of the term of the patent”. This can be interpreted to mean an extension 
of the patent term itself or the granting of additional protection, such as sui generis protection. 
It is important to note that art 63 does not oblige parties to extend or grant corresponding patent 
protection after the expiry of the patent term. Rather, the use of the phrase “nothing … shall 
limit the right” indicates that the parties to the EPC have the right to enact such laws at their 
discretion, which is not affected by the imposition of a 20-year patent term. Where a party does 
enact such laws, however, those laws apply to European patents under the same conditions as 
those applying to national patents.160 
Patent term restoration is mandated within the EU under Regulation No 469/2009.161 
Recognising the insufficient period of effective patent protection afforded to pharmaceutical 
                                                 
156 Art 2(2). 
157 Art 142(1). 
158 Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012, above n 152, art 3.1. 
159 EPC, above n 155, art 1.  
160 Art 63(2). 
161 Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the 
supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (Codified version) [2009] OJ L 152/1. Note that 
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products within the EU,162 the Regulation prescribes rules concerning the granting and 
conditions of a supplementary protection certificate (SPC), effective as corresponding patent 
protection after the expiry of the patent term. An SPC is available for any pharmaceutical 
product protected by a patent currently in force and which has obtained marketing 
authorisation, provided both SPC and marketing authorisation are the first of their kind granted 
to that particular product.163 Article 5 makes clear that the SPC “shall confer the same rights as 
conferred by the basic patent and shall be subject to the same limitations and the same 
obligations”, thereby having the same effect. 
The protection conferred by an SPC extends only to the product covered by the market 
authorisation and for any use of that product authorised prior to the expiry of the SPC.164 This 
has implications for second use patents, as the SPC would extend to that second use provided 
that patent is obtained prior to the expiry of the SPC. This is irrespective of whether the holder 
of the second use patent and the SPC are the same. An SPC would not, however, be applicable 
to a second use patent covering a product which has already been the subject of an SPC; the 
emphasis being the product, not the patent. 
Article 13 reinforces that the SPC takes effect at the end of the patent term and sets forth the 
method for determining the duration of the certificate; being the period between the filing of 
the patent application and the granting of market authorisation, minus five years. 
Notwithstanding that calculation, the overall duration of the SPC may not exceed five years.165 
This may, however, be extended by a period of six months where the patent relates to a product 
developed in order to meet the needs of the paediatric population.166  
Comparing Regulation No 469/2009 with the sui generis protection conferred under art 20.27 
of CETA, it is evident that there is a high degree of similarity between the two documents. As 
Canada had no domestic patent term extension scheme in force prior to the enactment of CETA, 
it can be inferred that the sui generis protection within CETA is a broad reflection of EU law. 
This does not necessarily mean that the interests of Canada are not also reflected within those 
                                                 
supplementary protection certificates have been available since 1992 under Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1768/92, above n 36. 
162 Regulation (EC) No 469/2009, above n 161, preamble at (4). 
163 Art 3. 
164 Art 4. 
165 Art 13.2. 
166 Art 13.3. Note that this extension may only take effect where art 36 of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on medicinal products for paediatric use and 
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provisions. It may be that the established patent term restoration scheme of the EU was deemed 
appropriate by both parties to CETA, with only minor adjustments necessary in order to suit 
the particular interests of Canada. 
New Zealand also provides a minimum term of patent protection of 20 years. This is 
encapsulated within s 20(1) of the Patents Act 2013 and applies from the patent date, being 
“the filing date of the relevant complete specification”.167 Unlike the EU, New Zealand does 
not provide for patent term extension or restoration. As part of its obligations under arts 18.46 
and 18.48 of the TPP Agreement, however, New Zealand passed legislation in order to enact a 
patent term extension scheme.168 This scheme would permit the granting of patent term 
extensions where there are delays in the granting of the patent or where there is unreasonable 
curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of the marketing authorisation process. While 
the legislation has been passed, it has not yet entered into force; nor will it until the TPP 
Agreement enters into force.169 As the US has notified that it has no intention of becoming a 
Party to that Agreement, it is uncertain whether the legislation may ever enter into force. 
Comparing the domestic legal systems of the EU and New Zealand, it is clear that any difficulty 
in the area of patent term will be in relation to a patent term extension/restoration scheme. This 
is evident by the fact that New Zealand has no such scheme, as opposed to the protection 
afforded under the EU’s SPC scheme. In addition, the high degree of similarity between the 
EU domestic legal position and the sui generis protection afforded under CETA emphasises 
the interest of the EU in including such provisions within their FTAs. The challenge for 
negotiators during the course of negotiations will therefore be in determining whether New 
Zealand should enact a patent term extension or restoration scheme and, if so, to what extent.  
(b) Patent linkage 
European Union law neither expressly permits nor prohibits patent linkage. It does, however, 
implicitly prohibit patent linkage by reference to the marketing of generic pharmaceutical 
products. Directive 2001/83/EC provides that an applicant for marketing authorisation need 
not provide the results of pre-clinical tests and clinical trials if the applicant can demonstrate 
that their product is a generic of a reference (originator) pharmaceutical product which has 
                                                 
167 Patents Act 2013, s 103(1)(a). See s 5 for interpretation of ‘patent date’, which directs viewers to s 103. 
168 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act 2016 (not in force). 
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been authorised within the EU for no less than eight years.170 Article 10.1 continues on to state 
that a generic product “shall not be placed on the market until ten years have elapsed from the 
initial authorisation of the reference product”.  
In order to utilise this abridged procedure for marketing authorisation, a generic manufacturer 
must demonstrate bioequivalence to the originator product. This requires the generic 
manufacturer to engage in acts which run the risk of infringing the patent. Article 10.6 was 
therefore introduced to exempt from patent infringement the conducting of “necessary studies 
and trials” in order to utilise the abridged procedure. In other words, a generic manufacturer 
may conduct tests in relation to the originator product in order to develop a generic 
pharmaceutical product where it may then use those tests to apply for marketing authorisation. 
The justification for this procedure is to ensure the speedy entry onto the market of generic 
pharmaceutical products upon the expiry of the patent of the originator product.  
The effect of art 10 is to permit the development, application and granting of marketing 
authorisation for generic pharmaceutical products – all during the lawful term of the patent. 
This is emphasised by the phrase “without prejudice to the law relating to the protection of 
industrial and commercial property” in art 10.1, which acknowledges the existence of 
conflicting protection, being the patent term. It is further emphasised by the express exemption 
from patent infringement of tests and studies under art 10.6. The European Commission has 
confirmed the effect of art 10 in a Reasoned Opinion under EU infringement proceedings 
against Italy, which sought to prohibit the submission of applications for marketing 
authorisation until one year prior to the expiry of the patent term of the originator product.171 
As the processing of marketing authorisation procedures can be carried out without being 
affected by laws relating to the protection of industrial and commercial property under art 10.1, 
Italy was bound to ensure compliance with EU law.172  
Once marketing authorisation has been granted and, in accordance with art 10.1, ten years have 
passed since the initial authorisation of the originator product, the generic product may be 
placed on the market, albeit at the risk of infringement proceedings. The Directive does not 
impose an obligation on any person or body to provide notification to the patent holder of the 
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entry onto the market of a generic pharmaceutical product. This means that a patent holder may 
be unaware that a generic pharmaceutical product has been placed on the market in breach of 
its patent, thereby delaying the initiation of infringement proceedings. The traditional approach 
is to leave the responsibility for the enforcement of private rights to the right holder, therefore, 
the failure to provide notification is by no means a new or unique practice.  
It must be noted that, while Directive 2001/83/EC sets forth obligations regarding generic 
pharmaceutical products, it is for each Member State to implement those obligations into 
domestic law.173 This may result in differences relating to application, interpretation and legal 
effect, however, such differences are permissible provided there is compliance with the 
obligations set out in the Directive. 
New Zealand does not specifically provide for patent linkage; however, it is required to enact 
a patent linkage system in order to implement its obligations under the CPTPP. As discussed 
above, art 18.53 of the TPP Agreement obliges the Parties to adopt a patent linkage system by 
either providing a system of notification informing a patent holder when a submission is made 
for marketing authorisation for a generic version of their patented product, or by precluding 
the granting of marketing authorisation to a generic pharmaceutical product unless by consent 
or acquiescence of the patent holder. Article 18.53 was not suspended under the CPTPP and is 
therefore binding upon New Zealand.  
Irrespective of this, it is considered that no legal change is required to ensure compliance with 
this obligation as the “current law and practice already satisfies these requirements through the 
information Medsafe publishes on its website, the availability of injunctive relief and the time 
it takes Medsafe to process applications”.174 As no provision relating to patent linkage was 
included within the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Amendment Act 2018, it may be inferred that, indeed, no legislative change was required. It is 
important to note that New Zealand’s obligations under art 18.53.1(a) of the TPP Agreement 
(and subsequently the CPTPP) is to provide for “a system to provide notice to a patent holder 
or to allow for a patent holder to be notified.”175 The latter does not strictly require that express 
notification be provided to the patent holder, but rather that the patent holder is made known 
                                                 
173 Note that while EU Treaties and Regulations are directly enforceable in each Member State, Directives are not. 
174 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade “Understanding CPTPP: Intellectual Property” 
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of the submission for marketing authorisation of a generic version of its product. Hence why 
the publication by Medsafe of information on its website is considered to satisfy in part the 
patent linkage obligations under the CPTPP. Based on the above, it may be said that patent 
linkage only applies within New Zealand to the extent that it provides for notification to a 
patent holder when a submission is made for marketing authorisation for a generic version of 
their patented product and ensures sufficient time and opportunity for that patent holder to seek 
injunctive relief. 
Comparing the legal systems of the EU and New Zealand in relation to patent linkage, it is 
evident that there is little significant difference between the two systems. While the EU does 
not permit patent linkage, New Zealand is only obliged to implement it in its weakest sense. 
The main difference between the legal systems is the requirement, or lack thereof, to provide a 
system of notification to the patent holder prior to the granting of marketing authorisation for 
a generic pharmaceutical product. However, even this requirement may be satisfied by 
providing for a system which makes known the existence of a submission for marketing 
authorisation for a generic pharmaceutical product, without requiring that express notification 
be provided to the patent holder. The onus is, therefore, on the patent holder to ensure it makes 
itself aware that a submission for marketing authorisation has been made. While EU law does 
not require a similar system of notification, there is nothing to prohibit Member States from 
implementing one in implementing their obligations under Directive 2001/83/EC. Such a 
system may similarly require the marketing authority to publish on its website submissions for 
marketing authorisation which involve a generic version of an originator product, thereby 
providing a system of notification.  
The second main difference relates to timing: to wit, where the New Zealand patent linkage 
system ensures sufficient time and opportunity for a patent holder to seek injunctive relief prior 
to the granting of marketing authorisation. Whereas in the EU, the ability of a patent holder to 
seek injunctive relief would only take effect after the granting of marketing authorisation and 
in accordance with the applicable domestic law.176 The underlying premise for seeking 
injunctive relief is to prevent infringement or the continued infringement of a patent, which 
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implies that a patent has been or is at risk of being breached. The issue of timing therefore goes 
towards preventing a breach of patent before there is even an imminent threat of that breach 
occurring. Irrespective of this, the grant of an injunction is entirely a matter for the national 
judicial authorities to determine in each individual case, and the timing of proceedings does 
not dictate whether or not an interlocutory injunction will be granted. 
Based on the above, it is unlikely that there will be any difficulty in the area of patent linkage 
going forward in the negotiations for an EU-NZ FTA.  
(c) Patentable subject matter: second use patents 
Similar to art 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, art 52(1) of the EPC provides that European patents 
are to be “granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application”. Unlike the TRIPS 
Agreement, however, the EPC provides guidance for the interpretation of each element, rather 
than providing a mere synonymous term. Of pertinence to second use patents is the 
interpretation of ‘new’. 
Novelty is considered under art 54 of the EPC, which provides that an invention is “considered 
to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art”.177 Article 54(2) continues by providing 
that the state of the art comprises “everything made available to the public by means of a written 
or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent 
application”. In other words, an invention is novel if it has not been disclosed prior to the patent 
application date.178 Article 54(4) provides an exception to this general rule by permitting the 
patentability of a known substance or composition if that substance or composition has not 
been previously disclosed for use in a method referred to in art 53(c).179 The justification for 
this exception lies in the novelty involved in discovering its application for a first medical use. 
The second and more recent exception to this general rule is for second medical uses. 
Over the years, the interpretation of ‘novelty’ has been expanded to include second use patents, 
which recently have been granted for inventions which would ordinarily not be considered 
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178 Note that a disclosure made in the six months preceding the filing of the patent application shall not be taken 
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patentable under art 53. The earliest use of such patents were known as ‘Swiss-type claims’, 
which are now covered under art 54(5) of the EPC. The difference between the former Swiss-
type claims and art 54(5) is that the former based its claim on the use of a known substance or 
composition in the manufacture of a medicament for a new medical use, while the latter bases 
its claim on the use of the known substance or composition for a new medical use, providing a 
broader scope. 
Article 54(5) of the EPC permits the granting of a patent for a second or further medical use in 
a method referred to in art 53(c), provided that the new use is novel and inventive. Similar to 
that under art 54(4), the novelty lies in discovering the second medical use of the known 
substance or composition. Under art 53(c), methods for treatment by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods are excluded from patentability. The justification for this exclusion is that 
medical practitioners should not be prevented from administering suitable medication for fear 
of patent infringement.180 However, the products for use in any of these methods are not 
excluded from patentability. Therefore, in applying for a patent under art 54(5), the claim must 
indicate precisely the use which the patent shall apply to. That said, there is seemingly little 
limitation on the scope of the use. Article 54(5) provides that it applies to “any specific use in 
a method”, provided that the use be a medical one. The result is that a claim in the broad form 
of ‘substance X for use in the treatment of [leukaemia]’ would be considered acceptable. 
What has traditionally been considered unacceptable, on the other hand, are claims in the form 
of ‘use of substance X for the treatment of [leukaemia]’. The reason for this is that the patent 
claim is for use in a method of treatment rather than the use of a substance in the treatment of 
a disease. Such claims have also traditionally included the delivery of non-novel 
pharmaceutical products; delivery being a form of method. However, in Actavis v Merck the 
UK Court of Appeal held that a dosage regime may be patentable as the claim relates to a 
different method of using a known substance or composition for the treatment of a particular 
disease.181 In other words, the novelty is in the method of using the substance or composition 
for treatment, rather than merely its use for treatment. The EPO has confirmed the patentability 
of dosage regimes for European patents in its decision G 002/08 (Dosage regime/Abbott 
Respiratory), acknowledging, however, that the new regime would have to show a particular 
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new technical effect to that which is already disclosed in the state of the art in order to satisfy 
the ‘inventive step’ requirement.182 
Despite the broadening scope of second use patents, their legal protection and effect is 
diminished by market practicalities and EU regulatory law. Article 11 of Directive 2001/83/EC 
permits the carving out from marketing authorisations of generic pharmaceutical products, 
those parts of the summary product characteristics referring to indications or dosage forms 
which are still under patent. This means that a generic pharmaceutical product may be 
authorised for an off-patent use without indicating in its labelling or packet leaflet its suitability 
for a use that remains under patent. Known as ‘skinny-labelling’, this enables a generic 
manufacturer to avoid the risk of patent infringement by limiting the marketing authorisation 
for the generic product.183 While this carve-out may be welcome to originator manufacturers, 
the practical effect is that the generic product may often be nonetheless dispensed by 
pharmacists to patients for a patented use, as many prescriptions refer to the active ingredient 
in the product, rather than the product’s name. This presents difficulties in evidencing patent 
infringement, as the omission of the patented use from the summary product characteristics 
eliminates any claim for direct infringement. While the issue of second use patent infringement 
is outside the scope of this research paper, it presents an opportunity for future research in this 
field. 
New Zealand also provides patents for all inventions that are novel, involve an inventive step, 
and are useful.184 This is subject to the proviso that the invention is a manner of manufacture 
within the meaning of s 6 of the UK Statute of Monopolies 1624:185 being not contrary to law, 
mischievous to the state or generally inconvenient.  
Novelty is defined in s 6 of the Patents Act 2013 as not forming part of the prior art base, which 
means “all matter (whether a product, a process, information about a product, or anything else) 
that has at any time before the priority date of that claim been made available to the public”.186 
In compliance with New Zealand’s obligations under art 18.38 of the TPP Agreement, a grace 
period for any public disclosure made within the 12 months prior to the filing of the patent 
application was introduced under s 77 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
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Trans-Pacific Partnership Amendment Act 2018. Any public disclosure made within those 12 
months is to be disregarded for the purposes of the prior art base.187 
Similar to the EU position, New Zealand also permits the granting of second use patents but as 
a Swiss-type claim. This was confirmed by the Commissioner of Patents in a practice note in 
1997 after reviewing international practice and trends in this field, having disallowed a claim 
for a Swiss-type claim in 1990.188 This practice note was approved by the Court of Appeal in 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, where it was held that 
there can be novelty in the discovery of unrecognised properties of known pharmaceutical 
products.189 In his judgement, Gault J examined the position of the EU and argued that the only 
difference in the law and practice between the EU and New Zealand in this field is where 
novelty is perceived to reside; novelty residing in the use in the EU and the product in New 
Zealand.190 In extending novelty to include second or further medical use, he emphasised the 
blurring of the distinctions between use and product and highlighted the difficulty in reasoning 
why novelty cannot be recognised as lying in the use, where he argued it truly lies.191 
Again, similarly to the EU, New Zealand has excluded from patentability methods for 
treatment. While the broader question of patentability of methods for treatment was not an 
issue for the court in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, 
Gault J commented that the exclusion of methods for treatment from patentability in New 
Zealand is now only supported on policy or moral grounds.192 The Court of Appeal in Pfizer 
Inc v Commissioner of Patents, however, respectfully disagreed with that obiter observation in 
holding that the exclusion remains sound law, basing their decision on established case law and 
statutory interpretation.193 The introduction of s 16(2) in the Patents Act 2013 has rendered this 
issue moot by expressly excluding from patentability methods for treatment, although the 
products for use in any method remain patentable. 
What remains uncertain is whether or not new dosage regimes are patentable under New 
Zealand law, as a method of using a substance or composition for treatment. The Assistant 
Commissioner of the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (IPONZ) in Abbott 
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Laboratories194 approved the UK case of Bristol-Myers Squibb,195 which excluded from 
patentability new and inventive dosage regimes of a known medicament. However, the 
Assistant Commissioner in the later decision of Merck & Co Inc196 followed the precedent set 
by the EPO (Technical Board of Appeal) in Genentech Inc,197 which extended the scope of 
Swiss-type claims to cases where the novelty lies in the dose or manner of administration. The 
rationalisation for that extension was that the invention sought to achieve the most effective 
way to administer (use) a known composition, thereby directing itself to potentially patentable 
subject matter rather than method for treatment.198 A third IPONZ decision, Genentech Inc and 
Washington University, confirmed the approach taken by the Assistant Commissioner in Merck 
& Co Inc, noting international developments in this field.199 The IPONZ decisions occurred 
prior to the introduction of s 16 in the Patents Act 2013, which did not address this issue, nor 
did the Court of Appeal in Pfizer Inc v Commissioner of Patents. It has been suggested that, in 
light of the later judicial and statutory exclusions, it is not for IPONZ to determine the matter.200 
It may therefore be said that, until the matter is raised in the appropriate forum, the position on 
dosage regimes remains uncertain in New Zealand. 
Based on the above, it may be posited that there is little significant difference in the approaches 
taken towards patentable subject matter between the EU and New Zealand. The main difference 
lies in the interpretation of novelty, with respect to the extent to which a second use may fall 
within a method for treatment. However, recent IPONZ decisions indicate the persuasiveness 
of international approaches, in particular those taken by the EU and the UK. These approaches 
have directly influenced the New Zealand position on this issue. Whether or not New Zealand 
chooses to continue following these approaches in the future is a matter for judicial or 
parliamentary authorities to determine. In any event, a divergent approach taken towards 
patentability for dosage regimes would not carry significant effects. Given that both parties 
permit second use patents within their domestic regimes and only diverge as to whether a 
particular second use may fall within the exclusion of a method for treatment, it is unlikely that 
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there will be any difficulty in the area of patentable subject matter going forward in the 
negotiations for an EU-NZ FTA.  
2 Regulatory protection: data and market exclusivity 
Data and market exclusivity are conferred in the EU by Regulation (EC) No 726/2004.201 
Article 14.11 of that Regulation provides that pharmaceutical products which have obtained 
market authorisation shall benefit from an eight-year period of data protection and a ten-year 
period of marketing protection. This means that, for a period of eight years after the granting 
of marketing authorisation, a generic manufacturer may not use the data submitted by the 
originator manufacturer in support of their application. At the end of this period, the generic 
manufacturer may use that data in support of their application; however, marketing 
authorisation may not be granted to that generic product for a further period of two years. 
Marketing protection may be extended by a further one year if, during the first eight years, the 
marketing authorisation holder obtains an authorisation for one or more new therapeutic 
indications which are held to bring a significant clinical benefit in comparison with existing 
therapies.202 In total, a pharmaceutical product may benefit from an 11-year period of 
regulatory protection under art 14.11, following an ‘8+2+1’ structure. 
The one-year extension provided in art 14.11 is reiterated in the fourth subparagraph of art 10.1 
of Directive 2001/83/EC. In order to obtain an additional one-year period of market exclusivity 
under either article, it must be shown that there is one or more new therapeutic indications and 
the indication must bring a significant clinical benefit in comparison with existing therapies. 
The European Commission has interpreted ‘new therapeutic indications’ as referring to either 
diagnosis, prevention or treatment of a disease.203 Within the indication, the target disease or 
condition must be clearly defined, distinguishing between treatment, prevention and diagnostic 
indications.204 Indications may include, but are not limited to, a new target disease or new 
population for the same disease, different stages for severity of a disease, a change in 
combination therapy, or a change from treatment to prevention or diagnosis of a disease.205 
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Any indication must be proven ‘new’ in comparison to the therapeutic indication already 
authorised.206 
In satisfying the second element, it must be shown that there is a significant clinical benefit “in 
comparison with existing therapies”.207 It is not enough to simply show that there is a benefit 
from the new indication. Existing therapies means satisfactory methods of diagnosis, 
prevention or treatment of the disease, and may include all authorised pharmaceutical products 
for that therapy as well as other non-pharmacological methods.208 In order to establish a 
significant clinical benefit in comparison with existing therapies, scientific data obtained from 
comparative clinical studies should be provided.209 Finally, the new therapeutic indication must 
show a significant clinical benefit. The European Commission has indicated that 
“demonstration of greater efficacy, improved safety, and more favourable pharmacokinetic 
properties resulting in demonstrable clinical advantages compared to existing methods” should 
be enough to satisfy this element.210 It may also include significant clinical benefits based on a 
major contribution to patient care, such as a new mode or route of administration which makes 
self-administration possible or easier for a patient to undertake.211 
It must be noted that authorisation for the new indication must be granted within the first eight 
years after the granting of market authorisation for the reference product in order for the 
manufacturer to obtain the additional one-year period of exclusivity.212  This means that any 
new or additional benefits cannot be authorised retrospectively. 
In addition to the ‘8+2+1’ structure, extensions to both data and market exclusivity are 
permitted in specific and limited circumstances. Data exclusivity may be extended for an 
additional one-year period under art 10.5 of Directive 2001/83/EC, where significant pre-
clinical or clinical studies were carried out in relation to an application for a new indication for 
a well-established substance. In assessing new indication, the same criteria apply to that 
discussed above relating to new therapeutic indications with significant clinical benefits. The 
second element requires that “significant pre-clinical or clinical studies” were carried out. The 
determination of ‘significant’ is a matter for the competent national authorities. However, the 
                                                 
206 At 3. 
207 Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, above n 133, art 14.11. 
208 European Commission Guidance on elements required to support the significant clinical benefit, above n 203, 
at 3.2. 
209 At 3.3. 
210 At 3.3. 
211 At 3.3.3. 
212 Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, above n 133, art 14.11 and Directive 2001/83/EC, above n 170, art 10.1.4. 
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European Commission has noted that, in principle, the applicant ought to have conducted at 
minimum one clinical trial which is compared to a suitable comparator and has indicated why 
it ought to be viewed as a significant clinical or pre-clinical study.213 It is important to note that 
the additional one-year period of protection is ‘non-cumulative’ under art 10.5. This suggests 
that it would operate as a stand-alone one-year period of data exclusivity in addition to the 
standard ‘8+2+1’ structure. This additional year of data exclusivity would only extend to the 
data concerning the new indication. 
An extension to market exclusivity may also be granted in respect of a pharmaceutical product 
designated as an orphan medicinal product, where the application for marketing authorisation 
includes the results of studies conducted in compliance with an agreed paediatric investigation 
plan.214 The justification for this extension is to provide an incentive for the development of 
pharmaceutical products targeting rare conditions or diseases within the paediatric population. 
While orphan drugs are expressly granted ten years of market exclusivity, a further two-year 
period of market exclusivity is granted where such products address the paediatric population 
in accordance with EU legislation. This period may, however, be reduced to six years if, after 
the first five years, it is shown that the orphan product is sufficiently profitable not to justify 
maintenance of market exclusivity.215 Nevertheless, the total period of market exclusivity that 
may be granted for such products is 12 years. 
Data exclusivity within New Zealand is provided for in s 23 of the Medicines Act 1981. Section 
23B of that Act requires the Minister of Health to protect confidential information submitted 
in support of an innovative medicine application. The Minister is obliged to take reasonable 
steps to ensure that confidential supporting information is kept confidential to the Minister and 
must not use that information for the purpose of determining whether to grant any other 
application during the protected period. Section 23A defines ‘protected period’ as no less than 
five years after the submission of the innovative medicine application to the Minister. Where 
the Minister notifies his consent or refusal to consent to the distribution of the medicine 
contained in the innovative medicine application, a five-year period of data protection shall 
commence on the date of notification. In other words, data exclusivity is granted for a period 
of five years from the date of approval or non-approval of a pharmaceutical product. Exceptions 
                                                 
213 European Commission Guidance on a new therapeutic indication for a well-established substance (November 
2007) at 3. 
214 Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006, above n 166, art 37. 
215 Regulation (EC) No 141/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1999 on orphan 
medicinal products [2000] OJ L 18/1, art 8.2. 
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to data protection are stipulated in s 23C, including disclosures or use of that confidential 
information with the consent of the applicant or where a disclosure is necessary to protect 
public health or safety. 
Data exclusivity only applies to ‘innovative medicines’. Under s 23A this means a medicine 
which contains an active ingredient that has not been previously submitted for approval as an 
active ingredient of a medicine.216 This interpretation excludes from data protection any data 
submitted in support of a marketing authorisation for a new indication or formulation, which 
includes a pharmaceutical product under a second use patent. On the one hand, this diminishes 
the incentive of originator manufacturers to market their product in New Zealand, while on the 
other hand it promotes the development of generic pharmaceutical products – which is in the 
best interests of New Zealand to do. It is important to note that the provision does not prevent 
the granting of patents or marketing authorisations for new indications or formulations; it 
merely prevents the protection of the data submitted in relation to the new indication or 
formulation. 
As is clear from the above, there is a significant difference between the regulatory regime 
applied in the EU and that applied in New Zealand. Both the EU and New Zealand provide for 
a period of data exclusivity upon approval of the pharmaceutical product. Where they differ is 
the total period of protection, extensions and scope of the protection. Unlike the EU, New 
Zealand does not provide for market exclusivity. Rather, market exclusivity is only provided 
to the extent that the protection is consequently afforded under data exclusivity. 
The limited scope or coverage offered under the New Zealand data exclusivity regime excludes 
from data protection a product which would ordinarily qualify for regulatory protection and 
extensions to either data or market exclusivity within the EU. The EU permits extensions in 
relation to new indications for a well-established substance or new indications claiming 
significant benefits. Neither extension would be granted data protection in New Zealand, let 
alone an extension, as they pertain to new indications for an existing product and therefore do 
not comply with the interpretation given to ‘innovative medicines’. The third permitted 
extension discussed above, orphan medicines which include studies under a paediatric 
investigation plan, is provided as an incentive or reward for research in that area. Unlike other 
permissible extensions, it is not granted as an extension for a new indication. In this case, the 
originator pharmaceutical product would benefit from five years of data exclusivity in New 
                                                 
216 Medicines Act 1981, s 23A, ‘innovative medicine application’. 
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Zealand; however, it would not benefit from any extension unless provided for in law. Unless 
the EU and New Zealand consider scope or coverage to be a matter for each party to determine 
themselves, the interpretation given to ‘innovative medicines’ may present a challenge which 
would need to be overcome in the course of negotiations. 
The maximum term of regulatory protection in the EU is eleven years compared to New 
Zealand’s five-year period of data protection. This may also be an issue which the parties would 
need to overcome in the course of negotiations. In particular, the term of protection in 
conjunction with the lack of market exclusivity within New Zealand. Market exclusivity in 
New Zealand is only provided to the extent that the protection is consequently afforded under 
data exclusivity. While a generic manufacturer may submit an application for marketing 
authorisation during the term of data exclusivity, they may not rely on or base their application 
on the confidential information provided by the originator manufacturer. The cost involved in 
producing pharmaceutical products, however, provides little incentive for a generic 
manufacturer to conduct their own studies. As a result, a generic manufacturer may not submit 
an application for marketing authorisation until the expiry of the five-year data exclusivity 
term. When marketing authorisation is ultimately granted, however, is a procedural matter for 
the marketing authority. However, it may be less than the two years of market exclusivity 
provided for by the EU. Based on this, it is likely that the length of protection will be an issue 
for the parties to overcome in the course of negotiations, for both data and market exclusivity. 
D Summary of Chapter: Determination of Challenges and Difficulties Going Forth in 
 the Negotiations for an EU-NZ FTA 
Based on the preceding sections of this chapter, it is clear that there are many differences in the 
TRIPS-plus protections relating to pharmaceuticals between CETA, the TPP Agreement and 
the CPTPP. While many of these differences may be described as negligible or having limited 
effect, the same does not hold true for all. The purpose of this section is to determine any 
challenges or difficulties arising from those differences that would need to be overcome during 
the course of negotiations.  
1 Patent protection 
(a) Patent term: extension/restoration 
Both CETA and the TPP Agreement mandate the implementation of patent term 
extension/restoration schemes. CETA prescribes a period of sui generis protection of between 
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two to five years, with the possibility of an extension, to be afforded at the request of the patent 
holder. This protection takes effect at the end of the patent term and confers on the patent holder 
protection for the product covered by the marketing authorisation and any use of that product 
that has been authorised prior to expiration of the sui generis protection. While the scope of sui 
generis protection afforded under CETA is broad, it does not necessarily follow that a Party 
may not limit the scope in its domestic law. CETA provides that the appropriate method of 
implementation is for each party to determine, thereby permitting flexibility to the 
interpretation and implementation of the obligations under that Agreement. 
In comparison, the TPP Agreement prescribes two systems of patent term extension by 
distinguishing between the granting of a patent and the granting of marketing authorisation. 
The first grants a period of patent term adjustment where there has been an unreasonable delay 
in the issuance of the patent of a period of more than five years, while the second grants a 
period of patent term adjustment or, alternatively, sui generis protection for unreasonable 
curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of the marketing authorisation process. The 
reason for this distinction could be in recognition that the two processes are separate from each 
other and that a delay in one process does not necessarily mean that there is a corresponding 
delay in the other process. In this respect, an applicant for patent term extension/restoration 
may only claim for the loss they have actually suffered.  
There are multiple differences between the provisions relating to patent term 
extension/restoration in CETA and the TPP Agreement. However, it does not mean that the 
two schemes are mutually exclusive. The reason for this is that both agreements offer a 
significant degree of flexibility to the Parties, so that they may be reconciled. Therefore, the 
wide scope of CETA could, to an extent, be limited by the Parties to unreasonable delays in 
the patent process or unreasonable curtailments of the effective patent term as a result of the 
marketing authorisation process, as requested by the TPP Agreement. Conversely, the period 
of adjustment afforded under the TPP Agreement could be limited by the parties to two to five 
years, like under CETA. Whether this limitation would apply to each of the two forms of patent 
term adjustment separately, or would apply in combination, would be a matter for each party 
to the TPP Agreement to determine for themselves. In this respect, the parties may be able to 
achieve a significant level of consistency between their domestic positions and the agreements.  
With that being said, the provisions relating to patent term adjustment were suspended under 
the CPTPP and are no longer applicable as good law. The implication is that legislation enacted 
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by New Zealand in order to comply with its obligations under the TPP Agreement has not come 
into force and is unlikely to do so. The domestic situation is at present that New Zealand does 
not permit patent term extension. This is in direct contradiction to the EU, which provides a 
sui generis scheme for patent term restoration very similar to that under CETA. Given the high 
degree of similarity between the EU domestic legal position and the sui generis protection 
afforded under CETA, it may be inferred that patent term extension/restoration is an area of 
significant interest to the EU and that its inclusion within an EU-NZ FTA will be a priority. 
The challenge for negotiators during the course of negotiations will, therefore, be in 
determining whether New Zealand should enact a patent term extension/restoration scheme 
and, if so, to what extent. 
(b) Patent linkage 
As identified above, the most significant difference between the patent linkage provisions in 
CETA and those in the CPTPP is that the CPTPP obliges parties to adopt a patent linkage 
system while CETA does not. Rather, CETA recognises that some parties may permit such a 
system without obliging other parties to adopt one. That said, the preferred patent linkage 
system in the CPTPP would see the formation of a notification system which would allow 
patent holders to seek remedies prior to the granting of marketing authorisation, rather than a 
system which would preclude the granting of marketing authorisation where there is an 
applicable patent. Of the two systems, the notification system carries the least impact and, for 
many parties, may be implemented with little amendment to domestic laws. In this respect, it 
could be argued that there is very little practical difference between a provision that recognises 
a party’s patent linkage system and a provision that requires very little amendment to a party’s 
domestic law in order to be compliant. 
Similarly, differences relating to patent linkage within each Party’s domestic legal system are 
not significant enough to present a challenge for the Parties. The EU does not permit patent 
linkage in its legal system. It may be inferred that it was for this reason that patent linkage was 
recognised but not mandated in CETA. New Zealand, on the other hand, is bound to implement 
a patent linkage system as part of its obligations under the CPTPP. This requires, at the 
minimum, the implementation of a system which would allow the patent holder to be notified 
upon the submission of an application for marketing authorisation of a generic product. As 
discussed above, this system does not oblige parties to provide notification, merely to provide 
a system which would allow for notification. This suggests a very low threshold must be met 
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in order for patent linkage mechanisms to be deemed acceptable. In consideration of this low 
threshold, New Zealand holds the understanding that the current legal framework provides 
adequate patent linkage, therefore no legal change is necessary to be compliant with their 
obligation. 
While there are literal differences between the respective obligations under CETA and the 
CPTPP, an analysis of those provisions indicates that the practical effect of those differences 
is very limited. At most, given the inclusion of the patent linkage provision in CETA in order 
to uphold and comply with Canada’s domestic situation, a similar provision relating to equal 
treatment of litigants could be included within an EU-NZ FTA. With that being said, the 
notification system that New Zealand is obliged to implement does not give rise to issues 
relating to equal treatment of litigants, unlike the situation in Canada.217 At any rate, New 
Zealand upholds the rule of law, including equality before the law, so the inclusion of such a 
provision would be neither controversial nor widely disputed. On this basis, it may be 
concluded that the inclusion of provisions similar to those discussed relating to patent linkage 
within an EU-NZ FTA would not pose any significant challenge or difficulty for the parties 
during the course of negotiations. 
(c) Patentable subject matter: second use patents 
In respect of patentable subject matter in general, there is no significant difference between the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, CETA and the CPTPP. The TRIPS Agreement and the 
TPP Agreement (as incorporated into the CPTPP) both expressly define what is recognised as 
patentable subject matter, broadly being any invention which is new, involves an inventive step 
and is capable of industrial application. CETA sets out no precise definition but does provide 
that the provisions therein complement the rights and obligations between the parties under the 
TRIPS Agreement. While those terms are left to the interpretation of each individual party, the 
TPP Agreement does provide some clarity or guidance on what factors ought to be considered 
in determining each step. 
The TPP Agreement goes beyond the TRIPS Agreement by incorporating a provision on 
second use patents. Rather than oblige parties to implement protection for second uses, the TPP 
Agreement instead requires that at least one of three forms of second use qualify for protection 
in the Parties’ domestic law. This may be interpreted to mean that all parties to that Agreement 
                                                 
217 Note that in Canada only the generic manufacturer may appeal an unfavourable decision. See above n 123. 
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already provide protection for second uses, therefore, the intention behind that provision is to 
lock-in existing policies so that they may not be reversed or amended in a way to limit their 
endorsement. This provision was suspended under the CPTPP, the effect being that each Party 
retains the flexibility to determine the issue of second use patents. 
Similarly, there is little significant difference between the EU and New Zealand in the domestic 
legislative implementation of patentable subject matter. Each Party applies the same three 
elements in the determination of what is patentable in a manner consistent with their respective 
international obligations. Where the main difference lies is in the interpretation of those 
elements. Of particular interest is the element ‘new’, which both the EU and New Zealand 
allowed to expand so as to include second uses of known substances. Crucially, it is the use of 
the known substance in the treatment of a disease rather than the method of treatment itself that 
is patentable. Irrespective of this, the EU includes new dosage regimes within the definition of 
second use, where it would otherwise have been treated as a method of treatment. The position 
in New Zealand remains uncertain as this issue has not yet come before the courts, although 
IPONZ decisions indicate it could go either way. 
With that being said, barring treaty definition, interpretation is a domestic matter. This is 
reflected within the international agreements, which provide flexibility to parties on how their 
obligations are to be implemented within their domestic law. In addition, the suspension of the 
provision on second use patents from the CPTPP means that there is no practical difference 
between CETA and the CPTPP with respect to patentable subject matter. Even had that 
provision not been suspended, its inclusion would not have resulted in any significant 
difference between the agreements as it merely sought confirmation of the existence of second 
use within the domestic legal system rather than imposing it. As New Zealand already protects 
second uses, it would not have made a difference to its domestic position. On this basis, it may 
be concluded that the difference in interpretation is not of a nature significant enough to pose 
any challenge or difficulty to the EU and New Zealand in the course of their negotiations. 
2 Regulatory protection: data and market exclusivity 
In accordance with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, both CETA and the TPP 
Agreement require parties to implement regulatory protection in respect of the protection of 
undisclosed test or clinical data submitted to authorities in order to gain marketing authorisation 
for a new pharmaceutical product. Both agreements go above those obligations by requiring 
parties to implement a minimum period of protection during which time a generic manufacturer 
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of a product may not use or rely on that undisclosed data with respect to authorisation for its 
own product. Under CETA, that minimum term is six years. In addition, CETA provides a 
period of market exclusivity, which applies for an additional two years after the expiry of the 
period of data protection. The purpose of this is to prevent generic manufacturers from 
marketing their product for an additional two years, during which time they may now use the 
data in order to obtain marketing authorisation without being able to place their product on the 
market.  
In comparison, the TPP Agreement provides for a minimum period of five years protection 
during which time a generic manufacturer may not market their similar product. There is no 
obligation to protect such data against use or reliance by a generic manufacturer in obtaining 
marketing authorisation, although the parties do remain bound by their general obligations in 
respect of disclosure under the TRIPS Agreement. Despite the omission of a data exclusivity 
scheme in the TPP Agreement, the practical effect resulting from the schemes of both 
agreements is identical if the overall intention of the Parties is to prevent the access onto the 
market of a generic product for a specified period of time. Whether or not a generic 
manufacturer is permitted to use or rely upon the originator’s data, they still may not market 
their product under either agreement until the expiry of the specified period of time. In this 
respect, the overall purpose is achieved, although the method in achieving it is not. The main 
difference is therefore the length of time which the protection is afforded for, which is 
dependent upon the domestic regimes of the Parties and their willingness to commit to anything 
further. 
Similar to the provisions relating to patent term extension/restoration, the provisions relating 
to the protection of undisclosed data under the TPP Agreement have also been suspended and 
are consequently not applicable as good law. Irrespective of this, New Zealand already protects 
undisclosed data within its domestic law, by providing a five-year period of data exclusivity. 
In comparison, the EU envisions an ‘8+2+1’ structure, providing for periods of both data and 
market exclusivity, in addition to a one-year extension in certain cases. The lack of market 
protection afforded by New Zealand coupled with the shorter period of data protection would 
likely present a challenge that the Parties would need to address in the course of negotiations. 
In addition, the data protection afforded by New Zealand only applies to innovative medicines. 
This significantly limits the scope or coverage as the interpretation for innovative medicines 
excludes new indications or formulations, thereby only protecting first references to an active 
ingredient. In other words, data relating to second use patents is precluded from protection, 
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whereas it may receive protection under EU law. While interpretation is a domestic matter, the 
limited scope may be an issue the parties may wish to address. 
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IV Geographical Indications 
 
A General Introduction 
The following chapter on GIs shall be broken into three sections. The first section shall provide 
a comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections within CETA, the TPP 
Agreement and the CPTPP, with the TRIPS Agreement providing a baseline for comparison. 
This analysis shall be conducted in accordance with arts 31 and 32 of the VCLT. The second 
section shall provide a comparative interpretative analysis of EU and New Zealand domestic 
law in order to ascertain the position of the Parties. Recourse will be had to archival materials, 
including government documents and position papers, in conducting this analysis. The third 
section shall pull together the main findings of this chapter to identify any challenges or 
difficulties which may arise and therefore need to be overcome during the course of 
negotiations. 
B Interpretation and Comparative Analysis of TRIPS-plus Protections: TRIPS 
 Agreement, CETA, TPP Agreement and CPTPP 
TRIPS-plus protection for GIs can broadly be described as relating to the extent to which 
protection is afforded to any given product or product class. Unlike the protection of 
pharmaceuticals, TRIPS-plus protection of GIs is not multi-faceted. The intention is to extend 
the protection conferred under the TRIPS Agreement to product classes other than those 
specified therein, and to broaden the scope of protection so as to afford more exclusive rights 
in respect of the use of the GI. It must be noted at the outset that the TPP Agreement and 
consequently the CPTPP do not provide for the specific protection of GIs. Neither agreement 
may therefore be said to be TRIPs-plus in this respect. In those agreements, emphasis is placed 
on the protection of distinctive signs under trade mark regimes instead. For this reason, a 
comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections between those agreements and 
CETA is not possible. However, a discussion of the differences between the agreements shall 
ensue in order to understand the different approaches taken by the Parties and what this may 
mean going forwards in the negotiations.   
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1 Legal protection of geographical indications 
Article 22.2 of the TRIPS Agreement obliges parties to provide for the legal protection of GIs, 
by providing the following: 
In respect of geographical indications, Members shall provide the legal means for interested 
parties to prevent: 
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or 
 suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than the true 
 place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the geographical origin of 
 the good; 
(b) any use which constitutes an act of unfair competition within the meaning of Article 
 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967). 
The TRIPS Agreement does not require Members to protect a given GI of any Member. Rather, 
it obliges Members to implement a system whereby any interested party may legally prevent 
either of the situations in (a) or (b). As the TRIPS Agreement does not specify the particular 
system to be implemented, this is left for each Member to determine for themselves.218 
Under art 22.2(a), a Member may prevent, in respect of a GI, the use of any means in the 
designation or presentation of a good that is untrue as to geographical origin and where it is 
misleading. The term ‘any means’ suggests that this would encompass more than the mere use 
of the indication name, including anything that would identify the good as coming from that 
region. Similarly, the reference to ‘presentation’ of a good would include a particular packaging 
style, including the use of colours and images indicative of a particular geographical 
location.219 The use of such characteristics must suggest that the good comes from a location 
other than its true geographical origin and must be done in a manner that misleads. This final 
element of public misleading emphasises consumer protection to, arguably, the detriment of 
the goodwill or reputation of the GI. 
As an example, the use of the term ‘Dutch’ coupled with the image of a Dutch flag on the front 
packaging of ‘Gouda Holland’ cheese would suggest that the true geographical origin is the 
region surrounding Gouda in the Netherlands. However, if this is accompanied with the terms 
                                                 
218 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 1.1. 
219 For a further discussion on the protection against misleading use, see generally Peter-Tobias Stoll, Jan Busche 
and Katrin Arend (eds) WTO – Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (2009, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden) at 396. 
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‘style’ or ‘type’ and its true geographical origin is stated on the back packaging, it cannot 
reasonably be said that the use of geographically unique terms have been used in a manner 
which misleads the public as to the true origin of the good. The requirement of public 
misleading adds a hurdle to the protection of a GI, rather than focusing on the dilution in value 
or reputation which occurs irrespective of actual misleading. In balancing interests, the TRIPS 
Agreement therefore strikes a balance in favour of consumer protection. 
A Member may also prevent the use of a name which constitutes unfair competition under art 
22.2(b), which includes use which is liable to mislead the public.220 While the standard in art 
22.2(a) is that the use ‘misleads’, here the standard is that the use is ‘liable to mislead’. This 
provides a lower standard than that used in art 22.2(a) and may be easier for a right holder to 
prove. In addition to the general protection afforded to GIs under art 22, the TRIPS Agreement 
also provides additional protection for GIs for wines and spirits. Article 23.1 obliges Members 
to provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent the use of a GI identifying wines 
and spirits for those wines and spirits not originating in the place indicated by the GI in 
question, 
… even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the geographical indication is used in 
translation or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation”, or the 
like.221 
A number of elements arise under this provision. First, protection may be afforded to a product 
even where the true origin is indicated or the product is distinguished from the GI by use of 
accompanying terms. This provides a much higher standard of protection to a GI than that 
under art 22.2(a) as it prevents the use of the GI by anyone other than those whose products 
fully comply with the terms of the GI. Second, it is irrelevant whether there is an element of 
public misleading. Article 23.1 omits any reference to misleading and instead focuses on the 
objective use. In so doing, it shifts the focus of GI protection from consumer protection to 
dilution in value and reputation through misappropriated use. In this respect, the additional 
protection for wines and spirits seeks to provide stronger protection in favour of the right 
holder. 
A third element limits or tempers the scope of art 23.1 as the provision “prevent[s] use of a 
geographical indication”. This means that the GI itself must be used in relation to the product; 
                                                 
220 Paris Convention, above n 13, art 10bis(3). 
221 Footnote omitted. 
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it is not enough to show that it was partially used or that a reasonable person would infer that 
the product is the same as one which references the GI. The implication is that a sparkling wine 
labelled, for example, ‘Vin de Bordeaux’ would not fall within art 23.1 as there is no use of the 
protected GI. If the label were to state ‘French-style Crémant de Bordeaux’, on the other hand, 
this would fall within art 23(1) as the GI has been used, even though it is accompanied by the 
term ‘French-style’. This limited scope must be compared to the scope under art 22.2(a) which 
prevents, in respect of GIs, “the use of any means in the designation or presentation of any 
good”.222 This encompasses more than the use of the GI itself and would include use of any 
characteristics which would indicate or suggest that the product originates in a place other than 
its true place of origin. In other words, art 22(a) offers a wider scope. 
CETA goes beyond the TRIPS Agreement in respect of legal protection for GIs by, first, 
imposing stronger protection than that afforded under the TRIPS Agreement and by, second, 
listing particular GIs where protection is mandatory within the domestic legal systems of both 
parties to that Agreement. 
Article 20.19 of CETA sets out the legal protection to be afforded to listed geographical 
indications contained in annex 20-A of that agreement. Under art 20.19.1, it is mandatory for 
each Party to protect those listed indications according to the level of protection set out in art 
20.19. Annex 20-A lists 143 EU GIs which Canada has agreed to protect within its domestic 
legal system. These cover food and drink products from multiple regions across the EU and 
consist of various product classes including cheeses, fresh and dry-cured meats, beer and hops, 
and oils and vinegars.  
Of importance, wines and spirits are not included within annex 20-A. The reason for this is that 
specified GIs pertaining to wines and spirits of both Parties are already protected within each 
other’s domestic legal system, by virtue of the 2003 Wines and Spirit Drinks Agreement.223 
Under that agreement, the names listed therein are officially recognised and protected as a GI 
within the meaning of art 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and are eligible for protection within 
both parties.224 Although the 2003 Wines and Spirit Drinks Agreement was enacted prior to 
CETA, it has been incorporated and made part of that Agreement under art 30.8.5 of CETA 
and is therefore relevant to this thesis. 
                                                 
222 Emphasis added. 
223 2003 Wines and Spirit Drinks Agreement, above n 82. 
224 Arts 10.1, 11.1, 14.1 and 15.1.  
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The TRIPS Agreement does not require a Member to protect any given GI. Rather, Members 
are obliged to provide a system so that interested parties may prevent the use of the GI. 
Therefore, the listing of specified GIs and imposing mandatory protection of those terms is 
above and beyond what the TRIPS Agreement requires. In this respect, CETA may be 
described as proactive. In addition, the imposition of mandatory protection for listed GI terms 
shifts the burden for protecting an interest from the interested party (GI holder) to the state. 
Provided that a producer complies with the requirements of a GI in order to obtain GI status in 
his home country, his product will automatically be protected in the other party by virtue of 
that name being a listed product under CETA. This eliminates the burden of actively seeking 
to have his separate legal interest upheld. This shifting of burdens does, however, only apply 
to products listed in annex 20-A or within the 2003 Wines and Spirit Drinks Agreement. All 
other GIs not specifically listed would still be required to seek protection in the other party. 
Article 20.19.2 incorporates the general protection afforded to GIs under art 22.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and is near identical in wording. The interpretation provided in respect of art 22.1 
is therefore also applicable to art 20.19.2 of CETA. Article 20.19.2(a) of CETA, on the other 
hand, affords specific protection to the GIs listed in annex 20-A, which is above and beyond 
that afforded by the TRIPS Agreement. Article 20.19.2(a) provides: 
Each Party shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent: 
(a) the use of a geographical indication of the other Party listed in Annex 20-A for a 
 product that falls within the product class specified in Annex 20-A for that 
 geographical indication and that either: 
 (i) does not originate in the place of origin specified in Annex 20-A for that 
  geographical indication; or 
 (ii) does originate in the place of origin specified in Annex 20-A for the  
  geographical indication but was not produced or manufactured in  
  accordance with the laws and regulations of that other Party that would  
  apply if the product were for consumption in the other Party; 
A number of elements arise within that provision. First, and similarly to art 23.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, art 20.19.2(a) “prevent[s] the use of a geographical indication”. Again, this means 
that the GI itself must be used in relation to the product; it is not enough to show partial use or 
that a reasonable person would infer that the product is in fact one covered by a GI. One 
particular issue that arises from this limitation relates to the use of GIs which are registered 
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under compound terms or names. The use of one part of that name under art 20.19.2(a) is not 
considered use of the GI as a whole and is therefore permissible. For example, a product sold 
under the name ‘Dutch Gouda’ or ‘Gouda’ is acceptable as it constitutes only partial use of the 
GI.225 However, a product sold under the name ‘Gouda Holland’, which is a registered GI and 
is listed within annex 20-A, would not be acceptable if it was not manufactured in compliance 
with the stipulations of the GI. A similar issue would arise, as an example, with the use of 
Edam (protected under the GI ‘Edam Holland’) or Manchego (protected under the GI ‘Queso 
Manchego’). 
Second, the use of the GI may only be prevented for a product that falls within the specified 
product class in annex 20-A. The implication is that the use of a GI for a product falling within 
a different product class to that specified is not preventable. The practical effect of this is 
somewhat diminished by the common knowledge of what products the GI actually covers. For 
example, a beer labelled ‘Gouda Holland’ is unlikely to create confusion or diminish the value 
of the GI as it is common knowledge that Gouda Holland refers to cheese, not beer.  
On the other hand, a beer labelled ‘Žatecký Chmel’ (Saaz hops) may create confusion or may 
diminish the value of the GI as it is well known that hops are an essential ingredient in most 
beers, even if it is stated on the label that a different variety of hops was used than that which 
is covered by the GI. An argument could be made that, as beer is a product created through the 
use of hops, the use of the GI for the name of the beer is in fact a representation of the variety 
of hops used in creating that finished product. The use of the GI would, therefore, refer to the 
hops used to create that product rather than the product itself. On this basis, use of that GI in 
relation to a beer which is not created with the variety of hops covered by the GI may be 
preventable. A strict interpretation of art 20.19.2(a), however, would suggest otherwise, as the 
use is clearly in relation to a name of beer rather than the hops used to create that beer, and 
therefore a different product class. Irrespectively, an argument could be raised under fair 
trading laws instead, claiming deceit or misrepresentation in trade. 
Finally, in order for use to be preventable, the product must either not originate in the place 
specified in annex 20-A for that GI or originate in that place but not be produced in accordance 
                                                 
225 Note that ‘Gouda Holland’ is a Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) within the EU and may only be used 
in compliance with the strict requirements set by cheesemakers and the Dutch Dairy Association. All other forms 
of the generic term ‘Gouda’ are permitted provided products are not labelled ‘Gouda Holland’. See Government 





with the applicable laws and regulations of the relevant party. The former is easy enough to 
identify by ensuring that the true origin is indicated on product labels. So, for example, a cheese 
labelled ‘Roquefort’ with a place of origin specified as Germany would be in breach of art 
20.19.2(a) as the specified place of origin for that GI is France. The latter is more difficult in 
identifying as the specified place of origin for all products in annex 20-A refers simply to the 
country of origin. Many GIs are region-specific. A product may correctly indicate the place of 
origin as specified in annex 20-A; however, it is not produced in accordance with the laws of 
that country. For example, the specified place of origin of the GI ‘Parmigiano Reggiano’ is 
Italy, whereas the concise defined geographical area comprises the territories of the Provinces 
of Bologna to the left of the Reno River, Mantua to the right of the River Po, Modena, Parma 
and Reggio in the Emilia Region.226 A cheese labelled ‘Parmigiano Reggiano’ and produced 
in Sicily would therefore not be produced in accordance with the laws of Italy relating to that 
specific GI, even if the label specifies its place of origin is Italy. 
Article 20.19.3 continues on by stating that the protection offered in art 20.19.2(a) shall be 
provided: 
… even where the true origin of the product is indicated or the geographical indication is used 
in translation or accompanied by expressions such as “kind”, “type”, “style”, “imitation” or the 
like. 
The above provision is identical to the wording used in art 23.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in 
relation to additional protection afforded to wines and spirits. The interpretation in relation to 
that provision is, therefore, also applicable to art 20.19.3.227 The only difference between the 
two provisions is the subject matter. Whereas art 23.1 of TRIPS applies only to GIs for wines 
and spirits, art 20.19.3 applies to the GIs specified in annex 20-A of CETA. It is important to 
note that, under art 20.21 of CETA, the use of a couple of specified GIs is permitted when the 
use of those terms is accompanied by the expressions listed in art 20.19.3.228 These GIs may 
be considered as contested between the Parties and their use is only permitted in combination 
with a legible and visible indication of the geographical origin of the product concerned.229 
                                                 
226 European Commission Publication of an amendment application pursuant to Article 6(2) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs (16 April 2009) OJ C 87/1 at 18. 
227 See also CETA, above n 5, art 29.17. 
228 Being those GIs indicated with a single asterisk in annex 20-A: Feta, Munster, Asiago, Fontina, Gorgonzola.  
229 CETA, above n 5, art 20.21.1. 
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While there are many similarities in respect of the provisions affording protection to GIs 
between the TRIPS Agreement and CETA, it is the higher standard of protection for GIs in 
conjunction with the mandatory protection of specified GIs in annex 20-A that makes the 
protections in CETA TRIPS-plus. While the TRIPS Agreement provides a higher standard of 
protection to wines and spirits as opposed to all other GIs, CETA provides a higher standard 
of protection to a broader variety of product classes, giving it a more expansive range. This is 
in addition to those products listed within the 2003 Wines and Spirit Drinks Agreement, which 
are incorporated into CETA. Furthermore, the specification of GIs to which the provision 
applies provides a concise and definitive list of those GIs which are to receive mandatory 
protection through the prevention of their use. This includes their use in conjunction with any 
accompanying terms or translations. While the TRIPS Agreement provides similar protection 
for wines and spirit drinks, it does not prescribe protection for specific GIs or for products 
outside of those two product classes. In this respect, the provisions in CETA are proactive as 
they force the Parties to protect those specified terms from unauthorised use, thereby providing 
stronger protection for the specified GIs. 
As mentioned above, the CPTPP, in comparison, does not require parties to protect a given GI, 
nor does it specify the extent to which a given GI is to be protected. Rather than require 
protection, parties to the CPTPP chose instead to specify the means through which protection 
may be afforded, recognising that GIs may be protected through a trade mark or sui generis 
system or some other legal means.230 The remainder of the section on GIs within the CPTPP 
addresses administrative procedures pertaining to the protection or recognition of GIs, 
including procedures relating to the opposition of registration of a GI. Such procedures also 
apply to GIs recognised or protected pursuant to an international agreement concluded after the 
conclusion of the CPTPP. Consequently, the provisions relating to GIs can to a large extent be 
described as reactive, as opposed to the proactivity mandated under CETA.  
Irrespectively, Parties to the CPTPP remain bound to the TRIPS Agreement, so the failure to 
specify protection within the CPTPP does not detract from the general obligation to provide a 
system in order for interested parties to prevent usage, in accordance with art 22.2 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.231 It does, however, indicate the intention of the parties to provide no additional 
                                                 
230 TPP Agreement, above n 7, art 18.30. 
231 Note that art 18.36.4 of the TPP Agreement stipulates that provisions relating to objection and cancellation 
procedures do not apply to GIs for wines and spirits or applications for those indications. This is due to their 
specific protection within art 23 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
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protection than what is required under the TRIPS Agreement, therefore the CPTPP cannot be 
said to be TRIPS-plus. 
2 Differing approaches: the relationship between geographical indications and  
 trade marks 
It is well documented that in many jurisdictions, GIs are considered the same as or similar to a 
trade mark, so that the protection afforded to a trade mark may also similarly apply to a GI. 
This is the case particularly in the US and Canada, where GIs are protected by trade mark as 
certification marks. In comparison, the EU protects GIs under their own unique IPR. The broad 
argument raised in favour of this latter approach is that GIs are inherently different from trade 
marks. While multiple producers across a given geographical region may apply for the same 
GI for the same product, a trade mark is held by one producer, irrespective of geographical 
location. The focus of each is also inherently different, with trade marks focusing on brand and 
consumer protection, and GIs on the economic value of a name. While the EU succeeded in 
incorporating protection for GIs within the TRIPS Agreement, many countries have been 
unwilling to offer more protection than required by TRIPS. This has been reflected within trade 
agreements, as is apparent between CETA and the CPTPP. 
The CPTPP may be said to place primacy on trade marks over GIs, the reason being that GIs 
are considered sufficiently protected under the trade mark system. Hence why there is no need 
to protect them by another method such as that required under the TRIPS Agreement or CETA. 
This point is established in art 18.19 of the TPP Agreement which states that “[e]ach Party 
shall also provide that signs that may serve as geographical indications are capable of 
protection under its trademark system”. Of notability is the reference to “signs that may serve 
as geographical indications”. The focus here is not on the GI itself but the sign which indicates 
the existence of a GI and which may be capable of obtaining trade mark protection. It must be 
noted that art 18.19 does impliedly distinguish GIs from trade marks by stating that such signs 
are capable of protection under the trade mark system. This indicates that GIs and trade marks 
are different, albeit that the protection afforded by trade marks is sufficient to also protect GIs.  
The primacy of trade marks over GIs is further emphasised in art 18.20 which establishes the 
exclusive right for owners of registered trade marks to “prevent third parties that do not have 
the owner’s consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs, including 
subsequent geographical indications”. Permitting a trade mark owner to prevent use in the 
course of trade of identical or similar signs, whether or not that sign is subsequently protected 
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as a GI, indicates that the rights of the trade mark owner prevail to the detriment of others who 
use that sign without the trade mark owners’ permission. 
Despite the divergent approaches taken by the Parties, it does not necessarily follow that a GI 
will never be afforded protection under the CPTPP or similarly that a trade mark corresponding 
to a GI will never be afforded protection under CETA. Provisions exist within each Agreement 
that operate to resolve conflicts that are based upon the different approaches that may be taken 
to the protection of distinctive signs. For the most part, what matters is timing. 
Article 18.20 grants the exclusive right for a trade mark holder to prevent the use of an identical 
or similar sign, including subsequent geographical indications, where such use is unauthorised. 
This may be interpreted as meaning that this provision applies to GIs where protection is sought 
after the signing or entry into force of the CPTPP and there is already an enforceable trade 
mark in existence. If this interpretation is correct, then this provision may arguably suggest that 
the exclusive right to prevent use does not apply where there is prior use or protection of a GI, 
only subsequent. 
On the other hand, footnote 11 (Chapter 18) of the TPP Agreement states that, “[f]or greater 
certainty, the exclusive right in this Article applies to cases of unauthorised use of geographical 
indications”. An argument may be made that, if a GI is protected by a party, then its use is not 
unauthorised and it therefore does not fall within this provision, whether or not protection is 
subsequent. Additionally, if a party authorises protection for a GI irrespective of an existing 
trade mark, then the trade mark holder cannot be said to have the exclusive right to use of that 
sign. This interpretation would suggest that both trade mark and GI could co-exist irrespective 
of prior use or protection, provided that the GI is authorised by that party.  
The validity of the exception for prior use is strengthened in art 18.32.1 which sets out 
obligations where a party to the CPTPP protects or recognises GIs through administrative 
procedures as opposed to trade marks. Where that is the case, art 18.32.1 requires the party to 
provide objection procedures and to refuse or otherwise not afford protection when certain 
grounds are met. Two of those grounds relate to trade marks and focus on the likelihood of the 
GI causing confusion with an established trade mark.232 In both instances, the trade mark or its 
use in good faith pending application or registration is already in existence prior to protection 
being sought for a GI. Therefore, the basis for objecting to protection is pre-existing rights.  
                                                 
232 TPP Agreement, above n 7, art 18.32.1(a) and (b). 
80 
 
CETA requires the registration of a trade mark to be refused or invalidated where the trade 
mark contains or consists of a GI listed in annex 20-A.233 This applies with respect to a product 
that falls within the product class specified in that annex and which does not originate in the 
specified place of origin.234 Reference to product class may arguably be interpreted to mean 
that a trade mark registered in respect of a product falling within a different product class than 
that specified would remain valid. This would be consistent with the discussion in the above 
section relating to the use of a GI as per art 20.19.2(a) of CETA.  
Irrespectively, CETA similarly provides an exception in order to protect trade marks where 
there has been prior use of a GI.235 This is applicable in respect of a GI used prior to the signing 
of CETA or, where the GI is later added to annex 20-A, prior to the date of inclusion. Of 
significance is that prior use occurs where a trade mark has been applied for or registered in 
good faith or where rights have been acquired through use in good faith. 236 The grounds for 
exempting prior use are near identical to those provided under art 18.32.1 of the TPP 
Agreement. 
Based on the above it may be said that where there is a pre-existing right, the approach is to 
uphold that right. Nevertheless, in consideration of the approach taken within the TRIPS 
Agreement and CETA, and the contrasting approach taken within the CPTPP, it is arguable 
that the CPTPP evidences an attempt to ‘rollback’ the protections afforded under the TRIPS 
Agreement and agreements such as CETA. As the approach taken under the CPTPP is broadly 
reflective of the domestic approaches to GI protection within the Parties to that Agreement, the 
provisions may be seen as the Parties seeking to protect the status quo. The practical effect is 
to prevent or limit parties from protecting, thereby limiting the global expansion of GIs as their 
own unique IPR outside the realm of wines and spirits in accordance with the TRIPS 
Agreement. That said, exemptions are made for prior uses of a GI so that a party would not be 
bound to invalidate an existing GI simply by ratifying the CPTPP. The ancillary effect of this 
is arguably to reassure parties that conflicting protection of IPR will not render a party in 
violation of one trade agreement upon entry into another where the protection of distinctive 
signs is afforded by another mode. 
                                                 
233 CETA, above n 5, art 20.19.6. 
234 Art 20.19.6. 
235 Art 20.21.5. 
236 Art 20.21.5. 
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C Interpretation and Comparative Analsyis of Domestic Law: European Union and New 
 Zealand 
As previously stated, international trade agreements are the result of negotiation and as such 
may be seen as culminations of multiple interests across multiple parties. As interests are often 
diverse between negotiating parties, international trade agreements may not accurately reflect 
the domestic position of any given party. The aim of this section is therefore to provide a 
comparative interpretative analysis of EU and NZ domestic law relating to the protection of 
GIs in order to ascertain the respective positions of the Parties and to determine any challenges 
or differences between their respective laws.  
The domestic legal approach taken towards GI protection significantly differs between the EU 
and New Zealand. Whereas the EU provides for a sui generis regime based upon product 
registration under EU quality schemes, New Zealand offers protection under a range of existing 
statutory and common law rules. Most of these rules have general application and do not 
specifically apply to GIs. In accordance with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement,237 a 
wine and spirits registrar has also been established, coming into force in July 2017. This permits 
the registration of GI names for applicable products, similar to the sui generis regime of the 
EU.  
Due to the differing legal approaches, this section shall be divided into two parts. The first part 
shall interpret and compare the registration schemes of both the EU and New Zealand while 
the second part shall discuss the application of other existing legal rules in the absence of a 
specific registration scheme. It must be noted that a complete analysis of the registration 
schemes is not possible within the scope of this thesis. The analysis will therefore strictly focus 
on the protection of GIs and relevant exceptions thereto. 
1  Registration schemes for the protection of geographical indications 
(a) Identification of registration schemes 
Protection of GIs within the EU is afforded in accordance with EU quality schemes, which 
protect the names of specific products which are linked to geographical origin in addition to 
traditional knowledge.238 Products may be identified with a GI if they fall within any of the 
                                                 
237 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 23.1. 




following three predominant quality schemes: Protected Designation of Origin (PDO), 
Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) and Geographical Indication.239 For the purposes of 
this thesis, reference to the broad term GI shall be understood as encompassing the above three 
schemes, unless otherwise stated. 
The EU quality schemes PDO and PGI were established under Regulation (EU) No 
1151/2012240 in order to ensure uniform protection of specific names as IP and to provide 
consumers with clear information on the value-adding attributes associated with such names.241 
In accordance with art 5.1 of that Regulation, to be identified as a PDO a product must originate 
in a specific place, the quality or characteristics must be “essentially or exclusively due to a 
particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors”, and all of 
the production steps must take place in the defined geographical area. Whereas in accordance 
with art 5.2 of that Regulation, to be identified as a PGI a product must originate in a specific 
place, the given quality, reputation or other characteristics must be essentially attributable to 
its geographical origin, and at least one of the production steps must take place in the defined 
geographical area. The main difference between the two relates to the strength of the 
relationship between the product and the specific geographical origin: where all aspects of the 
production, processing and preparation must occur in the specific region for a PDO, in 
comparison to the less stringent requirements regarding origin and production process for a 
PGI. A Geographical Indication, on the other hand, is almost identical to a PGI, but omits the 
requirement in respect of product steps.242  
Only products which fall within particular product classes may apply for EU GI status, being 
wines (aromatised and other), spirit drinks and agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
Consequently, the protection afforded to GIs is granted under a complex legal framework 
which involves various pieces of legislation. Of relevance to this thesis are the following: 
                                                 
239 Note that a fourth quality scheme ‘Traditional Specialty Guaranteed’ exists to protect traditional aspects of a 
product against misuse or falsification, without being linked to a particular geographical location. 
240 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality 
schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs [2012] OJ L 343/1. 
241 Art 4. 
242 See Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on the 
definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89 [2008] OJ L 39/16, art 15 and Regulation (EU) No 251/2014 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the definition, description, presentation, 
labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products and repealing Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1601/91 [2014] OJ L 84/14, art 2.3. 
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• For agricultural products and foodstuffs: Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs; 
• For wine: Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in 
agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 
234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007;243 
• For aromatised wine: Regulation (EU) No 251/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling 
and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products and 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 1601/91;244 
• For spirit drinks: Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 January 2008 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and 
the protection of geographical indications of spirit drinks and repealing Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 1576/89.245 
Under Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, agricultural products intended for human consumption 
may be protected by either a PDO or PGI.246 This applies to all products listed in annex 1 of 
the TFEU, including cheeses and dry-cured meats. Similarly, under Regulation (EU) No 
1308/2013, wine may be protected by either a PDO or a PGI.247 Spirit drinks and aromatised 
wines, on the other hand, may apply for a Geographical Indication under Regulation (EC) No 
110/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 251/2014 respectively.248 
In accordance with its international obligations, New Zealand enacted the Geographical 
Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act 2006,249 which entered into force in July 2017. 
The purpose of that Act is to provide a suitable legal framework for the registration of GIs and 
to protect the interests of consumers by providing assurance that applicable products using a 
GI do originate in the territory, region or locality to which the registered GI relates.250 A GI is 
defined under s 6(1) as “an indication that identifies a wine or spirit as originating in the 
                                                 
243 [2013] OJ L 347/671. 
244 See above n 242. 
245 See above n 242. 
246 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 2.1. 
247 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 103.1. 
248 Regulation (EC) No 110/2008, above n 242, art 15.1 and Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 20.1. 
249 As amended by the Geographical Indications (Wines and Spirits) Registration Amendment Act 2016. 
250 Geographical Indications (Wines and Spirits) Registration Act 2006, s 3(a) and (c). 
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territory of a country, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, or 
reputation, or other characteristic of the wine or spirit is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin”. This definition includes both New Zealand and foreign GIs.251 In order 
for a GI to be protected in New Zealand, it must be registered under s 8 of that Act. 
As indicated above, the EU permits the granting of a GI to products within the product classes 
wines, spirit drinks and agricultural products and foodstuffs. In comparison, New Zealand only 
permits the granting of a GI by registration to products identified as wines and spirit drinks. 
Producers of a product in any other product class would need to avail themselves of the other 
legal protections offered in order to protect their name within New Zealand. Considering the 
emphasis placed by the EU on the availability of protection for a registered GI, this limited 
coverage will almost certainly be identified as an area of high importance during the course of 
negotiations for an EU-NZ FTA.  
(b) Protection afforded to geographical indications 
The protection afforded to GIs in the EU is broadly consistent across the different product 
classes and legislation.252 To use as an example, art 13.1 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 
provides: 
Registered names shall be protected against: 
(a) any direct or indirect commercial use of a registered name in respect of products not covered 
by the registration where those products are comparable to the products registered under that 
name or where using the name exploits the reputation of the protected name, including when 
those products are used as an ingredient; 
(b) any misuse, imitation or evocation, even if the true origin of the products or services is 
indicated or if the protected name is translated or accompanied by an expression such as 
‘style’, ‘type’, ‘method’, ‘as produced in’, ‘imitation’ or similar, including when those 
products are used as an ingredient; 
(c) any other false or misleading indication as to the provenance, origin, nature or essential 
qualities of the product that is used on the inner or outer packaging, advertising material or 
documents relating to the product concerned, and the packing of the product in a container 
liable to convey a false impression as to its origin; 
                                                 
251 S 6(2) and (3). 
252 Compare Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 13; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, 




(d) any other practice liable to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product. 
A number of elements arise from the protection afforded to GIs. First, any direct or indirect use 
must be commercial. Any use that is not in the course of trade or business will not fall within 
art 13.1. Second, the use need not only be direct, but may also be indirect. Indirect use of a GI 
may include, but is not limited to, pictures of landscapes or familiar landmarks, heraldic signs, 
images of well-known persons253 or trade dress254.255 The reference to indirect use may also be 
broad enough to encompass uses accompanied by expressions indicated in art 13.1(b), in 
addition to packaging presentation as indicated in art 13.1(c), provided that the use is 
commercial. In any event, the indirect use must be associated with the GI to an extent sufficient 
to cause confusion with a comparable product or to affect the reputation of the GI.  
Third, the use of accompanying expressions is prohibited, even where the true origin is stated 
or where their use would convey that they are not the true product. This corresponds to art 23.1 
of the TRIPS Agreement and art 20.19.3 of CETA. What is noteworthy is the inclusion of the 
term ‘evocation’, which is not included within either of those agreements. This means that any 
use which invokes a feeling, memory or image of that GI is prohibited.256 Such use may include 
a catchphrase, a particular style of font or combination of colours on the packaging. Finally, 
elements of both producer and consumer protection have been included within that provision. 
Both (a) and (b) focus primarily on the protection afforded to a GI, while (c) and (d) focus on 
misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to the true origin of a product. Despite the 
inclusion of elements relating to consumer protection, however, the emphasis is on the 
protection of the GI, as indicated by the commencing phrase “Registered names shall be 
protected against”. 
Sections 21 to 25 of the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act provide 
for the protection of GIs by imposing restrictions on the use of registered GIs. Section 21 
imposes restrictions on the use of a New Zealand registered GI for wine. That section provides 
                                                 
253 For example, the inclusion on a label for chocolates of an image of Mozart may indirectly indicate the origin 
as Austria, without explicitly stating the place of origin.  
254 For example, the use of the ‘Clavelin’ bottle may only be used by French wines bearing the PDOs Côte du 
Jura, Arbois, L’Etoile and Château Chalon. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 2019/33 of 17 October 
2018 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
applications for protection of designations of origin, geographical indications and traditional terms in the wine 
sector, the objective procedure, restrictions of use, amendments to product specifications, cancellation of 
protection, and labelling and presentation [2019] OJ L 9/2, annex VII at 3. 
255 Albrecht Conrad “The Protection of Geographical Indications in the TRIPS Agreement” (1996) 86 Trademark 
Rep 11 at 11. 
256 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, above n 113, ‘evocation’. 
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that a person may use a New Zealand registered GI in trade in New Zealand in relation to wine 
only if at least 85% of the wine is obtained from grapes harvested in the place of geographical 
origin to which the GI relates, the remainder of the wine is obtained from grapes harvested in 
New Zealand, and the GI is used in accordance with its registration. Section 23 applies to the 
use of a New Zealand GI registered for spirits, providing that a person may use that GI in trade 
only if the spirit originated in the place of origin to which the GI relates, and its use is in 
accordance with its registration. Sections 22 and 24 apply identically and respectively to the 
use of foreign registered GIs for wines and spirits. Both sections provide that a person may use 
those GIs in trade in New Zealand only if the wine or spirit originated in the place or places of 
origin to which the foreign registered GI relates, and the GI is used in accordance with the 
scope of its protection in its country of origin, and with its registration in New Zealand. 
Section 25 provides additional rules relating to restrictions on use. Under that section, the 
restrictions on use in accordance with ss 21–24 apply whether or not the true place of origin of 
the wine or spirit is indicated, the registered GI is used in translation, or the use of the registered 
GI is accompanied by the expressions ‘kind’, ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘imitation’ or any similar word or 
expression. 
Significantly, the above five sections refer broadly to the ‘use’ of those GIs in trade, as opposed 
to “any direct or indirect commercial use of a registered name” under art 13.1(a) of regulation 
(EU) No 1151/2012. No interpretation for the term ‘use’ is provided within the Geographical 
Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act. Furthermore, its dictionary definition provides 
little clarity, defining ‘use’ as ‘the action of using something or the state of being used for a 
purpose’.257 While in a broad sense ‘use’ may encompass both direct and indirect forms, its 
interpretation must be done in a manner consistent with the context.  
Under ss 21–24, “[a] person may use a [New Zealand/foreign] geographical indication”. 
Geographical indication is defined under s 6(1) as “an indication that identifies a wine or spirit 
as originating in the territory of a country, or a region or locality in that territory”.258 More 
often than not it is the name of the GI, typically the place of origin, that indicates or is associated 
with that information. Indeed, the registration of a GI is done in accordance with the name of 
the GI. On this basis, the use of a GI would mean the name used to protect the particular 
product. 
                                                 
257 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, above n 113, ‘use’. 
258 Emphasis added. 
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This interpretation is consistent with art 13.1(a) of Regulation (EU) 1151/2012 in respect of 
protection against the use of registered names. The main difference between that provision and 
the restrictions on use under the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act 
is therefore the form of use. On the one hand, the purpose under s 3(d) of that Act is to facilitate, 
in a manner consistent with New Zealand’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, the other 
purposes listed therein. This includes the protection of the interests of consumers of wines and 
spirits by providing assurance that a product using a GI originates in the true geographical place 
of origin.259 It is arguable that, in achieving that purpose, use of a GI would extend to any 
means in the designation or presentation of a good in accordance with art 22.2(a) of the TRIPS 
Agreement – in other words, indirect use. On the other hand, the additional restrictions under 
s 25 of the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act suggest that actual or 
‘direct’ use of the GI is required, in particular the use of expression accompanying the GI and 
the use of the GI in translation. Furthermore, a good faith reading of the provisions relating to 
restriction to use would prevent reading in provisions that are not expressly included. In the 
absence of express provision to the contrary, the term ‘use’ may be interpreted as meaning 
actual use of the name of the applicable GI. 
It is clear from the above that the protection afforded under the Geographical Indications (Wine 
and Spirits) Registration Act only applies to actual use of the GI name, whether or not any of 
the additional protections in s 25 apply. This is in comparison to art 13.1 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1151/2012 which also protects against misleading and deceptive use. This protection is in 
addition to the broader protection granted under that Regulation with respect to unauthorised 
use of the registered name. Despite not specifically protecting against misleading or deceptive 
use within the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act, New Zealand law 
does still offer adequate protection under other legal instruments.260 As the scope of other legal 
protection is wide enough to encompass protection similar to that provided under art 13.1(c) 
and (d) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, it may be said that there is little significant 
difference between the domestic regimes of both New Zealand and the EU in that respect. The 
only significant difference with respect to the protection afforded to GIs is therefore in relation 
to the form of use.  
                                                 
259 Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act 2006, s 3(c). 
260 See discussion below in relation to the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the tort of passing off. 
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(c) Exceptions to legal protection afforded to geographical indications 
In addition to conferring protection under their respective registration regimes, both the EU 
and New Zealand also provide exceptions to that protection in limited circumstances. While 
exceptions to protection are not TRIPS-plus in nature and therefore were not discussed in the 
preceding section, their inclusion within the respective registration regimes indicates the extent 
to which protection is afforded by the Parties and therefore assists in understanding the 
positions of the Parties. For this reason, they shall be interpreted and compared here. 
(i) Grandfathering/continuous use 
None of the relevant EU legislation contains provisions on continuous use of a GI. The only 
exception is where there is a pre-existing trade mark. In that situation, provided that the trade 
mark had been applied for, registered or established by use in good faith before the date of 
protection of the GI in its country of origin, the trade mark may continue to be used and 
renewed irrespective of the GI, and provided that no grounds for invalidity or revocation 
exist.261 A trade mark and GI may, therefore, exist alongside one another where there is a pre-
existing trade mark.262 This exception for a pre-existing trade mark is broadly consistent across 
the four relevant pieces of legislation and is consistent with the EU’s obligations under art 
20.21.5 of CETA. 
Although it does not contain provisions for the continuous use of a GI where there is no pre-
existing trademark, Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 does afford a transition period of up to five 
years for prior uses of a GI.263 In order to make use of this period, prior users must show that 
the registration of the name would jeopardise the existence of an entirely or partly identical 
name and that such products have been legally marketed under that name in the territory 
concerned for at least five years prior to the Regulation.264 This transitional period may be 
extended by the European Commission in duly justified cases, including where the GI has been 
in legal use consistently and fairly for at least 25 years prior to the registration of the GI.265 
                                                 
261 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 14.2; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 102.2; 
Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 19.2 and Regulation (EC) No 110/2008, above n 242, art 23.2. 
262 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 14.2; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 102.2 
and Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 19.2. Note that Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 does not refer 
to the coexistence of a GI and pre-existing trademark. Above n 242. 
263 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 15.1. 
264 Art 15.1. 
265 Art 15.2(a). 
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The reason for omitting provisions relating to continuous use may relate to the historical 
emphasis placed on geographical origin and names within the EU. This is particularly so in 
relation to wines and spirits. For example, the use of the name ‘Champagne’ has been legally 
protected since 1891.266 In addition, a substantial number of GIs for wines and spirits are 
registered under a specific regional name. Presumably producers of those products would use 
that name where their products corresponded with the specific requirements of that name. 
Instances of continuous use would therefore likely be minimal. Agricultural products and 
foodstuffs, on the other hand, are often produced under less specific regional names or a name 
unrelated to the specific region, prompting use of the same name in other areas for the same or 
similar products. A well-known example of this is the use of the term ‘Feta’ by producers in 
EU Member States other than Greece who were prohibited from further use of that name after 
registration as a GI in 2002.267 It is arguable that it was for this reason that transitional 
provisions were included within Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, which applies to those 
products. 
New Zealand, on the other hand, provides protection for the continuous and similar use of a 
GI. This is subject to the proviso that a person has either used a GI in trade in a continuous 
manner for the ten years preceding the signing of the TRIPS Agreement or has prior to that 
date used a GI in trade in a continuous manner and in good faith.268 The reason for affording 
protection for continuous use under the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) 
Registration Act may be explained by the fact that New Zealand is considered a New World 
country, where many of its inhabitants find their ancestral roots in older parts of the world, 
including Europe. As a result of immigration, traditional practices and ways of life were 
imported into New Zealand, including the use of traditional names. Provisions for continuous 
use protect those names in respect of products made in accordance with traditional practices. 
Traditional uses between Old and New World countries may, therefore, explain why New 
Zealand protects continuous use while the EU does not. 
New Zealand also provides for the continued used of a pre-existing trade mark under s 30(1) 
of the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act. Similar to the legal 
                                                 
266 See Treaty of Madrid (1891), above n 13. Note that art 1(2) permits a country to secure protection for their 
marks by filing said marks at the International Bureau of Intellectual Property. 
267 Note that Germany and Denmark opposed the initial registration of ‘Feta’ as a PDO in 1999 and subsequently 
sought annulment of that registration on grounds of invalidity in 2002. See Joined Cases C-465/02 and C-466/02 
Federal Republic of Germany (C-465/02) and Kingdom of Denmark (C-466/02) v Commission of the European 
Communities [2005] ECR I-9115. 
268 Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act 2006, s 29(1). 
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approach taken by the EU, use of a pre-existing trade mark may be continued where the trade 
mark has been applied for, registered or established by use in good faith before the date of 
protection of the GI in its country of origin.269 
It is important to note that although the EU does not contain provisions protecting the 
continuous use of a GI in its domestic law, it has included such provisions within CETA, albeit 
to a limited extent. Rather than exempting protection for all instances of continuous or similar 
use, art 20.21.2 – 4 identifies those products where continued commercial use shall not be 
prevented. This is provided such use has occurred for a specified duration of time prior to the 
date on which the CETA negotiations were concluded. Transitional periods are also provided, 
during which time continued use shall not be prevented for those who have used that GI in a 
continuous manner for less than the specified duration of time. The inclusion of these 
provisions in the absence of corresponding domestic laws indicates that the EU could be willing 
to introduce similar provisions into future trade agreements. This could temper any obligation 
for New Zealand to implement TRIPS-plus protection for GIs under an EU-NZ FTA. 
(ii) Customary/generic terms 
Registration of a generic term is prohibited within each piece of relevant EU legislation.270 A 
term is defined as generic where the name, although it relates to the place or region where a 
product was originally produced or marketed, has become the common name of that product 
in the EU.271 In establishing whether a name has become generic, relevant factors shall be taken 
into account, including the existing situation in areas of consumption and the relevant EU or 
national law.272 
Use of a generic term is expressly permitted under art 41.1 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012. 
This includes where the generic term is part of a name that is protected under a GI.273 Article 
13.1 of that Regulation does make clear, however, that where a generic term is part of a 
protected GI, use of that term remains subject to conditions protecting the GI against 
misleading indications and where use of that term is liable to mislead consumers. While the 
                                                 
269 Or before the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, whichever is later. 
270 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 6.1; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 101.1; 
Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 18.1 and Regulation (EC) No 110/2008, above n 242, art 15.3. 
271 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 3.6; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 101.1; 
Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 18.1 and Regulation (EC) No 110/2008, above n 242, art 15.3. 
272 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 41.2; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 101.1 
and Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 18.1. Note that Regulation (EC) No 110/2008 does not contain 
a similar provision. Above n 242. 
273 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 41.1. 
91 
 
use of a generic term is not expressly provided for in the remaining pieces of relevant EU 
legislation, use may be presumed on the basis that registration of a generic term is expressly 
prohibited. As registration of a name ensures protection, a term cannot be protected against use 
when it may not be registered. Use of a generic term may therefore be implied. 
Similarly, s 12 of the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act prohibits 
the Registrar from registering a GI for a wine or spirit if it is identical to the term customary in 
common language as the common name of a wine or spirit in New Zealand. While there is no 
reference to generic names or the use thereof within that Act, it may also be presumed that if 
such a name cannot be registered, it also cannot be protected against use. Use of a generic term 
may also therefore be implied. On this basis, there is no effective difference between the 
provisions relating to customary use in the EU and New Zealand relating to generic terms. 
Of note is that, under s 45(1) of the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration 
Act, “[t]he Registrar may remove a registered geographical indication from the register if 
satisfied that”, among other grounds, the GI “has become a term customary in the common 
language as the common name for a wine or spirit in New Zealand.”274 Any proposed removal 
of a GI from the register may be opposed by any interested person;275 however, the decision to 
remove a GI is ultimately one for the Registrar to make. This is in direct contrast to the 
approach taken under the relevant EU legislation, which all prohibit a registered GI from 
becoming generic.276 In practice, however, the effect of s 45(1) may arguably be insubstantial 
as registration prohibits use of that name. As use of the name is no longer permitted other than 
by those whose product is legitimately covered by that GI, there is little opportunity for that 
particular name to fall into generic use.  
Where this provision shall take most effect is where the use of a name protected by a GI is 
already permitted due to its continued use. This would be due to continual exposure of the 
generic products to consumers, which may mislead them as to the true origin of that name and 
its relation to a given product. One way to get around this would be to ensure that any name, 
the use of which is permitted by continuous use, shall be accompanied by expressions or that 
                                                 
274 Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act 2006, s 45(1)(e) (emphasis added). 
275 S 45B. 
276 Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, above n 240, art 13.2; Regulation (EC) No 1308/2013, above n 243, art 103.3; 
Regulation (EU) No 251/2014, above n 242, art 20.3 and Regulation (EC) No 110/2008, above n 242, art 15.3. 
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the label visibly indicates place of origin. This would contribute to distinguishing a generic 
product from one protected by a GI and may prevent consumers from being misled. 
Finally, New Zealand prohibits the registration of a GI which is identical to a customary name 
of a grape variety existing in New Zealand upon entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement. This 
is consistent with obligations under that Agreement, which leaves the matter to each WTO 
Member to determine themselves.277 EU legislation, in comparison, is silent on this matter. The 
effect of this provision is likely to be insignificant, however, as there are alternative means to 
protect those terms. An example is the Italian wine Prosecco, which arguably may not be 
capable of registration as a GI in New Zealand due to the commonality of its name.278 
Irrespective of this, and whether or not protection is granted by way of a GI, Prosecco already 
receives protection as a brand name under registered and protected trade marks.279 
2 ‘Other’ methods of legal protection for geographical indications in New Zealand 
In the absence of a specific registration scheme other than for wines and spirits, New Zealand 
affords protection to GIs through other legal mechanisms. Protection may be granted through 
the general application of rules that may operate to prevent the misleading of consumers in 
respect of a product’s true geographical origin. These legal mechanisms are trade mark law, 
the Fair Trading Act 1986 and the tort of passing off. The following section shall discuss the 
applicability of those existing rules to GIs. 
(a) Trade mark law 
A GI may be protected under a New Zealand trade mark provided it meets the criteria under 
the Trade Marks Act 2002. A trade mark may be granted for any sign that is capable of being 
represented graphically and which distinguishes the goods of one person from those of another, 
including both certification and collective marks.280 In respect of a certification mark, the mark 
may distinguish “goods certified by any person in respect of origin, material, mode of 
manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics from goods not so certified”; whereas 
a collective mark distinguishes goods of a collective association from those of a person who is 
                                                 
277 TRIPS Agreement, above n 3, art 24.6. 
278 Note that the Consorzio di Tutela Della Denominazione di Origine Controllata Prosecco filed an application 
for the registration of Prosecco as a GI in New Zealand on 06 November 2017, which is currently under 
examination. Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, Geographical Indications Register, IP number 1025. 
279 Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand, Trade Mark Register, IP Numbers 975131 and 982408. 
280 Trade Marks Act 2002, s 5(1) ‘trade mark’. 
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not a member of that collective association.281 The rights afforded under a registered trade mark 
extend to both certification and collective marks, granting the mark holder the exclusive right 
to use or authorise others to use that mark.282 Under a collective mark, this exclusive right 
extends to all members of the relevant collective association.283 
GIs may be registered under any of the above-mentioned marks, one difference between them 
being the persons or products that a mark holder may exclude from using that particular mark. 
A search of the IPONZ trade mark register reveals the registration or application of a number 
of well-known European GIs for each type of mark. For example, the Consorzio Vini Asolo 
Montello has sought a collective mark that applies to Prosecco, while a collective mark has 
been registered in respect of Prosciutto di San Daniele. Similarly, certification marks have been 
granted to registered products such as Stilton cheese, Parmigiano Reggiano and Parma ham, 
while trade marks have been granted to registered products such as Champagne, Cognac and 
Riccadonna. 
Although trade marks in general afford adequate protection in place of a GI, protection is 
weaker and limited in scope when compared with GI protection. Primarily, trade marks are 
registered by individual producers, which leads to the implication that there is no common 
standard set down for a given product. This includes standards relating to the geographical 
origin of that product. The purpose of the trade mark is not to protect the product and its 
perceived quality but rather to protect or draw attention to the brand affixed to that product. 
Trade marks are therefore not so much indicators of quality as they are indicators of producers. 
This is in contrast to a GI, the purpose of which is to protect against the dilution in value of a 
product where the geographical origin and quality are inherently linked.  
While certification marks afford stronger protection than a sole trade mark, the standards are 
set down by private certifiers and may or may not require a link between geographical origin 
and quality. Collective marks confer the strongest protection afforded by a mark as standards 
designed to control product quality and integrity are set by a public consortium or organisation 
made up of producers of those specific products. Irrespective of this, such products may still 
be forced to compete against products using accompanying terms such as ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘kind’, 
‘imitation’ or the like, as collective marks do not protect against such use of the mark. 
                                                 
281 S 5(1) ‘certification trade mark’ and ‘collective trade mark’. 
282 S 10(1)(a) and (b). 
283 S 10(2)(a). 
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In addition, the individualistic nature of the trade mark system places overly formalistic and 
tedious processes on right holders in comparison to a registration scheme when seeking 
protection in a foreign country. While a trade mark applicant would need to seek protection in 
each foreign country it wishes to have protection in, a product registered under a GI in its place 
of origin would automatically benefit from protection where that term is recognised as a GI by 
a foreign country. Finally, in the event of a dispute, infringement of a GI is easier to resolve 
than infringement of a mark. This is given the broader level of protection afforded to prevent 
the use of GIs as opposed to trade marks. 
(b) Fair Trading Act 1986 
The Fair Trading Act seeks to contribute to a trading environment where businesses have the 
ability to compete effectively and where consumers may participate confidently in knowing 
that their interests are protected.284 To this end, the Fair Trading Act “promotes fair conduct 
and practices in relation to trade” by prohibiting certain forms of unfair conduct and 
practices.285 The most frequently cited prohibition relates to misleading conduct, prohibited 
under s 9 which states “[n]o person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive”. While the Fair Trading Act does not provide an 
interpretation for either mislead or deceit, they have been described as similarly meaning “to 
lead into error”, where ‘deceit’ carries a sense of “craft or overreaching”.286 In addition to s 9, 
which may be described as a general catch-all phrase, s 13(1) prohibits false or misleading 
representations, including representations which relate to the quality or place of origin of a 
good.287 
The prohibition on misleading conduct imposes a reasonably low threshold as it merely 
requires that conduct is capable of misleading or is likely to mislead; it does not require 
evidence of actual misleading. Provided that the conduct in trade is capable of or is likely to 
cause consumers to adopt the wrong idea or impression, the requirements of s 9 will likely be 
met. As an example, the use of a name protected as a GI in its country of origin, in relation to 
a product that is produced elsewhere, may constitute misleading conduct if the use of that name 
causes a consumer to adopt the wrong impression as to the true origin of the product. However, 
if a product clearly distinguishes itself from the GI despite adopting the same name, it is less 
                                                 
284 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 1A(1). 
285 S 1A(2)(a) and (b). 
286 Ian Gault and others Gault on Commercial Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [FT9.04]. 
287 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 13(1)(a) and (j). 
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likely that the conduct would be considered misleading or deceptive. Of note is that the 
approach taken is reflective of consumer protection, therefore there is no obligation to provide 
evidence of damage to a product’s goodwill or reputation.288  
A misleading or false representation, on the other hand, involves the description or portrayal 
of something in a particular false or misleading way.289 This includes “oral and written 
statements associated with pictorial material”.290 In respect of a GI, this could include the 
display of images or the use of a logo or sign used to illegitimately identify the product as that 
to which the logo or sign applies. Use of the particular images, logo or sign may falsely 
represent either the quality or the origin of the GI concerned. The focus here is on the display 
or portrayal of something in a misleading way, as opposed to the nature of the conduct itself. 
Of note is that s 16 of the Fair Trading Act prohibits the forging of a trademark or the 
application of a sign so similar to a trademark that it is likely to mislead or deceive. If a logo 
or sign is displayed on a product where that logo or sign is protected by a trademark, a claim 
could be raised under either section. 
(c) Passing off 
While the FTA largely focuses on consumer protection, the action of passing off was developed 
under the common law in order to protect business goodwill against unfair competition between 
traders.291 It is particularly concerned with misrepresentations that have as their aim the passing 
off of goods as those of another, thereby appropriating the goodwill or reputation of the 
other.292 In order to establish a claim, the party must satisfy the following three-pronged test:293 
a) there is goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services, associated with an 
identifying feature; 
b) there has been a misrepresentation by the defendant, leading or likely to lead the public 
to believe that the goods are those of the plaintiff; and  
c) the plaintiff has suffered or is likely to suffer damage as a result of the 
misrepresentation. 
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289 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, above n 113, ‘representation’. 
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The three-pronged test for passing off was applied in New Zealand in the case Anheuser-Busch 
Inc v Budweiser Budvar National Corporation,294 which involved a dispute between the parties 
over the labelling of their respective beers. The plaintiff held the New Zealand trade marks for 
‘Budweiser’ and ‘Bud’ beer, the names having been derived from the German name of the 
Czech town České Budějovice. The defendant later registered a trade mark for its rival beer 
‘Budějovickŷ Budvar’, where it included on the label the terms ‘Budweiser Budvar’. In 
assessing the claim of the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal rejected a claim for passing off on the 
basis that there was nothing in the presentation of the goods to increase the likelihood of deceit 
as the products were visually different.295 In addition, the labels of the defendant sufficiently 
disclosed that the beer was a Czech lager, therefore any possible connection could not arise 
above “cause to wonder”.296 Evidence presented in order to indicate the reputation attached to 
the name ‘Budweiser’ was dismissed by the Court, although that evidence was unnecessary for 
the Court to reject the claim. Budweiser Budvar National Corporation has since obtained a PGI 
for ‘Budějovické pivo upon accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.297 
Similarly, passing off has been used in New Zealand to protect the goodwill or reputation of 
‘Champagne’ against winemakers seeking to appropriate that name for their own sparkling 
wine. In upholding a claim by French winemakers for passing off, the Court of Appeal in 
Wineworths Group Ltd v Comité Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne held that the requisite 
distinctiveness and goodwill of that name was well established in the New Zealand market.298 
In so holding, Justice Gault stated that “[i]t is not the name that indicates the characteristics but 
the name in conjunction with experience or repute. … For suppliers the attracting force in the 
name constitutes a part of the goodwill of their business.”299 The inevitable consequence of use 
of that name would be the erosion of its distinctiveness, which would undoubtedly cause 
damage to the goodwill and reputation of those legitimately producing Champagne.300 Despite 
the continuous adverse use of the term Champagne, the Court held that such use had not been 
sufficient to dilute the distinctiveness of that term to the point that it may now be considered 
generic.301 For these reasons, the claim for passing off was made out. 
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While French winemakers were successful in this case, it is questionable whether a less 
prominent or well-known name would achieve the same result. Here, the case hinged on the 
well-established reputation of that particular name. The problem facing other producers 
seeking to protect their GIs under the tort of passing off would be in evidencing the requisite 
goodwill and distinctiveness of their GI as compared with a product that has appropriated that 
term. This is particularly so in relation to agricultural products which have been produced and 
marketed under those names in New Zealand for an extended period of time. 
D Summary of Chapter: Determination of Challenges and Difficulties Going Forth in 
 the Negotiations for an EU-NZ FTA 
Based on the preceding sections of this chapter, it is clear that there are significant differences 
in the TRIPS-plus protections relating to GIs between CETA and the CPTPP. The purpose of 
this section is to determine any challenges or difficulties arising from those differences that 
would need to be overcome during the course of negotiations.  
1 Legal protection afforded to geographical indications 
The approaches taken to the protection of GIs differ significantly between CETA and the 
CPTPP. Whereas the CPTPP prioritises trade marks and emphasises the role of trade marks in 
protecting GIs as signs, CETA affords legal protection to GIs as a distinct IPR. This is 
consistent with the international obligations imposed on WTO Members under the TRIPS 
Agreement, albeit the level of protection afforded under CETA is of a higher standard and 
covers a broader range of product classes. To this end it requires the protection of a number of 
specific names or terms pertaining to agricultural products and foodstuffs, registered in their 
country of origin as GIs. In addition to protecting the use of that specific name, CETA requires 
that protection be extended to the use of that term in conjunction with accompanying 
expressions such as ‘type’, ‘style’, ‘kind’, ‘imitation’ or the like. The aim is to prevent the 
dilution of a specific GI and its reputation by eliminating all association of generic products 
with that protected term.  
Legal protection of GIs under CETA is broadly reflective of EU domestic law. As discussed 
above, the EU provides for quality schemes where producers of foodstuffs and agricultural 
products, wines and spirits may register a term under one of three schemes in order to obtain 
protection for direct or indirect use of that term. This applies against misleading use as much 
as deceptive use or misuse, and similarly extends to accompanying expressions and 
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translations. An earlier agreement between the EU and Canada was incorporated within CETA 
to address the protection of wines and spirits. Given the consistency between EU domestic law 
and CETA in relation to the protection of GIs, it may be inferred that CETA is broadly 
reflective of EU interests and priorities as opposed to the interests and priorities of Canada. 
This proposition is supported by the fact that all GIs specifically included in CETA as names 
to be protected belong to EU Member States; none listed therein belong to Canada. 
New Zealand has only recently implemented a register for wines and spirits in compliance with 
its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. This permits GI holders to seek registration of a 
name in order to ensure its protection against use. Whereas EU law protects against direct or 
indirect use, which includes presentation and labelling, New Zealand protects against actual 
use of the GI, providing a stricter standard. The main difference lies in the product classes that 
are protected under each Party’s registration scheme, with the New Zealand scheme only 
applying to wines and spirits and not foodstuffs or agricultural products. Despite this, New 
Zealand offers other legal mechanisms that apply generally to protect GIs: trade mark law, the 
Fair Trading Act and the tort of passing off. These mechanisms offer various methods of 
protecting a GI by way of mark or sign registration, misleading or deceptive conduct or 
misleading representation as to quality or origin, and the erosion of distinctiveness thereby 
damaging goodwill and reputation. That said, each mechanism presents its own hurdles or 
process burdens while a registration system provides a streamlined process to the ease of GI 
holders. It also upholds GIs as a class of IP in its own right. For these reasons, it is very likely 
that the difference in protection schemes between the Parties will present challenges or 
difficulties that the Parties would need to overcome in the course of negotiations. 
The CPTPP broadly reflects the domestic law of the Parties to that agreement, which includes, 
to a large extent, those of New Zealand. Because of this, the provisions relating to GIs within 
that agreement predominantly apply to ensure the implementation of certain procedures where 
GIs are protected other than by trademark. Such procedures include opposition and invalidation 
procedures, which has implications in respect of trade agreements which seek to accord 
protection to distinctive signs under a GI. This shall be discussed further below. Otherwise, the 
CPTPP places priority on trade mark protection which arguably seeks to rollback protection 
afforded under a GI. That said, both CETA and the CPTPP protect pre-existing rights, therefore 
a subsequent trade mark will not invalidate an existing GI and vice versa. 
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2 Exceptions to legal protection afforded to geographical indications 
(a) Grandfathering/continuous use 
EU domestic legislation does not permit continuous use of a GI other than where there is a pre-
existing trademark. A transitional period of up to five years is, however, permitted where there 
has been prior use of a GI relating to agricultural products and foodstuff only. The reason for 
this may lie in the particular product classes to which GI protection is afforded and the 
specificity of GI names to a particular region, which renders illegitimate marketing of a GI less 
likely. New Zealand, on the other hand, does provide protection for continuous use. As 
discussed above, the reason for this is in recognition that traditional practices and ways of life 
have been imported to New Zealand through immigration. Continuous use provisions, 
therefore, permit traditional users to continue producing products in accordance with those 
traditional ways. 
It is important to note that despite the EU’s domestic position, CETA affords protection, albeit 
limited in scope, to contentious GI names where there has been continuous use. This may 
indicate the willingness of the EU to negotiate limited exceptions in order to secure protection 
for GIs in its trade agreements with third parties. 
Both Canada and New Zealand are relatively similar with respect to immigration and the 
importation of traditional practices and ways of life, both being examples of New World 
countries. Whether New Zealand should afford protection to GIs other than wines and spirits 
in an EU-NZ FTA is a matter that the Parties will need to determine during the course of their 
negotiations. This will involve a consideration of those GI terms currently protected by another 
producer under a New Zealand trademark and whether continuous use of those names will be 
permitted under an EU-NZ FTA. 
(b) Customary/generic terms 
EU law permits use of a generic term, either by express or implied permission, as discussed 
above. In respect of use by express permission, this applies even where the generic term is part 
of a name that is protected under a GI. It does, however, make clear that use of that generic 
term remains subject to conditions protecting the GI against misleading indications or 
misleading of consumers. In respect of use by implied permission, EU law prohibits the 
registration of a generic term. It may be presumed that, if a term cannot be registered, it also 
cannot be protected against use, hence permission to use is implied. Similarly, New Zealand 
100 
 
impliedly permits the use of a generic term by prohibiting the registration of a term identical 
to the term customary in common language. On this basis, there is no effective difference 
between the domestic approaches of the Parties in order for any challenge or difficulty to arise 
in respect of customary or generic terms.  
New Zealand does permit the removal from the register of a GI where the registrar is satisfied 
that the name has become customary in the common language. Where this may cause issues is 
in relation to continuous use of a GI, where the continual exposure to a generic product may 
over time mislead consumers as to true origin and ultimately bring that name into the common 
language. This may, therefore, be an issue which the parties may wish to discuss further in the 
course of negotiations, should the parties agree to permit continuous use for certain GI names.
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V Implications for New Zealand 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the implications arising from the challenges posed by 
protections relating to patent term extension/restoration, data and market exclusivity, and the 
protection of GIs, in light of the Parties’ respective positions and interests. In so doing, the 
issue of whether New Zealand should implement TRIPS-plus protections and to what extent 
shall be discussed, along with how existing international obligations may be reconciled. 
A Towards an EU-NZ Free Trade Agreement 
The respective positions of the Parties towards the protection of IP are naturally reflective of 
their IP manufacturing capabilities. As already mentioned above, the EU is a high producer of 
IP while New Zealand is a high consumer of IP, therefore it is no surprise that the EU provides 
a stronger level of domestic protection than New Zealand. This is not to say that New Zealand 
does not provide adequate IP protection. Rather, the levels of protection afforded in each party 
reflect an appropriate balance between the competing interests of right holders and consumers 
in that respective party. Each party may, therefore, be said to effectively and efficiently protect 
IPRs domestically to a level that meets their respective needs.302  
The present issue is that the EU seeks to export its norms in its international agreements in 
order for EU producers to achieve the same or similar level of protection for their goods in a 
foreign market, thereby levelling the playing field. This is the case in CETA, which is broadly 
reflective of EU law. The exportation of norms may be to the disadvantage of the trading 
partner as the level sought has the effect of skewing the balance between the interests of right 
holders and those of consumers in that country, often to the detriment of consumers. In the case 
of New Zealand, given its domestic position, the imposition of those TRIPS-plus protections 
identified as posing a significant challenge will very likely have this effect. The challenge going 
forward in the negotiations is, therefore, in upholding and attaining the interests of both Parties 
in a manner that avoids or minimises harm. 
Both the EU and New Zealand have made it clear that an IP chapter should include mutually 
beneficial provisions on the protection and enforcement of IPRs.303 It has also been made clear 
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that, where New Zealand does make commitments in sensitive areas of IP, the focus will be on 
ensuring the minimisation or avoidance of any costs or disadvantages.304 These elements 
comprise the starting approach to any discussions on how TRIPS-plus protections may be 
included within an EU-NZ FTA. 
B Implementation of TRIPS-plus protections: a balance of interests and possible 
 outcomes 
In order to enhance global competitiveness, the EU contends that stronger IP protection is 
necessary outside of the domestic sphere. To this end, the vulnerability of creativity, research 
and design in other jurisdictions was acknowledged by the European Commission in its trade 
policy Trade for All, compelling the EU to step up the protection and enforcement of IPRs in 
its FTAs.305 The aim is to promote international harmonisation through the broad alignment of 
rules, creating a more predictable and certain IP environment.306 As the overall objective is to 
promote a stronger level of protection for IPRs, the EU takes as the starting point in its FTAs 
similar levels of protection as its domestic law, thereby promoting harmonisation at the level 
it deems sufficient to adequately protect the interests of EU right holders. On this basis, it may 
be expected that a similar approach be taken towards the protection of IPRs in an EU-NZ FTA. 
Despite taking as a starting point levels of protection similar to its domestic law, the EU does 
“calibrate [their] level of ambition to the partner country’s level of development”.307 In a strict 
sense ‘development’ may be interpreted as meaning the economic development of a country 
relative to other nations. This interpretation would be consistent with the European 
Commission’s Communication on a strategy for the protection and enforcement of IPRs in 
third countries, which does state that a limited set of IPR provisions “may be considered” for 
least-developed countries and poorer developing countries.308 However, this interpretation 
disregards the practical realities that some countries, like New Zealand, are developed yet are 
also small market economies. The implication is that their interests can align with those of 
either other developed or developing countries.309 In this case, it may be arguable that a limited 
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set of IPR provisions should be considered as a starting point in recognition of this unique 
position. That said, an international agreement is ultimately a multi-party creation. While the 
starting point may propose stronger protection than what one party is willing to commit to, 
there must be some give and take in order to recognise and give effect to the other party’s 
interests or reservations. If not, then an agreement will not be reached. 
1 Protection for pharmaceuticals 
The protection of IPRs is paramount to the EU pharmaceutical sector, which relies heavily on 
those rights in order to protect and promote innovation. Conditions that stimulate creativity and 
innovation are therefore required in order for pharmaceutical companies to invest in research 
and development, so that they may deliver life-saving pharmaceutical products to those in need. 
Without such conditions, investors would shy away from investing in innovative solutions to 
medical challenges. A strong and robust IP framework which incentivises research and 
development through stronger protection is therefore crucial to securing investment and 
consequently enhancing the competitiveness of the EU pharmaceutical sector in an increasingly 
global world.310 It is for this reason that the EU promotes the inclusion of TRIPS-plus 
protections for pharmaceuticals within its trade agreements, particularly protections relating to 
patent term extension/restoration and data and market exclusivity. 
With that being said, it is questionable whether stronger protection for pharmaceuticals may be 
justified based upon the economic underpinnings for granting rights in IP.  
The basic premise behind pharmaceutical protection by way of IPRs is that innovators must be 
allowed to reap what they sow. While the creation of an idea is potentially unlimited, there will 
usually be a cost in the production or development of that idea. As a result, an innovator will 
seek to recoup their costs, ordinarily by imposing a price to access the idea or its product. If an 
innovator cannot obtain an appropriate return for the development of that idea, there will be 
little or no incentive to invest in innovation.311 This also leads to a social cost as the inability 
to recoup sunken costs by excluding access to an idea or its product deters an innovator from 
creating and developing ideas. This includes ideas which, once developed, produce social 
benefits such as the production of life-saving medicines. Thus, by establishing property rights 
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in IP an innovator has an incentive to invest in innovation, as it allows them to recoup their 
costs by excluding access to ‘free-riders’ who would otherwise copy or freely use their ideas. 
On the other hand, excluding others from accessing ideas limits the diffusion of those ideas 
and prevents people from benefitting from what would otherwise be a public good. In economic 
terms, IPRs prevent competition by providing the right holder with a monopoly over their 
idea.312 This runs against free market principles as competition ensures the efficient allocation 
of resources.313 As lack of competition imposes a social cost, IPRs may only be justified by a 
public goods approach if an appropriate balance is struck which encourages the creation and 
dissemination of ideas while offsetting societal costs resulting from restricting competition.314 
The result is known as the ‘access-versus-incentive’ trade-off: reducing access to an innovation 
(public good) in the contemporary, thereby making it artificially scarce, increases the incentive 
to innovate thus generating a future social benefit.315 
Care must, however, be had in ensuring an appropriate balance is struck between the interests 
of right holders in protecting their IP and the interests of consumers in using that IP. Excessive 
protection may lead to what economists’ call ‘rent-seeking’, defined as “a return over and 
above the cost of generating the return”.316 In other words, it is pure profit. This may lead to 
over-innovation in activities that produce larger returns and under-innovation in those that do 
not.317 This is irrespective of the social benefits arising from the latter. Furthermore, excessive 
protection does not necessarily mean that new innovations arising as a result of that protection 
will be socially beneficial.318 This is because increased creative activity does not necessarily 
lead to the use of new innovations.319 For these reasons, policy makers must ensure that the 
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level of IP protection is sufficient in order for right holders to reap no more than what they 
sow. 
From an economic perspective, the issue with imposing TRIPS-plus protections for 
pharmaceuticals is that it changes the balance struck between the interests of right holders in 
protecting their IP and the interests of consumers in using that IP. This may be appropriate in 
IP producing states, the cost of innovation has increased since the TRIPS Agreement was 
concluded, in order to ensure that pharmaceutical manufacturers do indeed reap what they sow. 
However, it may not be appropriate in IP consuming states where restricting access to 
pharmaceuticals would impose a much greater social cost. What may be economically sound 
for one state is not necessarily economically sound for another. Care must therefore be taken 
by policy makers when determining whether to implement TRIPS-plus protections in order to 
ensure an appropriate balance is maintained and is consistent with their economic position. 
(a) Patent term: extension/restoration 
The EU has submitted for discussion to New Zealand a draft IP chapter for inclusion within an 
EU-NZ FTA which includes a provision for patent term extension. The operative clause within 
that provision requires each party to provide a period of further protection for a pharmaceutical 
product which is protected by a patent for a period of time equal to that which elapses between 
the patent application date and the date of marketing authorisation.320 This is to be reduced by 
a period of […] years, while the duration of that protection may not exceed […] years.321 
Substituting […] for [five] years and [a period of two to five years] respectively, the proposed 
provision is identical to art 20.27.5 – 6 of CETA – of which there is a high degree of similarity 
to EU domestic law. Considering the interest of the EU in promoting stronger levels of IP 
protection in its FTAs and the relationship between the above proposed provision and CETA, 
it may be assumed that the EU is seeking to enforce within an EU-NZ FTA a level of protection 
similar to its domestic law, even though the proposal purposively omits any specific periods of 
time that would otherwise be referred to within that provision.  
While the determination of length of time has been left to the parties to discuss during the 
course of negotiations, any determination must be seen as arbitrary. As identified above, New 
Zealand does not permit patent term extension. Nor is it obliged to implement such a scheme 
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as the CPTPP suspended the provisions pertaining to patent term extension. The determination 
of a particular number would therefore be seen as a random choice following no obvious reason 
or system on the part of New Zealand other than in order to form a compromise. Not only is 
the determination of a specific period of time arbitrary but it may be seen from one perspective 
as irrelevant; for the effect of the provision is to oblige New Zealand to provide for a period of 
patent term extension, regardless of any reference to length of time. By requiring New Zealand 
to provide for a period of patent term extension, the EU has sought to enforce within an EU-
NZ FTA a similar level of patent protection to its domestic law that is above the level already 
provided by New Zealand. 
Consequently, the issue that New Zealand would face in relation to patent term extension is 
whether or not it should implement such a provision and, if so, to what extent. 
Any implementation of a patent term extension scheme would have the consequence of 
delaying the entry of generic pharmaceutical products onto the New Zealand market. As a high 
net user of IP, New Zealand has a strong interest in enabling rapid entry onto the market of 
generic products upon expiry of a patent in order to ensure that consumers have prompt access 
to affordable medicines. Until generic entry occurs, the patented product may often be 
unaffordable due to the monopoly enjoyed by the originator manufacturer. This is compounded 
by the purchasing approach taken by New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical Management Agency, 
where generic products are purchased over patented products in order for more products to be 
subsidised. The unavoidable consequence of implementing a patent term extension scheme is 
that a life-saving pharmaceutical product may be protected for a further period of time after 
expiry of the patent term, to the severe detriment of those who rely on that product to live.  
Issues surrounding affordability have recently been highlighted by the European Parliament, 
which in a 2016 report noted that over the past decades the price of new medicines had 
increased to the point of being unaffordable to many EU citizens, thereby threatening the 
sustainability of national health care systems.322 The report continued to deplore the increase 
in litigation cases aiming to delay generic entry, pointing out instead that biosimilar medicines 
enable competition thus improving access to medicines and stressing that their market entry 
should not be delayed.323 This would seemingly provide support for refusing to implement a 
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patent term extension scheme. A 2015 report also of the European Parliament highlighted the 
need for a “more ambitious strategy concerning the protection of intellectual property rights 
vis-à-vis its trading partners”.324 On the one hand, it may be assumed that the 2016 report 
indicates a change in political thinking by placing emphasis on consumers over right holders, 
thereby casting the net to eliminate those TRIPS-plus protections which delay generic entry 
onto the market. A more plausible inference may, however, be that the delay in generic entry 
has more to do with unfair or unreasonable litigation than the imposition of protections of a 
TRIPS-plus nature that require a stronger level of protection. 
Within that 2015 report, the European Parliament passed comment on the benefits that may 
arise from stronger protection of IPRs, by stating that it was “convinced that better protection 
of intellectual property rights and effective implementation of related rules in third countries 
would be a strong incentive for investors from the European Union and elsewhere to invest”.325 
Indeed, a cursory product search on the website of Medsafe reveals that many pharmaceutical 
products registered and sold in New Zealand under their tradenames are owned and 
manufactured by foreign pharmaceutical companies in Europe or other parts of the world. For 
example, Nurofen is manufactured by the British company Reckitt Benckiser, Keytruda by 
Merck Sharp & Dohme (a subsidiary of the United States company Merck & Co), Elevit by 
the German company Bayer and Valium by the Swiss company Roche. While the above 
pharmaceutical companies for the most part have registered subsidiaries sponsoring their 
products in New Zealand, the products themselves are manufactured elsewhere and imported 
to New Zealand. This means that investment in research and development is not occurring in 
New Zealand. 
This point is picked up on by Medicines New Zealand in its submission on the implementation 
of the IP chapter under the TPP Agreement.326 In that submission it is similarly contended that 
patent term extensions will encourage more innovative activity in New Zealand. This not only 
extends to investment in innovation but would include increased filing of patent applications 
by innovative pharmaceutical companies.327 The reasoning behind this is that, if a company 
may reclaim some time lost during the patent application and market authorisation processes, 
thereby increasing the effective patent term, there is more incentive for that company to apply 
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to patent and sell its pharmaceutical product in New Zealand. This particularly holds true if the 
patent term extension applies beyond the pharmaceutical substance to cover new uses, delivery 
mechanisms or formulations, given the increasing research into new uses for existing active 
ingredients.328 
It may be necessary to exercise a degree of caution when examining the benefits of 
implementing patent term extension within New Zealand. On the one hand, the implementation 
of patent term extension may indeed provide an incentive for innovative pharmaceutical 
companies to seek patent protection in New Zealand, thereby introducing a wider range of 
necessary medicines to the New Zealand market and benefiting society at large. On the other 
hand, those new products would nevertheless be subject to both patent protection and extended 
protection – as would every other pharmaceutical product under patent in New Zealand. The 
implication is that those products for which patent protection would have been sought in New 
Zealand, irrespective of the existence of any patent term extension, could now obtain extended 
protection, thereby extending the exclusive monopoly of the right holder for that product and 
ensuring a higher price (in comparison to the generic drug) is retained for a longer period of 
time. At a cost of $670,000 per patient per year, the pharmaceutical product marketed in New 
Zealand under its tradename Soliris and used to treat the rare blood disease Paroxysmal 
Nocturnal Hemoglobinuria is already unaffordable to those who require that product.329 
Enactment of patent term extension would only serve to keep sufferers of that disease or others 
like it from accessing life-saving medicine. There is no benefit to society in this. 
Given New Zealand’s relative population size and share of the global market, there is no 
guarantee that an innovative pharmaceutical company would perceive the patent term extension 
provisions as an incentive and therefore seek patent protection in New Zealand. New Zealand’s 
market share in pharmaceutical sales represents a tiny drop in the ocean, so it is arguably not a 
lucrative market for a pharmaceutical company who desires to recoup the costs of research and 
development.330 New Zealand’s small population size reinforces this as there may very likely 
be less people who require that specific pharmaceutical product. That said, any company who 
seeks patent protection in New Zealand is unlikely to be doing so primarily to recoup costs. 
The motivation instead could be either moral, to ensure global access to medicines, or rent-
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seeking. If this were the case, however, patent term extension would offer little incentive for 
that company to seek patent protection in New Zealand anyway. 
Whether or not New Zealand should implement patent term extension, it is clear from the above 
that the EU’s proposed provision is not mutually beneficial to both Parties, nor does it minimise 
or avoid the risk of harm to New Zealand and its society. The provision as it stands may likely 
be considered unacceptable to New Zealand. 
One option for minimising the risk is to implement a TPP-style patent term extension scheme, 
the primary aim being to compensate right holders where there are unreasonable delays in the 
patent or market authorisation processes. This may be in accordance with the interests of the 
EU, as the introduction of the SPC was in recognition of the length of time that elapses between 
the filing of a patent and the granting of marketing authorisation and the subsequent 
insufficiency of effective patent protection. This may be interpreted to include unreasonable 
delays. As emphasised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) in its National 
Interest Analysis of the TPP Agreement, it would be unlikely that the implementation of patent 
term extension under that Agreement would result in significant costs. The reason for this is 
that both IPONZ and Medsafe have efficient processing times. Consequently, very few delays 
would be expected to occur so an extension would rarely be granted. 
The fact that extensions may only be offered in the event of unreasonable delays or curtailment 
may, however, be deemed unsatisfactory to the EU. As already mentioned, the SPC takes into 
account the length of time between the filing of a patent and the granting of marketing 
authorisation. This is irrespective of whether that length of time may or may not constitute an 
unreasonable delay. Justification for this may be found in the preamble of Regulation (EC) No 
469/2009 which states that the lapse of time “makes the period of effective protection under 
the patent insufficient to cover the investment put into the research”, which “leads to a lack of 
protection which penalises pharmaceutical research”.331 It is not the delay that is the issue, but 
the overall time it takes to get a pharmaceutical product onto the market and the consequent 
loss of protection resulting from the entire process. 
The approach taken by the EU takes into account the entire length of time between patent filing 
and the grant of marketing authorisation. This is in comparison to the approach under the TPP 
Agreement which separates that time into two distinct periods. The first relates to delays in the 
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patent approval process while the second relates to delays in the market authorisation process. 
One significant implication is that the patent term adjustment scheme under the TPP Agreement 
only takes into account delays attributable to the relevant authorities in their examination of 
either patent application or application for marketing authorisation. It does not take into 
account the length of time necessary to conduct the relevant tests and trials in determining 
whether the product is viable, safe and effective before an application for marketing 
authorisation can be made. It has been suggested that, from a practical perspective, delays 
attributable to the testing phase are necessary in order to apply for marketing authorisation, so 
should be taken into account.332 A fairer method would be to take into consideration the time 
taken during the testing phase, minus any time during which the applicant failed to act with 
due diligence.333 Such an approach may result in the granting of more extensions, depending 
upon the consideration given to the time taken in the testing phase, but may go towards 
reconciling the interests of both New Zealand and the EU towards patent term extension within 
an EU-NZ FTA. 
Alternatively, the Parties may agree to the provision proposed by the EU, provided that the 
method of implementing that obligation is a matter for the Parties to determine for themselves. 
This may provide New Zealand with some flexibility in order to tailor the obligation to its 
domestic situation; however, it would require New Zealand to take into account the testing 
phase within a patent term extension scheme. In addition, it would require New Zealand to 
commit to providing a maximum period of patent term extension, which it already proposed to 
do under the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Act 2016.334 Of note is that it 
has been suggested by Medicines New Zealand that to impose a maximum duration of 
extension is both arbitrary and unnecessary, as the intention behind patent term extension is 
compensation. Moreover, a cap on the duration of extension may not fully compensate right 
holders for the loss they have actually incurred, resulting in an unfair outcome. 
Any provision relating to patent term extension will be a matter for the parties to determine, on 
the basis of whether the provision is mutually beneficial or, if not, whether the risks may be 
minimised. The above merely seeks to provide elements that the parties may consider during 
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the course of negotiations and possible outcomes, where the aim is to reconcile the differing 
interests. 
(b) Regulatory protection: data and market exclusivity 
The draft IP chapter submitted by the EU for proposed inclusion within an EU-NZ FTA also 
provides a provision for the protection of data submitted in order to obtain an authorisation to 
put a pharmaceutical product on the market. In sum, art X.45 of the draft proposal requires the 
Parties to protect commercially confidential information against disclosure to third parties and 
requires that the Parties ensure both a period of data and market exclusivity. The specific 
requirements for each period of exclusivity are consistent with EU domestic law. Under the 
draft proposal, each Party shall provide an [8]-year period of data exclusivity where the 
marketing authority may not accept a subsequent application that refers to the results of 
preclinical tests or trials submitted by the originator manufacturer.335 This period shall be 
increased in order to provide in total a [10]-year period of market exclusivity where a generic 
product subsequently authorised on the basis of the originator’s preclinical test data may not 
be placed on the market without express consent of the originator.336 An additional one-year 
period of market exclusivity shall be provided to extend the total market exclusivity period to 
[11]-years if the originator has subsequently obtained marketing authorisation for one or more 
new therapeutic indications.337 This ‘8+2+1’ structure is identical in effect to art 14.1 of 
Regulation (EC) No 726/2004. It may be concluded that, similarly to patent term extension, 
the EU is seeking to enforce within an EU-NZ FTA a level of protection similar to its domestic 
law. 
The provision pertaining to data and market exclusivity specifically inserted the length of time 
for which the EU expects those exclusivity periods to apply. This may be interpreted to mean 
that the EU has a higher expectation for the respective periods of time than what it did in 
relation to patent term extension. It could also be interpreted that it was known to the EU that 
the imposition of an obligation pertaining to data and market exclusivity would not cause as 
much contestation as would a provision on patent term extension. Therefore, a higher period 
of time was set in recognition that, while the provision may not likely be removed, the term of 
exclusivity would likely be reduced in the course of negotiations. Support for this latter 
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proposition may be found in an impact assessment conducted by the EU in 2017 with respect 
to an EU-NZ FTA, where specific issues in IPRs were identified by EU business respondents 
as including in the area of patent term extension, yet no reference was made to either data or 
market exclusivity.338 
New Zealand already applies a maximum five-year period of data exclusivity in order to protect 
preclinical test data submitted to the marketing authorities from being used in support of any 
other application for marketing authorisation. It does not, however, provide for a period of 
market exclusivity. Consequently, the issue that New Zealand would face in relation to data 
and market exclusivity is whether or not it should adopt a period of market exclusivity and/or 
whether it should increase the current period of data exclusivity.  
Any implementation of either a longer period of data exclusivity or the adoption of a period of 
market exclusivity would have the effect of endangering the swift entry of generic 
pharmaceutical products onto the New Zealand market. Due to the costs involved in conducting 
clinical trials, generic manufacturers rely upon the data submitted by the originator 
manufacturer in order to market their product, thereby keeping the cost down. A longer period 
of data protection has the effect of delaying the ability of a generic manufacturer to access and 
rely upon that data, which in turn delays the marketing of their product. In addition, a longer 
period of data protection could have the unintentional consequence of deterring a generic 
manufacturer from obtaining marketing authorisation in New Zealand. The effect would be to 
lessen competition, driving prices up. Any increase in data protection would, therefore, come 
at a significant cost to consumers as it hinders the availability of affordable medicines.  
The same may be similarly said should New Zealand adopt a period of market exclusivity. 
Ordinarily, market exclusivity applies after the expiry of the period of data exclusivity, so that 
a generic manufacturer may obtain marketing authorisation through the access to and reliance 
on the originator manufacturer’s data but may not place their product on the market until the 
period of market exclusivity expires. Consequently, the period of market exclusivity extends 
beyond the period of data exclusivity, further delaying the entry onto the market of generic 
pharmaceutical products. 
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That said, a manufacturer may not market their generic product until the expiry of the patent 
term; otherwise, they run the risk of infringement proceedings for breach of the valid patent. 
Although it is not impossible, in many cases it is unlikely that the data (or any market) 
exclusivity period will run beyond the expiry of the patent term. This is particularly so in 
relation to small molecule pharmaceutical products, given that they are relatively simple to 
develop and are cheap and easy to reproduce.339 On this basis, it may be said that an extended 
period of data or market exclusivity would have little effect as the patent would prevent the 
marketing of a generic product otherwise.  
The situation may be different in the case of biologics, which are complex and expensive to 
develop, and which take much longer to bring to market.340 As a result, patent approval may 
take an extended period of time, which pushes back the period of data exclusivity so that both 
patent and data exclusivity expire at the same or a similar time. It could be that an extension to 
data exclusivity has the consequence that the patent expires first. While a biosimilar would 
ordinarily be able to come on to the market upon patent expiry, that biosimilar may not obtain 
the data in which to acquire market authorisation for its product if data exclusivity still applies. 
The implication is that the originator product effectively receives an informal extension to its 
patent term due to the extended monopoly granted through data exclusivity.  
Given the complexity and expense required to bring a biologic to market, it would be assumed 
that an increased period of data exclusivity would be sought for biologics as opposed to small 
molecule products. On the contrary, the constraints imposed by their complexity and expense 
already provide strong barriers to market entry, including the market entry of biosimilars.341 
This is due to the expertise and financial resources required in order to develop biosimilar 
products. Even where a generic manufacturer does develop biosimilars, the composition of 
biologics is such that biosimilars would need to have their own trials conducted to a limited 
extent, even where reliance is on previously submitted data. This means that while introducing 
a generic product for a small molecule will bring about a price reduction of approximately 80–
90%, introducing a biosimilar will bring about a price reduction of approximately 10–50% 
instead.342 
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In a report on biosimilars, the US Federal Trade Commission contended that anything beyond 
five-to-seven-year periods of data protection could provide excessive monopoly protection to 
right holders and cause unnecessary delays in the access to affordable health.343 In the TPP 
Agreement, a period of five–eight years of data and market exclusivity was agreed upon as 
opposed to five years for small molecules. The imposition of a general ten-year period in 
comparison, as proposed by the EU, is beyond what may be considered reasonable. 
In any event, given New Zealand’s reliance on generic products and the significance attached 
to ensuring swift entry on to the market so as to make prices affordable, it may be said that the 
provision relating to data protection is not mutually beneficial, nor does it minimise harm to 
New Zealand.  
Any extension to data exclusivity, or the adoption of market exclusivity, does not minimise 
harm to New Zealand but rather creates it. There is no real benefit to New Zealand in 
implementing increased periods of data protection. A suitable alternative that would seek to 
minimise harm would be to lock in the existing policy by obliging New Zealand to commit to 
its present five-year period of data exclusivity. Currently, New Zealand may amend its laws as 
it sees fit in this regard. By locking in the policy New Zealand would be bound to that level, 
thereby limiting New Zealand’s future ability to modify those rules, even where the domestic 
situation requires it.344 While this constitutes a new obligation for New Zealand, it is an 
obligation that does not directly disadvantage New Zealand. At the same time, it indicates a 
commitment to the EU to ensure the current levels are maintained. 
It is important to reiterate that presently data exclusivity only applies to innovative medicines 
under s 23A of the Medicines Act, which excludes all data pertaining to second uses for a 
known substance. As innovation slows, pharmaceutical companies are turning more towards 
repurposing known products than formulating new substances. A recent study found that of 
pharmaceutical patents submitted for approval to the US authorities, 78% related to existing 
substances.345 Provided that New Zealand retains the exclusion to data protection by way of 
innovative medicines, it may be that an extension to data exclusivity will have less impact than 
initially believed. 
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Any provision relating to data and market exclusivity will be a matter for the parties to 
determine, on the basis of whether the provision is mutually beneficial or, if not, whether the 
risks may be minimised, or as a bargaining chip. The above merely seeks to provide elements 
that the parties may consider during the course of negotiations and possible outcomes, where 
the aim is to reconcile the differing interests. 
2 Protection of geographical indications 
The protection of GIs is of “core, cultural and economic importance” to the EU.346 Given the 
traditional values underpinning regional names and the extensive quality schemes that provide 
for the protection of GIs as their own separate IPR within the EU, it is no surprise that the EU 
seeks obligations for the protection of GIs within its trade agreements. The approach taken by 
the EU towards an EU-NZ FTA will undoubtedly be no exception to this. 
Consistent with the approaches taken under CETA and its own domestic law, the draft IP 
chapter submitted for discussion by the EU proposes the protection of a number of specified 
GIs annexed to that chapter.347 The level of protection sought is identical to that stipulated 
within art 13 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012: being direct or indirect commercial use of a 
registered name, any misuse, imitation or evocation, even if the true origin is indicated or the 
name is either translated or used with accompanying expressions; other false or misleading use 
as to origin, nature or qualities; and any other practice liable to mislead as to the true origin.348 
Of those GIs annexed to the proposed IP chapter, 172 names for which protection is sought are 
agricultural products and foodstuffs while the remainder are wines and spirits. 
New Zealand protects GIs through numerous legal mechanisms, including a registration 
scheme for GIs for wines and spirits. Agricultural products and foodstuffs are protected through 
trade mark laws and consumer protection law instead. The lack of specific protection for 
agricultural products and foodstuffs has been criticised by the European Commission, which 
in a recent impact assessment highlighted the perceived insufficiencies to the protection of GIs 
in New Zealand, particularly for EU dairy products.349 The Commission went on to note that 
an EU-NZ FTA is expected to provide the necessary framework to effectively address these 
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issues. During scoping discussions both parties agreed that the provision of a broader 
framework for the recognition and protection of GIs should be aimed for during the course of 
negotiations.350 However, any agreement on that framework would be subject to an overall 
satisfactory outcome for New Zealand. 
In addition to the framework, a satisfactory outcome would also include the specific names that 
the EU has proposed for protection in New Zealand. A number of those proposed names will 
be deemed ‘sensitive’ by New Zealand producers, especially those pertaining to cheeses and 
dry-cured meats. Any protection of sensitive names must take into consideration the continuous 
and common use of those names by domestic producers, adequately balancing their interests 
against those of EU GI holders. Consequently, the issues that New Zealand would face in 
relation to the protection of GIs is whether New Zealand should adopt GI protections as 
advocated for by the EU and, if so, how would New Zealand ensure an appropriate balance is 
struck between upholding protection for those GIs and permitting limited and legitimate 
exceptions to their use. 
(a) Extension of GI protection to agricultural products and foodstuffs 
It is undeniably clear that to protect specific terms in the manner proposed by the EU would 
cause significant prejudice to how those terms are currently used in New Zealand. Conferring 
protection as proposed would prevent the outright use of those terms in the marketing of a 
product that falls within the given product class. Presently there are no exceptions in the EU’s 
proposed text for continuous use or generic terms. This means that producers would need to 
rebrand or rename their products so that they may still be marketed.  
Of concern to New Zealand producers is the long-standing use of terms which have become 
familiar to New Zealanders as names for particular types of products.351 Such names include, 
but are not limited to, Feta, Cheddar, Danbo, Parmesan, Gouda, Halloumi and Prosciutto. As a 
result, producers have invested in the development and maintenance of those names,352 
consequently establishing reputation in their particular brand. More generally, it has further 
been contented that given the global incidence of immigration and the importation of traditional 
practices as a result, the link between geographical location and name has been whittled away 
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and many names have now entered the common language as a generic name.353 The name no 
longer denotes origin but rather indicates the style of product which falls within that name.354 
Opponents to GI expansion therefore emphasise both the time and expense incurred in 
rebranding products and the likelihood of consumer confusion arising from that rebranding.355 
Conferring protection to specific names would not only affect New Zealand producers who 
market their products under those names but would also affect foreign producers who sell their 
products in New Zealand under those same names. The reason being that protection would be 
afforded against the use of those names in New Zealand, rather than against the use of those 
names by New Zealand producers. Presently, cheese marketed as Feta and produced in 
Denmark and Bulgaria may be sold in New Zealand, as Feta is not protected by New Zealand 
as a GI. Were New Zealand to protect Feta as a GI, the marketing of those products would no 
longer be permitted under that name. The implication is that either producers of these products 
would similarly need to rebrand or those products would simply be pulled off the New Zealand 
market to the detriment of consumers who may enjoy those particular products. 
Conversely, the marketing of products produced in New Zealand under a protected name for 
the purpose of export would not require rebranding. In this situation, the product is not intended 
for the New Zealand market and would therefore not fall foul of any protection. With that being 
said, the rising trend of including GIs within trade agreements means that names once 
unprotected may be subsequently protected by a party in order to fulfil its trade obligations. 
Caution must therefore be exercised in ensuring that products exported under a name are in 
compliance with the importing country’s international obligations. In this respect, increased 
global protection may lead to a change in business practice as it becomes more difficult to 
export certain products that do not conform to the specifications attached to a given name. 
While the concerns raised by producers are legitimate, the detrimental effect of protecting the 
specific names proposed by the EU would in fact be limited to a handful of names. For all 
others, there should not be any such effect. This is because most names proposed by the EU 
for protection are specific to a particular place or region or consist of compound names. The 
implication is that many of those names for which protection is sought are not actually used in 
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the marketing of New Zealand products. With respect to wines, it has been acknowledged that 
GI protection may be less contentious than for other products in light of the Geographical 
Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act.356 Names which may be controversial have 
been identified as those registered under a single name, including ‘Sherry’, ‘Port’, ‘Chablis’ 
and the recognised grape varieties ‘Prosecco’ and ‘Montepulciano’.357 Each of these names are 
included within the EU’s proposed list of wine GIs; a list which comprises 31 pages and 
hundreds of wine GIs.358 
A similar situation exists for agricultural products and foodstuffs. For example, rather than seek 
protection for the name ‘Parmesan’, the EU has sought protection for ‘Grana Padano’ and 
‘Parmigiano Reggiano’ instead.359 This is despite the EU-held belief that the name Parmesan 
has not become a generic term.360 Similarly, ‘Prosciutto’ has not been proposed for protection 
but rather ‘Prosciutto di Parma’ and ‘Prosciutto di San Daniele’ for Italy and ‘Dalmatinski 
pršut’, ‘Istarski pršut’ and ‘Krčki pršut’ for Croatia.361 Names considered generic by New 
Zealand have also been proposed under their registered names, including ‘Camembert de 
Normandie’, ‘Brie de Meaux’, ‘West Country Farmhouse Cheddar cheese’ and ‘Gouda 
Holland’. Indeed, the compound name approach taken by the Netherlands in submitting for 
registration of Gouda and Edam cheeses in 2003 was welcomed as pragmatic by the Dairy 
Companies Association of New Zealand, as New Zealand Gouda may still be legitimately 
marketed in the EU as a result.362 
Further, concerns were initially raised in relation to established international standards for 
commonly known cheeses under the Codex framework363 and the possibility that some of those 
cheeses may be subsequently included for protection within an EU-NZ FTA.364 The names 
included within Codex are what may be said to be the generic names for those where protection 
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is sought by the EU under their registered name. The names Brie, Camembert, Emmental, 
Mozzarella, Provolone, Edam, Gouda and Cheddar all have established global standards for 
their production under Codex and are all included within the EU’s list of proposed foodstuffs 
under their registered names.  
On the other hand, cheese names such as Danablu, Gruyère, Munster, Feta, Asiago, Fontina 
and Gorgonzola are included in the EU’s proposed list for protection in an EU-NZ FTA and 
do not have established international standards for their production. This implies that while 
common names may not be prevented from use in the marketing of such products worldwide, 
names that are not included on Codex may not be said to be considered common and may 
therefore receive protection to prevent the genericisation of their names. Interestingly, 
Parmesan is not included on Codex and therefore its status as a generic name remains contested. 
What is noteworthy is the inclusion on Codex of Danbo and Havarti cheeses, yet both names 
were subsequently submitted for registration by Denmark on the EU Commission’s Database 
of Origin and Registration, where Danbo became registered as a PGI in 2017. 365 Neither name 
is included on the EU’s proposed list for protection. This suggests that common names may be 
reclaimed by the EU. Whether or not international protection will later be sought remains to be 
seen.  
While the protection of GIs would come at a cost to certain product names, it also presents an 
opportunity for New Zealand to promote its own unique products and seek international 
protection for associated product names. As an example, the opportunity to protect New 
Zealand wines under the Geographical Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act was 
welcomed by the wine industry which emphasised the registration system as “providing a 
secure and solid platform for New Zealand wine producers to promote our wines and regions 
in international markets”.366 For the wine industry in particular, GI protection acted as a means 
to protect and promote their products in the EU market due to the EU’s highly complex and 
prescriptive regulatory system.367 This was compounded by the fact that in order to receive 
protection for New Zealand names in the EU the product must first be formally registered in 
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its place of origin.368 For this reason, GI protection for wines was deemed necessary to 
promoting New Zealand wines on the international market. 
Since coming into force, a number of New Zealand wine associations and societies have 
registered GIs for their demarcated region, including Central Otago, Gladstone, Hawke’s Bay, 
Marlborough, Waiheke Island and Waipara Valley.369 Others are yet to register their interest 
or announce an intention to do so. For example, the Hawke’s Bay Winegrowers Association 
Gimblett Gravels has established a world-renowned reputation for their product which places 
significant emphasis on the unique qualities provided by the gravelly soils on which their 
Member’s products are grown.370 Presently it is protected in New Zealand by a collective mark 
but would qualify for GI protection should it wish to do so.371 While GI protection would 
undoubtedly confer benefits to that brand, it may be that the name is sufficiently protected on 
international markets under a pre-existing trade mark. Given EU domestic and multilateral 
rules on the rights attached to pre-existing trade marks, it may be that protection under a GI is 
considered unnecessary. 
The opportunity presented by GI protection is also applicable to agricultural products and 
foodstuffs. New Zealand has an abundance of unique and innovative food products which 
would benefit from GI protection by preventing not only their misuse or misappropriation but 
also from diminishing in economic value. Such products include Kapiti and Morrinsville 
cheeses, Bluff Oysters, Nelson Sauvin hops and Manuka honey. Of those, Kapiti, Bluff Oysters 
and Manuka honey are protected by registered trade marks.372 However, it also gives producers 
of products which may be affected by any GI protection the opportunity to rebrand and 
diversify their products. Irrespective of the cost, this would enable producers to distinguish 
their products from others and create a reputation in a new market unique to them. 
Were New Zealand agricultural products and foodstuffs to benefit from GI protection then their 
transition onto international markets would be much more streamlined and less bureaucratic. It 
would enable producers to set common standards for the production of a product and exclude 
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from the use of their GI all other products which do not conform to those set standards, 
including standards linking geographical origin to quality. This would assist in establishing a 
reputation which is built upon the quality delivered by products marketed under that GI. 
A prime example of a product which would benefit from this opportunity is Manuka honey. 
Until recently, Manuka honey was produced and sold under multiple quality standards, such as 
UMF 10+, MGO 250, MGS 16+ and OMA 16+.373 Not only were these standards confusing to 
a consumer but there was also no recognised testing regime to verify the health claims touted 
by producers of ‘active’ Manuka honey.374 Unsurprisingly, Manuka honey has been subject to 
global counterfeiting and mislabelling, in addition to international competition.375 It has 
recently been recognised that in order for New Zealand to maintain the premium position of 
Manuka honey in overseas markets, confidence in the authenticity and integrity of the  product 
is essential.376 
Protection for Manuka honey is on the rise. The Ministry for Primary Industries in December 
2017 approved a “robust and scientific definition” to determine the authenticity of Manuka 
honey which centres upon a combination of five attributes.377 This approved definition came 
on the back of a decision by the United Kingdom Trade Mark Registry to uphold the name 
“Manuka” as a Maori word that is accepted as the common word for the specific plant variety 
of Leptospermum Scoparium, grown in New Zealand, thereby accepting Manuka honey as a 
certification mark.378 Soon after a certification mark applied for by the Manuka Honey 
Appellation Society Incorporated in August 2015 was approved by IPONZ but is yet to be 
registered due to opposition by Australian competitors and indigenous stakeholders.379 
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Notwithstanding potential protection under a certification mark, Manuka honey would benefit 
from greater protection under a GI. 
While it is clear that the EU’s draft IP chapter offers an opportunity for New Zealand products 
to branch out and benefit from EU-style GI protection, it is also clear that such protection would 
be detrimental to other producers and their products. An appropriate balance to GI protection 
must therefore be struck between the economic benefits and costs of protecting GIs, to ensure 
sufficient protection against unfair competition and misappropriation without imposing undue 
restrictions which would undermine the functioning of a competitive market.380  
(b) Striking an appropriate balance 
Concerns raised by producers primarily focus on the long-standing or continuous use of terms 
which have become familiar to New Zealanders as names for particular types of products. Such 
use came about through immigration and the importation of traditional ways of life and have 
since been developed and maintained as commercial names for those products. Protection as 
advocated by the EU would have a significant detrimental impact upon industries that have 
used those names in good faith for many years. Given the economic costs in protecting specific 
GIs proposed by the EU, it is highly conceivable that a satisfactory outcome for New Zealand 
will be conditional upon the inclusion of an exception for continuous use within an EU-NZ 
FTA. 
No such exception was included in the EU’s draft IP chapter. It may be inferred that an 
exception was omitted as exceptions for continuous use are not permitted within its domestic 
law, other than where there is a pre-existing trade mark. Irrespective of this omission, 
continuous use is protected under art 24.4 of the TRIPS Agreement in relation to wines and 
spirits that have been used in a continuous manner for at least ten years preceding that 
Agreement. Unless the Parties expressly provide to the contrary, this obligation should remain 
enforceable as an international obligation irrespective of whether a provision is included that 
would protect continuous use. 
With that being said, a multi-layered exception for continuous use was incorporated within 
CETA in order to take into account the domestic situation of Canada. That exception applies 
specifically to a limited number of GIs and to varying degrees. At its broadest, art 20.21.2 
provides that those products listed in annex 20-A and identified with one asterisk may continue 
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to be used in Canada by “any persons, including their successors and assignees, who made 
commercial use of those indications with regard to products in the class of ‘cheeses’ preceding 
the date of 18 October 2013”. Those products identified with one asterisk are Feta, Munster, 
Asiago, Fontina and Gorgonzola. These GIs may be considered as contested between the 
parties, where their use under art 20.21.1 is only permitted in combination with accompanying 
expressions and the inclusion of a legible and visible indication of their true geographical 
origin. Due to their contested nature, a broader exception is maintained for continuous use. 
Further continuous use exceptions are provided for products listed in annex 20-A and identified 
with either two or three asterisks and apply where there has been continuous use for at least 
five or ten years respectively from the above-stated date.381 Where there has been commercial 
use of the specified products for less than the duration required to constitute continuous use, a 
transitional period of five years shall apply, provided the commercial use occurred prior to the 
above-stated date. In total, only eight GIs are subject to the above continuous use provisions in 
CETA.  
The inclusion of continuous use exceptions within CETA indicates that the EU could be willing 
to introduce similar provisions into an EU-NZ FTA. Given the similar historical positions of 
New Zealand and Canada with respect to immigration and the importation of traditional 
practices, it may be assumed that similar treatment could be expected. That said, the respective 
negotiating power of Canada and the market situation for products where continuous use was 
sought would be different to that of New Zealand. This could also be the case in relation to the 
specific products for which continuous use exceptions are sought. New Zealand may be able 
to use the inclusion of continuous use exceptions as a bargaining tool for protecting EU GIs. 
The extent to which those provisions may be included and what terms may fall within that 
exception would be a matter for the Parties to determine in the course of negotiations, having 
due regard to the actual position of New Zealand. 
It is important to note that a provision has been included within the draft IP chapter that would 
protect pre-existing trade marks that would otherwise fall foul of GI protection. The problem 
for New Zealand is that a search on the IPONZ trade mark register indicates that while the 
brand name of products which are marketed under names where continuous use may apply are 
registered, the names of those products themselves are not registered. So, for example, Bouton 
D’or, Kapiti and Perfect Italiano are registered but the types of cheeses that may be marketed 
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under those brands (ie Feta, Parmesan, and Gruyère) are not. On this basis it may be said that 
the inclusion of continuous use provisions is crucial for the ability of such brands to continue 
marketing those cheeses as they may not fall back on the provision regarding pre-existing trade 
marks. 
Operating in tandem with continuous use is the belief that many of those names used by 
producers over the years have fallen into the common language as generic names. Helpful 
guidance for determining what is or is not generic may be those names included on Codex as 
discussed above, given the contribution of the EU and its Member States to the development 
of the standards therein. Of those names included within the EU’s proposed list of foodstuffs 
GIs, none are included within Codex. This does not mean that all the GIs proposed by the EU 
are considered non-generic to New Zealand. In fact, a number of those terms are considered 
contentious between the EU and New Zealand.  
It has been reported that objections have been made with respect to 29 of the 59 dairy products 
that the EU has sought protection for.382 Public submissions pertaining to the EU’s proposed 
lists and calling for nominations of any New Zealand terms to be put forward for consideration 
of EU protection opened in late 2018 and closed on the 19th of March 2019. Submissions made 
during that consultation period have not yet been publicly released. It is not the place of this 
author to speculate which terms may have been opposed within those submissions. That said, 
earlier submissions made to MFAT in relation to the EU-NZ FTA make clear that the terms 
‘Feta’, ‘Parmesan’ and ‘Gruyère’ are considered common within New Zealand and may 
therefore be opposed as either generic terms or terms protected by continuous use.383  
No specific provision is included within the draft IP chapter for exceptions relating to generic 
use of a term.384 This is inconsistent with both CETA and EU domestic law, both of which 
provide limited exceptions for generic use. As discussed above, use of a generic term is either 
expressly or impliedly permitted under EU law and includes use where the generic term is part 
of a name that is protected under a GI. Similarly, art 20.21.7 of CETA protects the right to use 
either a translation of a GI or a term that is contained within a GI, where that term is customary 
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in common language as the common name for a product. In the former, use of the translated 
term ‘Parmesan’ would be considered a permissible exception as a term deemed customary in 
the common language of New Zealand, as the GI ‘Parmigiano Reggiano’ is included within 
the EU’s proposed list of foodstuffs GIs. Whereas use of the term ‘Camembert’ would be 
considered a permissible exception in the latter instance as the common name for the GI 
‘Camembert de Normandie’, which is also included within the EU’s proposed list. While 
Camembert is a name included on Codex, concerns have been expressed that the EU may be 
reclaiming generic names, given the recent registration of Danbo and the recent submission for 
registration of Havarti.385 Inclusion of a provision protecting generic use in relation to 
translations and partial use of GI would therefore allay concerns and ensure certainty for 
producers who invested in the development and maintenance of those terms. Exceptions for 
generic use may be utilised as a bargaining tool should New Zealand agree to afford protection 
to EU GIs as advocated by the EU. 
It has been contended that a balanced system should provide allowances for generic producers 
who already produce in markets where GI protection has only recently been introduced or 
where protection is not yet afforded.386 Allowances would include exceptions for both 
continuous and generic use. Another solution would be to remove the exclusion of 
accompanying terms such as ‘kind, ‘type, ‘style’, ‘imitation’ or the like, provided that the use 
of such terms does not mislead consumers as to the place of origin.387 While this approach 
would be strongly opposed by the EU, it may assist in striking the balance between combatting 
misappropriation and ensuring a competitive market. At the same time, such a compromise 
may contribute to a wider global embracement of GI protection.388  
Given the priority placed by the EU on GI protection and the entrenched protection of terms 
against use, including use with accompanying terms, it is highly unlikely that such a solution 
would be considered let alone adopted by the EU. That said, CETA permitted continued use of 
the terms ‘Feta’, ‘Munster’, ‘Asiago’, ‘Fontina’ and ‘Gorgonzola’ by Canada without 
accompanying terms where commercial use had occurred prior to 18 October 2013. It also 
permitted new use of the same terms with accompanying terms.389 This suggests that while the 
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EU would not be prepared to accept use with accompanying terms for all GIs, it may accept 
such use in limited circumstances. An appropriate balance in an EU-NZ FTA could see such 
use permitted in the event that contentious terms are not excluded by the Parties in the course 
of their negotiations.  
In addition to issues surrounding the level of protection sought for specific terms, outstanding 
issues relating to regulatory aspects remain which create further barriers to legitimate 
competition. With respect to EU classification of a product as a PGI, at least only one of the 
production steps must take place in the defined geographical area. This is opposed to a PDO 
where all the production steps must take place in the defined geographical area. It has been 
contended that GI protection should only be granted to those producers whose products are 
either grown or are manufactured in their entirety in that geographical area.390 Without a strong 
linkage between product and location, the GI would effectively operate as a disguised subsidy 
for local producers against outside competition and would be misleading as to product origin.391 
A strong linkage would serve to increase rather than stifle competition as a GI merely prevents 
competitors from using “the same nomenclature”, but does not prevent them from producing 
the same type of product and marketing it under a different name.392 Thus, GI protection could 
result in increased competition through product differentiation and innovation.393 While 
regulatory aspects such as GI classification are outside the scope of this thesis, it is worth noting 
as a consideration for New Zealand in determining the extent to which GI protection may be 
afforded or a term may be registered within New Zealand. 
Finally, if New Zealand were to afford protection to agricultural and foodstuffs GIs, it must 
ensure that the mode of protection is appropriate for New Zealand. Whether this may be via a 
registration scheme similar to that implemented for wines and spirits under the Geographical 
Indications (Wine and Spirits) Registration Act or through either a certification or collective 
mark is for New Zealand to determine, having due regard to that which will minimise the harm 
caused as a result of GI protection. While a GI registration scheme would confer the strongest 
protection to both EU and New Zealand products it would cause the most harm to New Zealand 
producers whose products are currently marketed under names where protection is sought. 
Whereas protection under either a certification or collective mark would run the risk of 
                                                 
390 Calboli and Gervais, above n 85. 
391 Calboli and Gervais, above n 85. 
392 Calboli and Gervais, above n 85. 
393 Calboli and Gervais, above n 85. 
127 
 
weakening protection, with particular regard to accompanying terms. In addition, neither mark 
requires a link between geographical origin and quality. With that said, New Zealand producers 
have not generally organised themselves under a consortium or organisation that would allow 
for protection under a collective mark. It may therefore be more practicable and least harmful 
to confer protection by way of a certification mark. At the time of writing, protection by way 
of a certification mark has been disclosed as the most likely candidate for protection were 
protection to be granted.394 Whatever the outcome, it is for the Parties to determine during the 
course of negotiations. 
C Reconciliation of Obligations under Existing Trade Agreements: Trade marks and the 
 CPTPP 
In protecting GIs as advocated by the EU, New Zealand would be committing itself to applying 
two distinct systems for the protection of distinctive signs. The first being the protection of 
signs as GIs under an EU-NZ FTA and the second being the protection of signs as trade marks 
under the CPTPP. It does not necessarily follow that this imposes conflicting obligations on 
New Zealand. The primary consideration when granting protection to either a GI or a trade 
mark relates to timing and whether a pre-existing GI or trade mark already exists. Where one 
does exist, neither agreement requires the invalidation of the other form of protection but rather 
permits their co-existence.395 In the event of a conflict between its obligations, New Zealand 
law would “favour the first-filed application for either type of right”.396  
The CPTPP, however, goes beyond that required under the EU’s draft IP chapter by imposing 
obligations on the parties to that Agreement with respect to applications or petitions for GI 
protection or recognition. These obligations apply in respect of applications made where GI 
protection is granted under national law and also where GI protection is conferred pursuant to 
an international agreement. With respect to the latter, the party must ensure that all applications 
for GI protection are published and subject to objection procedures, as well as provide for 
cancellation or refusal of GI protection.397 In addition, the party must detail online the terms 
that protection is sought for and any transliterations or components of a multi-component term, 
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and provide reasonable time for a person to oppose the protection of any term.398 The purpose 
of these objection procedures is to enable a party to the CPTPP to raise an objection against 
the protection of a term in another party where they have legitimate grounds to oppose that 
protection. Grounds for opposition and cancellation are set down in art 18.32.1 of the TPP 
Agreement, being where the GI is likely to cause confusion with a pre-existing trade mark or a 
trade mark that is held in good faith and where the GI is a customary or generic term in that 
party. 
The CPTPP requires parties to that Agreement to provide a reasonable opportunity for other 
parties to that Agreement to object to an application for GI protection pursuant to another 
international agreement. Here, the focus is on consultation with other CPTPP parties in order 
for a party to raise a legitimate objection to an application for protection of any given term. 
There is, however, no requirement for the party to refuse protection to that GI merely because 
another party has raised an objection. Rather, the objection must be supported by one of the 
three grounds for opposition in order for protection to be denied. Provided that the consultation 
obligations have been complied with prior to acceptance and registration of a GI, the party has 
acted consistent with its obligations under the CPTPP. Were that party to grant protection for 
that GI prior to consulting, however, there could be infringement as protection may have been 
conferred in contravention of a party’s legitimate objection. A prudent approach that would 
minimise the risk of infringing a trade agreement would therefore be to consult prior to any 
decision on the conferral of GI protection. This approach was taken by MFAT with respect to 
the EU-NZ FTA, by calling for public submissions on the EU’s proposed list of GIs, thereby 
providing other CPTPP parties the opportunity to raise objections. 
The grounds for opposition or cancellation firstly suggests that there is a form of pre-existing 
right to the use of that term in the territory of the party. The emphasis here is that the right is 
not pre-existing for the party putting forward the objection, but the party for where GI 
protection is sought. This would operate to void provisions permitting the co-existence of trade 
marks and GIs but would comply with the general approach which favours the first-filed 
application.  
It is not enough to show that there is a pre-existing right. It must also be shown that where that 
pre-existing right relates to a trade mark, whether registered or subejct to pre-existing good 
faith, the GI is likely to cause confusion with that trade mark. Provided that the GI makes clear 
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the true origin of the product or displays images or logos which operate to distinguish the 
products, it cannot be said that confusion is caused. The focus on elements relating to consumer 
protection assists in circumventing the grounds relating to pre-existing trade marks.  
Where the pre-existing right does not relate to a trade mark, it must be shown that the GI “is a 
term customary in the common language as the common name for the relevant good”.399 As is 
made clear in art 18.33 of the TPP Agreement, it is the party in which protection is sought that 
has the authority to “take into account how consumers understand the term in the territory of 
that Party” in determining genericity. There is no obligation on the party to base their decision 
on consumer understanding, only that consumers’ understanding of that term is to be taken into 
account. This imposes a low threshold as it requires little more than turning the mind to how a 
term is perceived by consumers. Ultimately, other factors may take precedence. That said, a 
term is said to be generic when it is understood as the common name. If consumers do not 
understand it to be the common name then the argument putting forward the term as generic is 
drastically weakened. In this respect, consumer understanding ought to be taken into account 
in any determination of genericity. On this basis,  it is arguable that this ground of opposition 
or cancellation has little significant effect, or imposes nothing additional to what would already 
be considered when making a decision regarding genericity. 
On the other hand, that ground of opposition could operate as a valuable tool to avoid protecting 
a given GI term where that term is considered generic by the party in which protection is sought. 
Provided an objection is made on this ground, a party may uphold the objection and fall back 
on their international obligations in refusing to confer protection to that contested term. In this 
respect, the provision could be just as beneficial as it is restrictive on the free will of a party. 
For example, protection for the term ‘Feta’ within an EU-NZ FTA may be opposed by a CPTPP 
party on the ground that it is a generic term within New Zealand. This would be welcomed by 
producers of Feta as, were that objection to be deemed valid, New Zealand would be bound 
under the CPTPP to refuse protection to that term. 
One final note to make is that the definition of a geographical indication within the TPP 
Agreement provides that it means “an indication that identifies a good as originating in the 
territory of a Party …”.400 It has been pointed out that as a GI is defined in terms of a ‘Party’s’ 
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territory, it excludes from the defintion GIs of a party who is not a Party to the CPTPP.401 On 
this basis it would appear that the provisions relating to the relationship between trade marks 
and GIs do not apply to non-party GIs. However this interpretation fails to consider that art 
18.36.1 of the TPP Agreement expressly applies to GIs pursuant to an international agreement 
and contemplates that such agreements will be entered into with non-CPTPP parties. It is 
therefore incorrect to assume that non-party GIs may not be subject to the provisions within 
the TPP Agreement in relation to opposition procedures.
                                                 






The purpose of this thesis was to identify those TRIPS-plus protections relating to 
pharmaceuticals and GIs that may be included within an EU-NZ FTA and the implications 
arising from any implementation of those protections in New Zealand domestic law. A 
comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections in recent FTAs identified three 
forms of protection which would pose a significant challenge to the Parties during the course 
of their negotiations. It was determined that implementation of those protections would come 
at a cost to New Zealand, however, it is possible to minimise the harm or take advantage of the 
opportunities that are simultaneously offered. It was further determined that despite conflicting 
obligations under its trade agreements, New Zealand could protect distinctive signs as GIs 
without breaching its obligations. 
B Summary of Findings 
A comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections identified a number of 
differences between the Parties in respect of protection for pharmaceuticals. Of those, 
differences relating to patent term extension and data and market exclusivity were identified as 
posing the most significant challenge or difficulties for the Parties during the course of 
negotiations.  
This thesis made it clear that the implementation of either patent term extension or extended 
data and market exclusivity provisions would be detrimental to New Zealand. To implement a 
patent term extension scheme would have the consequence of delaying the entry of generic 
pharmaceutical products onto the New Zealand market. As a high consumer of IP, New 
Zealand has a strong interest in ensuring rapid entry of generic pharmaceutical products onto 
the market so that consumers have access to affordable medicines. Implementation of a patent 
term extension scheme would have the consequence of hindering access to life-saving 
medicines. A similar consequence arises from the implementation of extended data exclusivity 
provisions as such provisions prevent generic pharmaceutical companies from relying on the 
originator’s data in obtaining marketing authorisation. To implement a period of market 
exclusivity in addition to data exclusivity would further delay entry of generics onto the market. 
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Given the high cost of originator pharmaceutical products and New Zealand’s reliance on 
generics, there is no benefit to New Zealand in implementing either forms of protection. 
That said, it is possible to minimise the risk of harm. The patent term extension scheme of the 
EU takes into account the entire period between the filing of the patent application and the 
granting of marketing authorisation; the aim being to compensate for the reduction in effective 
patent term. However, this approach takes into account all delays, including those that are not 
directly attributable to the approval or authorisation processes. Whereas in fulfilling its TPP 
obligations, New Zealand passed legislation (not in force) that would distinguish the two 
processes and remove from consideration delays not directly attributable to those processes. 
While it is arguable that due regard should be had for the clinical testing phase, as testing is 
required in order to obtain marketing authorisation, a TPP-style scheme would provide the least 
harm to consumers whilst also compensating for the loss that has actually occurred. Given the 
efficiency of those regulatory bodies responsible for the approval and authorisation processes, 
it is expected that few delays would occur.  
A fairer method that is consistent with the EU’s purpose for granting sui generis protection 
would be to take into consideration delays in the testing phase, minus any time which the 
applicant failed to act with due diligence. Such an approach may result in the granting of more 
extensions but would go towards reconciling the interests of both Parties. 
It is also possible to minimise, to an extent, the risk of harm in implementing data or market 
exclusivity provisions. Were New Zealand to implement such provisions, the outcome with the 
least impact would be to simply lock-in existing policies on data protection. This would prevent 
New Zealand from lowering the current levels of protection but would not entail the 
implementation of any additional protection. A similar approach was taken within CETA; 
however, it did require Canada to implement a period of market exclusivity which it previously 
did not provide.  
Should New Zealand be required to implement provisions additional to the present level of 
protection, New Zealand’s current laws offer a degree of protection to lessen the impact. Given 
that the minimum patent term is 20 years and efficient regulatory procedures permit the quick 
entry of products onto the market, it is very unlikely that a patent term will expire before the 
period of data exclusivity expires. A generic company may not market its product, even if it 
has obtained marketing authorisation, until the patent term expires, without running the risk of 
infringement proceedings. Even were New Zealand to implement an extended period of data 
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exclusivity or enact a period of market exclusivity, it is unlikely that there will be a significant 
effect. The situation could be different with respect to biologics, however, the complexity and 
cost involved in producing biosimilars provide strong barriers to market entry as it is. 
Furthermore, New Zealand currently prohibits from obtaining data protection any data 
submitted for second uses of a known substance. Given that most new pharmaceutical products 
are developed using known substances, many will not qualify for data protection let alone 
protection for an extended period of time. It would be in New Zealand’s interests for the current 
interpretation of ‘innovative medicine’ to be retained. 
A comparative interpretative analysis of TRIPS-plus protections also identified a number of 
differences between the Parties relating to GIs. Presenting the most significant challenge or 
difficulties for the Parties was additional protection for specified terms. New Zealand also has 
obligations arising from the CPTPP which could conflict with any protection of GIs, unless 
those conflicting obligations can be reconciled. 
This thesis made it clear that to protect GIs as advocated by the EU would come at a cost to 
agricultural producers who have invested time and money into the development and 
maintenance of terms familiar for certain types of products. That said, the potential harm is 
minimised by the fact that many of the terms where protection is sought are not used in New 
Zealand and, where they are, they are registered under compound names. Although the EU has 
not proposed any exceptions, exceptions are provided for within EU law and within CETA, 
indicating that New Zealand could negotiate the inclusion of exceptions for continuous use and 
generic terms. This would further minimise the impact of protecting GIs by limiting the extent 
to which rebranding would be necessary. 
The protection of distinctive signs by GIs was also identified as representing an opportunity 
for New Zealand producers to diversify and create a reputation in a new market unique to them. 
New Zealand has an abundance of unique and innovate food products which would benefit 
from GI protection, given its focus on preventing the dilution in economic value through misuse 
and misappropriation. Having common standards linking geographical origin to quality would 
assist in establishing a reputation which is built upon the quality delivered by products 
marketed under that GI, to the benefit of New Zealand producers. 
That said, New Zealand is bound to obligations under the CPTPP which seek to roll-back GI 
protection, limiting the global expansion of GIs. With respect to the entry into trade agreements 
with non-CPTPP Parties, New Zealand is bound to provide a reasonable opportunity for 
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interested parties to raise objections to any proposed GI protection. Provided an objection 
satisfies the grounds for objection, protection must be either refused or cancelled. However, 
the grounds for objection contain elements of consumer protection which seek to ensure 
consumers are not misled. Provided the GI is clearly distinguished from an existing trade mark 
so that confusion cannot occur, the GI may be protected. A further ground requires Parties to 
take into account consumer understanding of common terms. However, there is no obligation 
to base a decision regarding genericity on a consumers’ understanding, although in practice it 
would be difficult to say a term is or is not generic if consumers do not hold the same opinion. 
On this basis, the conflicting obligations may be reconciled.  
From another perspective, the CPTPP obligations could be utilised to avoid granting protection 
for a term, in particular where the genericity of a term is contested between New Zealand and 
the non-CPTPP party. In this respect, the obligations may in fact be beneficial to New Zealand. 
Overall, any implementation of TRIPS-plus protections relating to pharmaceuticals and GIs 
within an EU-NZ FTA would come at a cost to New Zealand. However, outcomes are possible 
that would see the risk of harm minimised or reduced, and in fact may confer opportunities that 
New Zealand could embrace with respect to domestic products. A satisfactory outcome is 
achievable provided the Parties recognise and respect that each has the right to calibrate its 
laws to fit its specific needs and that any agreement must be mutually beneficial. 
C Limitations 
This thesis has not been without its limitations. First, the scope of this thesis permitted the 
examination of only two trade agreements – one agreement concluded by each Party. This 
invokes a question regarding reliability, given that the premise of the thesis is based upon ideas 
of path dependency. For this reason, a second comparative interpretative analysis was 
conducted in order to assess the Parties’ domestic laws. This provided a baseline to assess the 
difference between a Party’s actual position and its negotiated position. 
Second, it is expected that a comparison of trade agreements ought to produce divergent results 
as those agreements are a negotiated outcome. Every party to an agreement will have different 
interests, and the agreement will be reflective of those differences. It is therefore not possible 
to definitively conclude on an outcome but be limited to inferences.  
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Third, this thesis focused on TRIPs-plus protections. However, the CPTPP did not contain 
TRIPs-plus protections with respect to GIs, therefore a comparison between those protections 
was not possible.  
Finally, this thesis focused on doctrinal legal analysis, therefore issues surrounding the 
economic and social impacts of implementing TRIPS-plus protections were not addressed in 
depth. This would have been beneficial to provide a comprehensive overview of the 
implications for New Zealand. 
D Future Research 
There is much scope for future research on the sufficiency of existing New Zealand law to 
adequately protect a GI. The scope of this thesis permitted the researcher to merely scratch the 
surface on this topic. While it is clear that the legal mechanisms addressing misuse and 
reputational damage only grant redress for one element of GI protection, there is the possibility 
that trade mark laws may provide sufficient protection. If not, then there is scope for future 
research to determine how we may amend existing laws to adequately protect GIs without 
necessitating the establishment of a GI register for agricultural products and foodstuffs. 
A further area for research would provide an in-depth analysis of New Zealand’s conflicting 
obligations under the CPTPP and any decision to confer GI protection. Such research may 
comprehensively address the grounds for opposition and the implications this has for New 
Zealand’s obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, to protect pre-existing rights. 
Two further questions arise out of interest but were outside the scope of this thesis. The first 
relates to the relationship between data exclusivity and compulsory licencing. Research in this 
area would be beneficial to understand how to reconcile conflicting obligations, to protect 
originator data whilst simultaneously authorising for market entry a product manufactured 
under a compulsory licence. The second relates to second use patents and infringement, where 
there is uncertainty surrounding the type of use that may or may not be deemed patentable. 
Given the tendency for New Zealand courts to follow international developments, research on 
developments in this area would contribute to understanding the possible direction New 
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